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Objectives and Methods 
The primary objective of this work consists in providing a typology and a critical 
examination of the key contemporary approaches to the topic of concepts and 
conceptual structure in its relation to categorisation. In the course of the text, I 
advance and defend two specific main theses. Firstly, concepts – at least for the 
purposes relevant to cognitive scientific research – are most fruitfully understood 
as ‘lexical categories’, in the sense of mental representations with lexical 
correlates. Secondly, concepts, so conceived, have internal structures, contrary to 
the influential proposal put forward by conceptual atomists. By way of 
conclusion, I suggest that quantitative categorisation models from other content 
domains (e.g. perceptual categorisation), such as exemplar models, may be the 
best suited to revealing the internal structures of concepts. 
 The other major goal, which can be considered auxiliary, consists in a 
comprehensive and epistemologically informed discussion of the cognitive 
perspective on the study of language, its utility and validity. What is worth 
stressing is the broad construal of ‘the cognitive perspective’, which embraces 
but also largely transcends cognitive linguistics. In accordance with the spirit of 
Cognitive Science, it extends to cover all research that is both founded on strong 
mentalistic and representational assumptions and relevant to understanding 
human language processing – thus being open to insights from experimental 
psycholinguistics, cognitive psychology, neurolinguistics, philosophy of 
language and mind, as well as a number of related fields.   
 The character of the present book is theoretical. In view of the breadth of 
the thematic scope of this work, I pursue the two major goals presented above 
mostly by way of surveying and synthesising contemporary research in the 
cognitivist tradition. However, contemporary and historic research from other 
traditions is presented as well, not just to seek the due theoretical distance that is 
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necessary for this type of academic work, but also in order to provide a proper 
background. Despite the theoretical character, in the course of the text I devote 
substantial effort to grounding the theorising in available empirical findings, 
whenever such results come as relevant. This work is based (largely but not 
exclusively) on a review and analysis of literature in the English language that 
dominates contemporary international research on the topic of categorisation and 
concepts. Philosophically, it builds to a substantial degree on the theoretical 
achievements of the Anglo-Saxon analytic tradition (but again, not to the 
exclusion of other relevant approaches). 
 At various points in the course of this dissertation, I stop to discuss and 
clarify matters of terminology. The definitions of several key terms assumed in 
this work, such as category, concept, and mental representation, are concisely 
stated in the glossary at the end of this text. 
 
Profile and Scope 
This thesis can be classified as having a historical-systematising profile. I put the 
views of particular influential authors, as well as larger intellectual approaches, 
into perspective and broken down into components, with the exposition of 
underlying philosophical commitments. The survey and analysis of contemporary 
research into the issue of concepts and categorisation are set in the appropriate 
historical context. This context, however, is necessarily overall rather than 
exhaustive, for reasons related to the breadth of the issue under consideration: in 
practice, most large-scale theoretical problems in the history of Western thought 
can be claimed to have relevance to the question of concepts. I have chosen to 
give priority to those thinkers whose contributions can be seen as foundational 
for occidental epistemology or inspirational for later analytic philosophy of mind 
and language, including Plato and Aristotle, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and 
Gottlob Frege. 
 As for the current intellectual background, the thesis follows closely 
Noam Avram Chomsky’s general philosophical assumptions regarding the nature 
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of language, i.e. strong mentalism, as well as the crucial methodological 
postulate of psychological reality1. Indeed, spelling out the consequences of the 
conflict between the mentalistic (internalist) and the non-mentalistic (externalist) 
perspectives becomes a central motif of this dissertation, discussed in detail in a 
separate chapter but recurring throughout the text. The views of Ray S. 
Jackendoff, a linguist with both generative and cognitivist inclinations, are also 
often referred to in a similar context. Among the key philosophical issues 
considered in this work that have been developed by contemporary analytic 
philosophy are those related to the ontological status of conceptual contents – a 
question which leads to a polemical discussion with the argumentation advanced 
by Hilary W. Putnam. Finally, the scrutiny of the current empirical research 
regarding categorisation focuses on the experimental findings from cognitive 
psychology, most prominently those by Eleanor Rosch (formerly Heider) and her 
collaborators and continuators, as well as the group of researchers associated 
with Douglas L. Medin. 
 Perhaps the most central researcher in the context of this dissertation is the 
linguist and philosopher Jerry Alan Fodor, for the past two and a half decades 
affiliated with Rutgers University. This prominence results from both the 
personal importance of Fodor as a leading cognitive scientist and philosopher of 
Cognitive Science, and from the relevance of multiple threads of his research. 
Fodor’s views are quoted and discussed regarding several main issues of this 
work, such as the internalistic perspective in the study of language, the 
methodological soundness of interdisciplinarity, the ontology of concepts, and 
the requirements on a theory of concepts. What is more, Fodor’s atomistic theory 
of conceptual content, often seen as a major contender, is reported and then 
critically addressed in a separate chapter. 
 
Structure 
                                                 
1 While remaining noncommittal on several more detailed premises, such as the autonomy of 
syntax or the existence of Universal Grammar. 
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This thesis assumes a three-part organisation, with the parts devoted, 
respectively, to the perspective of study, the object of study, and the analysis of 
the relevant theoretical approaches to the issue of conceptual structure and 
categorisation. 
 
Part I – Research Perspective 
The first part of this work aims at the presentation of the research perspective as 
well as a distanced discussion by way of contrasting it with viewpoints external 
to it. The initial chapter has a preparatory character, having as its objective an 
introduction of Cognitive Science; most importantly, in the historical aspect of its 
development over the past several decades, as well as more contemporarily, in 
the aspect of its relation to the cognitive study of language. It also sets up and 
critically examines the representational and interdisciplinary context relevant to 
the remaining part of this work. 
 I trace back the history of Cognitive Science to its birth from the research 
on Artificial Intelligence (Alan M. Turing and others) and memory (George A. 
Miller), and most importantly, the linguistic as well as philosophical 
contributions of Noam A. Chomsky. Two ways of understanding Cognitive 
Science are presented, with the first one, concentrated on the study and 
simulation of symbolic, computationally explicit processes, being now 
complemented with – and to an extent replaced by – a different approach, 
stressing the importance of a bodily and environmental context of cognition, as 
well as the role of nonsymbolic representational format. There follows a 
diagnosis of the present status of Cognitive Science, and in particular of the 
question of its interdisciplinarity, leading to a suggestion that the canonical 
descriptions of Cognitive Science in terms of its member disciplines fail to do 
justice to its present nature. 
 The issue of interdisciplinarity is explored in more detail, with focus 
placed on the methodological reservations often raised against it. After 
acknowledging some of the risks associated with it, I defend the idea of 
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interdisciplinary cooperation, both in general and specifically in the context of 
the study of the mind. Crucially, I intend the section on the strengths of 
interdisciplinarity to highlight the mutual relevance of cognitive linguistics 
(narrowly construed) and Cognitive Science: especially, how data from widely 
different disciplines of Cognitive Science can enrich, complement and validate 
purely linguistic data. An important role in this context is played by the examples 
of actual research; in particular, the examples inspired by George P. Lakoff’s 
study of conceptual metaphor are backed up by several layers of converging 
empirical nonlinguistic evidence from a range of disciplines. 
 Chapter Two of the present dissertation seeks to substantiate, on 
independent grounds, a crucial research decision, that is the assumption of the 
intrasystemic understanding of concepts and categories. The intrasystemic 
perspective is evaluated as an alternative to the more routinely taken externalistic 
perspective. The guiding motivation behind this thread is the avoidance of the 
petitio principii fallacy, i.e. the validation of the intrasystemic standpoint merely 
on the basis of its being a necessary consequence of the presupposed cognitivist 
commitments. 
 I formulate this theoretical problem referring mainly to the framework set 
up by Noam Chomsky. The rivalling, externalistic perspective is then introduced, 
leading to the discussion of the reasons for the understanding of concepts as 
nonmental, abstract beings existing independently of individual minds. Gottlob 
Frege’s influential account is presented in order. I explain the motivations behind 
his antipsychologism but resist the construal, common in the literature on 
concepts, of concepts as entities ontologically corresponding to Fregean senses.  
 The next step in the discussion of the perspective of study consists in the 
exposition of the overarching debate between externalism and internalism of 
conceptual content. Particular attention is devoted to a meticulous treatment of 
terminological distinctions, with a view to avoiding frequent misunderstandings 
resulting from the terminological intricacies in this area. The presentation of the 
content of the externalistic doctrine is based on the central example of Hilary 
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Putnam’s “Twin Earth” thought-experiment. The rest of the chapter serves to 
spell out the consequences of such a position: extant and novel arguments against 
it are combined, ultimately leading to the rejection of this view, and thus 
reinforcing the internalistic position. 
 
Part II – Object of Study 
The second part of the thesis is concerned with the object of study, that is the 
topic of concepts and categorisation. These are introduced and depicted in a 
possibly general and theory-neutral way before being approached specifically 
from the cognitivist and mentalistic point of view adopted in this work. 
Terminology, again, plays a central role, and terminological decisions are 
carefully justified. 
 Chapter Three deals with the key notions of the thesis: concept, 
categorisation, mental representation. A maximally broad construal of the notion 
of concept is offered as a starting point, with an extensive list of conditions of 
‘concepthood’ imposed by different theoretical outlooks; it serves as a broad 
background for the subsequent delimitation of the scope of study in Chapter 
Four. An important interim conclusion of this part of the work is that at least 
some of the criteria of concepthood might be impossible to reconcile within a 
single research perspective. 
 The notion of categorisation is treated in a more historical way, but in this 
case, too, a broad and inclusive construal is established. The fundamental role of 
(so broadly understood) categorisation for all kinds of cognitive activity is 
highlighted. Important in this context is the acknowledgement of the continuity 
between higher-level, linguistics categorisation and low-level, perceptual 
categorisation. With respect to the notion of mental representation, the most 
significant task to be achieved is the juxtaposition of the traditional philosophical 
understanding of this term with a modified and more contemporary cognitivist 
one, proving more functional in the area of today’s Cognitive Science. 
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 Chapter Four is pivotal to the construction of the entire thesis. In this 
chapter, I make and substantiate in detail several decisions related to 
terminology. Furthermore, I delimit the exact scope of this work to concepts as 
understood by Cognitive Science, that is considered from the mentalistic 
perspective. Most importantly, I advance the central argument regarding the 
nature of the relation between concepts and word meanings. 
 The proper scope of this work is restricted to categorematic concepts, in 
particular such lexical concepts that are expressed by nominal lexemes 
containing a single lexical morpheme. The special status of categorematic 
concepts – their psychological reality as a separate category – is documented 
based on empirical data from psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic research. 
Subsequently, the central ontological assumption derived from the cognitivist 
perspective is formulated: concepts and categories are understood here in an 
internalistic and individualistic way, as mental entities having the nature of 
representations. After reviewing a set of possibilities present in the literature on 
this subject, the definitional relation between concepts and categories is 
established in the following way: concepts are those categories that possess a 
lexical correlate (which can be understood as an entry in the mental lexicon). 
 The numerous theoretical problems resulting from the decisions described 
above are addressed in order; among them the controversial consequence that the 
cognitive systems of nonlinguistic organisms are denied concept possession. The 
wealth of mental representations unequivocally ascribed to such cognitive agents 
can be reinterpreted in terms of nonconceptual content, so that these systems can 
be said to have mental representations, but not fully fledged concepts. I adduce a 
broad range of evidence from linguistics (analyses by Ray Jackendoff, Steven A. 
Pinker, and others), psycholinguistics (Elisabeth S. Spelke and collaborators, 
Susan Carey), and general Cognitive Science (Andy Clark) that is intended to 
support this distinction as a factual rather than purely nominal one – a distinction 
that reflects the actual ontogenetic influence of language acquisition on the 
development of the conceptual system. Another section is devoted to showing 
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that the proposed direct linking of the conceptual repertoire to the lexicon need 
not produce strongly Whorfian consequences. This linking, however, makes it 
possible to deal with one of the most refractory problems faced by mentalistic 
theories of concepts, namely that of the shareability of concepts.  
 Tying together concepts and lexical items in such a straightforward, but 
principled way is a novel proposal that shows promise for a more rigorous use of 
‘concept’ as a theoretical term with a unified meaning across the Cognitive 
Sciences. 
 
Part III – Analysis of Theoretical Approaches 
The third part of the present dissertation considers the particular approaches to of 
conceptual content in the aspect of categorisation. Accordingly, it constitutes the 
bulk of this dissertation. Chapter Five comprises a review of the classical theory 
of categorisation. This review is accomplished mostly from a historical position; 
however, it leads to conclusions regarding the present utility – or, more precisely, 
the severe limitations – of this approach. The discussion of the relevant views of 
the major figures in the history of philosophy – from Plato and Aristotle to the 
British empiricists to the logical positivists – is aimed at illustrating the 
unrivalled historical dominance of the generalised ‘classical approach’ to 
concepts and categorisation; it is then complemented by summing up the major 
modern directions of criticism of this stance (notably, by the philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and the linguist William Labov). This necessary review of well-
known historical positions is followed up by an extended critical commentary 
and re-evaluation of the classical view. In those sections, I reveal its certain 
hidden ontological assumptions (being a possible reason for its incompatibility 
with the cognitivist perspective), and secondly, argue against the attempts to 
restore its utility for the cognitivist conceptions – the issue of psychological 
essentialism being perhaps the only viable area for its revival. I also underscore 
one specific theoretical problem – the problem of the format of features into 
which a concept is decomposed, as opposed to the way of (de)composition. 
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 Chapter Six brings the analysis – and later, a refutation – of the influential 
position of conceptual atomism, championed most prominently by Jerry Fodor. 
Both the discussion and the rebuttal of this particular standpoint are important 
because it constitutes a major contender theory with respect to conceptual content 
– one that remains incompatible with mainstream Cognitive Science. Concepts, it 
is argued in Chapter Six, are most fruitfully construed as entities possessing 
complex internal structures, contrary to the atomistic position. 
  The substance of the first part of this chapter is comprised of the 
presentation of Fodor’s rich and interconnected doctrine regarding the nature of 
mind and concepts. Among the main topics reviewed are those of folk 
psychology, broad and narrow mental content, modularity of mind, nativism, and 
language of thought (mentalese). The establishing of such a context allows the 
atomistic view to be seen, not as an isolated theoretical position, but rather as a 
direct consequence following naturally from the above doctrine. In the polemical 
treatment of conceptual atomism, simplistic arguments sometimes levied against 
Fodor’s view are discarded. The criticism is focussed on the relative fruitlessness 
of this theoretical outlook, rather than its falsehood in any more absolute sense. 
 Chapter Seven concludes the dissertation. The theoretical assumptions as 
well as advantages of the so-called similarity-based approaches to 
concepts/categorisation are discussed. The exemplar view is suggested as an 
underestimated approach that maximises the potential advantages of the 
similarity-based approaches. The other general similarity-based view, the 
prototype approach, is not considered in detail. Rather, the discussion is focussed 
on shedding light on the underlying tenets of this broad group of views, in 
particular, on elucidating the role of the notion of similarity. Secondly, the 
differences between the very popular prototype view and the relatively 
undervalued exemplar view are spelled out. Thirdly, the prospects of applying 
exemplar-based models specifically to the tasks of modelling lexical 
categorisation are considered in the convention of research postulates. 
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In the first part of this work, I consider questions related to the perspective of 
study. Chapter 1 is devoted in full to the presentation of Cognitive Science – 
including but substantially exceeding cognitive linguistics as its specific subfield 
– and to discussing the vantage point that it provides for the study of language. In 
my exposition of Cognitive Science, I begin with identifying its guiding 
theoretical assumptions and tracking down its historical roots, before sketching 
out its contemporary picture. In order to supply an externalised theoretical 
perspective, I examine several lines of criticism against Cognitive Science; in 
particular, I discuss the hazards of interdisciplinarity, and the reasons for which 
they are outweighed by its benefits. 
 The function of the second chapter is to demonstrate the validity and 
robustness of the mentalistic/internalistic perspective that lies at the heart of 
Cognitive Science. The character of this part of my thesis is primarily 
philosophical, bringing into focus metatheoretical issues indigenous to the fields 
of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. I diagnose the reasons for the 
historically dominant character of the alternative view on the ontological status 
of language and the methods of its study, while not failing to notice the 
complementary rather than rivalling character of those two approaches. Finally, I 
critically address the position known as externalism regarding conceptual 
content. The specific sub-goal of this part of my work is a rebuttal of Hilary 
Putnam’s thought experiment, which provides the chief motivation for the anti-
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1. History and profile of Cognitive Science 
 
1.1. Introduction 
All academic effort derives its meaning and significance from being related in 
systematic ways to a larger body of research. Thus, it is incumbent on the author 
to define their undertaking against the background of a larger-scale tradition. 
Consciously locating one’s inquiry in a broader scientific landscape gives the 
project its identity, necessary for a number of reasons. The researcher inherits a 
‘frame of mind’: an intellectual legacy that, although partly implicit, always 
forms scaffolding for the progress of further research, and provides one with an 
indispensable toolkit of methods by which to arrive at the solution of outstanding 
problems. Another important factor is the awareness of long-term research goals. 
The presence of such a long-term objective, even one that may seem distant and 
illusionary, ensures that one’s work does not become what is known as ‘mere 
Baconian fact-gathering’ or ‘porcupine research’2, but – if indirectly – helps 
achieve some eventual utility. 
 The framework of the present modest work can best be described in most 
general terms as contemporary Cognitive Science. The rationale for the choice of 
such a broad paradigm as the background has to do with the very nature of 
Cognitive Science as a superdiscipline, a theme that will be dealt with more 
extensively in the following sections. 
                                                 
2 Sir Francis Bacon (1561–1626), English philosopher and politician, is commonly considered 
as an early precursor of the approach to science that heavily emphasised bottom-up, inductive 
way of gathering information, at the expense of neglecting the overall guiding theoretical 
perspective. 
The term ‘porcupine research’ is an informal derogatory expression for a type of study 
consisting in repeated replication of a research procedure with only slightly changed 
experimental conditions, thus generating very little new insight. 
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 The general discussion provided in this chapter is necessary for several 
reasons. Firstly, the cognitivist perspective on language is sometimes taken to be 
coextensive with cognitive linguistics. As is explained in the sections to follow, 
broadly construed cognitive linguistics – despite having played a pioneering role 
in laying the foundations for the development of Cognitive Science at large – 
constitutes only one of its several major components. Secondly, over the five 
decades of its development Cognitive Science has undergone a slow but 
systematic transformation, having evolved into a field of study quite different 
from the original Cognitive Science from which it should be distinguished. 
Thirdly, the foundational principle of interdisciplinary collaboration, although 
very firmly established in Cognitive Science, continues to be seen by some as 
methodologically suspect – a criticism that is raised particularly frequently 
during conference panel discussions. 
 Consequently, in this chapter I undertake to address the questions of:  
 
- what contemporary CS is, 
- where it comes from (both directly and in terms of general intellectual 
legacy), 
- how it locates itself on the landscape of views regarding human cognition 
- what goals it strives to achieve,  
- how it is related to the study of concepts, 
- why it remains a methodologically sound enterprise 
 
1.2. Cognitive Science: definitions and basic assumptions 
 Cognitive Science (sometimes: the Cognitive Sciences; commonly 
abbreviated in literature to CS or CogSci) is notoriously resistant to definition 
except on a very high level of generality. Reasons for such elusiveness might 
include the high dynamics of its development over the past several decades and 
at present, and its cutting across the traditional boundaries of academic 
disciplines. It appears that Cognitive Science is in fact better explained through 
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description and instantiation, and not through stipulation. Symptomatically, the 
single most authoritative reference work in the field, The MIT Encyclopedia of 
the Cognitive Sciences (edited by Wilson and Keil, 1999), avoids formulating a 
definition, and the editors “prefer to let the volume speak largely for itself” (p. 
xiii). One may also remember that if, so to say, definitions dislike Cognitive 
Science, the relation is reciprocal: it is a tradition closely associated with 
Cognitive Science that has brought about the rejection of definitions as the 
exclusively adequate modus operandi for characterising the meaning and use of 
natural language concepts (a point developed in detail in Chapter 5). Thus, this 
field might be more accurately conceived of in terms of ‘family resemblance’, 
with its many constituent disciplines, methodologies and goals brought together 
through a network of relations, without a precise set of universal features shared 
by all ‘members’. By no means does this make the notion vacuous; 
(contemporary) Cognitive Science retains the necessary level of integrity for this 
name to be meaningful, functional, and intuitively clear. 
 The adjective ‘contemporary’, meant in the sense of Lakoff and Johnson 
(1999), is important. As indicated before, a problem working to the same effect 
of making precise definitions unwieldy is the fact that Cognitive Science is a 
living organism in the process of development. During the half of century of its 
history, Cognitive Science has undergone certain changes – although without 
being transformed into something radically different – and some narrower uses of 
this name, making reference to a more specific tradition, might differ from its 
present, broader understanding. This point will receive a more adequate 
treatment in 1.4.5. Here, I will depict and, later, relate my research to Cognitive 
Science in its present shape. 
 The initial sentence of the entry ‘Cognitive Science’ in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (the largest and most up-to-date specialised 
reference work in philosophy) captures most succinctly the overall nature of the 
article’s subject (Thagard 2006): 
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Cognitive Science is the interdisciplinary study of mind and intelligence, 
embracing philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, 
linguistics, and anthropology. 
 
A Companion to Cognitive Science, although offering an introductory 
formulation (Bechtel et al. 1998: 3): 
 
Cognitive Science is the multidisciplinary scientific study of cognition and its 
role in intelligent agency. It examines what cognition is, what it does, and how 
it works[,]  
 
immediately qualifies it as ‘premature’, and complements it with a longer list of 
provisos. In The Blackwell Dictionary of Cognitive Psychology Cognitive 
Science is described in a somewhat less concise, though by no means 
comprehensive, manner (Eysenck 1990):  
 
Cognitive Science refers to the interdisciplinary study of the acquisition and 
use of knowledge… [it] was a synthesis [of computer science, information 
processing psychology, and generative linguistics] concerned with the kinds of 
knowledge that underlie human cognition, the details of human cognitive 
processing, and the computational modeling of those processes. There are five 
major topic areas in Cognitive Science: knowledge representation, language, 
learning, thinking, and perception.   
 
All the above (and many other) examples converge, at the most schematic level, 
on a common superdefinition of Cognitive Science as the interdisciplinary study 
of mind. Thus, two terms emerge as fundamental: 
  
 (1) mind as the object of scientific study, and  
 (2) interdisciplinary cooperation as a critical methodological postulate.  
 
This is a submitted manuscript version. The publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint the 
material in any form. Final published version, copyright Peter Lang: https://doi.org/10.3726/978-3-653-05287-9 
 22 
The immediate elaborations on, and instantiations of, the two notions include, for 
(1), intelligence, thought, knowledge, mental processes, information processing, 
perception, conception and memory, the acquisition, storage, and use of mental 
representation, etc.; and for (2), the list of subdisciplines with linguistics, 
psychology, philosophy, neurology, and artificial intelligence (conflated with 
computer science for terminological convenience) recurring as the core scientific 
branches.  
  
1.3. Basic tenets of Cognitive Science 
Extending on the above minimal definition, it appears to be possible to list a 
number of traits that jointly provide a framework of CS’s fundamental tenets. 
Basing on the literature reviewed in the sections to follow, I suggest several 
assumptions whose status appears to be central. Cognitive Science: 
 
a) deals with the subject matter of cognition, or the mind of an individual, 
b) broadly defines the mind as a representational system that processes 
information, 
c) is profoundly naturalistic in its approach to the mind, 
d) claims that the mind, although necessarily physically implemented,  
e) can be described on several levels, 
f) in the relation between the cognitive agent and its environment it focuses 
on the internal processes of the former, 
g) is founded on the idea of interdisciplinary collaboration 
 
Those views, although themselves capacious and potentially heterogeneous, are 
not universally agreed upon, and sometimes even contested within the field; 
nevertheless, they can be given as the guiding mainstream beliefs upon which 
Cognitive Science rests. In the next sections, I add more substance to the above 
skeletal description by singling out and the scrutinising CS’s basic assumptions. 
The discussion to follow is intended as a contrastive, picturing Cognitive Science 
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in its relation to the alternatives offered by other outlooks. A larger section is 
devoted to the historical development of Cognitive Science and the transition 
from earlier to more contemporary trends. The discussion of interdisciplinarity is 
postponed until the end of this chapter so that it follows naturally from the 
historical considerations, with which it is closely connected. 
 
1.3.1. Cognition 
Cognition is, again, a rather broad term with rich and varied connotations in 
different intellectual approaches. Most generally, cognition (from Latin 
cognoscere, to learn, to know, or to recognise) refers to the process of acquisition 
or transformation of knowledge by an intelligent subject, or to the results of this 
process. Antoni Podsiad (2000: 652–654) distinguishes cognition (Polish: 
poznanie) as a process (cognising) and cognition as a product (the contents of 
mind). Cognition as a process is further divided by Podsiad into direct and 
indirect, and into theoretical, ethical, and creative; prototypically, cognition is 
direct and theoretical. According to this author, human cognition is characterised 
by being conscious (and sometimes reflexive), assimilative, intentional, and 
aspective. 
 As obiectum reale, cognition appears to be extremely elusive. Historically, 
the study of cognition may be considered as largely identical to the study of 
knowledge or ‘the processes of the mind’. In the occidental tradition, cognition 
has generally been construed as individualistic, representational and linguaform. 
For example, Descartes’3 “cogito ergo sum” expresses a solipsistic intuition that 
the only thing know to the subject are their own (internal, individual) thought 
processes; what is more, although cogito is supposed to capture a primitive, 
prelinguistic intuition, it can be expressed only in language. To John Locke4, 
knowledge “is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas. 
Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion 
                                                 
3 René Descartes (1596–1650), Renatus Cartesius, French philosopher and mathematician. 
4 John Locke (1632–1704), an English philosopher and anatomist. 
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of and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In this 
alone it consists”5 (1999 [1960]: 515). This underscores the representational 
character of cognition, which always has to be mediated by ‘ideas’. The great 
conceptual contribution from Immanuel Kant6 was the appreciation of the active, 
constructive role of the subject in the process of cognition. 
 More controversial than the ‘shape’ of cognition has been the source of 
cognition. For instance, in Plato’s nativistic doctrine, ‘true’ cognition, that is the 
kind of cognition leading to properly understood knowledge, was essentially re-
cognition, or anamnesis, that is the rediscovery of the knowledge already 
(latently) present in one’s memory7. In contrast, the empiricist position is 
summed up in a widely cited passage from Locke (1999: 87): “All ideas come 
from sensation or reflection. Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white 
paper, void of all characters, without any ideas:—How comes it to be 
furnished?... To this I answer, in one word, from experience”. The debate 
between the nativistic and empiricist factions still continues in today’s Cognitive 
Science.  
 Cognition was traditionally thought of as rational rather than driven by 
emotion, passive rather than creative, and constrained to ‘higher’ mental 
processes such as reasoning or planning, as opposed to ‘low-level’ mental 
processes such as perception, or bodily processes such as sensation or motor 
control8. As a result, it was also considered as a human rather than animal trait. 
                                                 
5 Discussed in Dębowski (2000: 35). 
6 Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), a German philosopher. 
7 Plato (427–347 BC), a Classical Greek thinker, one of the classics of the Western intellectual 
tradition. Author of the theory of anamnesis. See Tatarkiewicz (2003: Vol. 1. 59–74). 
8 Cf. the entry “cognition” in Oxford Companion to Philosophy (ed. Ted Honderich): 
“…[t]raditionally this has been regarded as the domain of thought and inference, marking the 
contrast with perceptual experiences and other mental phenomena such as pains and itches. 
Sensations, perceptions, and feelings are all distinguished from episodes of cognition since they 
provide input to the domain of thinking and reasoning but are not thoughts themselves. More 
recently, cognition has been conceived as the domain of representational states and processes 
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More currently, all of the above distinctions are beginning to be seen as arbitrary, 
and the study of emotion, of constructive character of mental processes, ‘animal 
cognition’ and ‘motor cognition’ form important subfields of contemporary 
Cognitive Science9.  
 On the present analysis, contemporary CS assumes cognition to consist in 
information processing (as such being amenable to a quantitative approach and 
formal analysis), to be representational, to be a natural rather than supernatural 
phenomenon and an individual rather than collective phenomenon. These 
assumptions are critically examined below. 
  
1.3.2. Representationism and presentationism  
An absolutely central assumption of Cognitive Science is that cognition is 
representational in nature, with mainstream CS being organised around a more 
specific, symbolic representation format (see e.g. Steven Pinker 1995 [1994]: 55–
82). Representationism, however, is only one view on the character of cognition, 
its most prominent alternatives being: 
 
- behaviourism 
- the cybernetic perspective 
- presentationism 
 
                                                                                                                                               
studied in cognitive psychology and *Cognitive Science. These are phenomena involved in 
thinking about the world, using a language, guiding and controlling behaviour. The new 
definition embraces some aspects of sensory perception where this involves representations of a 
spatial world and the intelligent processing of sensory input.” (1995: 138) 
This is also testified to by the apparent transition from contrastive to inclusive use of ‘cognition’ 
and ‘perception’ in cognitive-scientific literature. 
9 See, e.g. the relevant entries in The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences (1999, ed. 
Wilson and Keil). 
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Behaviourism10 is a doctrine that used to be popular in the first half of the 
twentieth century (more in the US than in continental Europe), according to 
which entities that by their nature are not objectively observable by the 
researcher are not a legitimate object of scientific study. George Botterill and 
Peter Carruthers (1999: 4–20) remark that it is necessary to distinguish between 
logical behaviourism that denied the existence of mental states11, and 
methodological behaviourism that merely denied the possibility of scientific 
study thereof. Both versions of behaviourism can be thought of as strongly 
antirepresentational. 
 A different approach comes from cybernetics. For example, Aaron Sloman 
(1993: 70) proposes that the mind be regarded as a control system, “involving 
many interacting control loops of various kinds, most of them implemented in 
high level virtual machines, and many of them hierarchically organised”. Such a 
rendering captures the crucial intuition that a mind is a mind only in so far as it 
belongs to some concrete cognitive agent, whose meaningful, goal-oriented 
behaviour it controls (see section 1.4.5.4.). Still, this perspective is not broadly 
popular in contemporary literature. 
 Józef Dębowski (2000) scrutinises a general perspective that most directly 
opposes representationism, that is presentationism. Presentationism opposes the 
mainstream view of modern philosophy that cognition is mediated by ‘ideas’ that 
stand for the object of cognition in the external world. Paradoxically, one strand 
of presentationism is extreme idealism: scepticism about the existence of external 
reality and considering ideas themselves as the only (both direct and ultimate) 
possible object of cognition (Dębowski 2000: 47). But a more standard version of 
                                                 
10 The term ‘behaviourism’ was proposed in 1913 by the American behaviourist psychologist 
John B. Watson (1878–1958), who based on earlier insights from the Russian physiologist Ivan 
Pavlov (1849–1936) and American zoologist Herbert Spencer Jennings (1868–1947). 
11 Particularly important in this context was Gilbert Ryle’s (1951 [1949]) The Concept of Mind, 
where he aimed at showing that predicating existence of mental states was committing a 
category-mistake (see section 3.2.2.). 
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presentationism relies on the elimination of the notion of idea as an intermediary, 
with cognition construed as direct and/or intuitive. 
 Thomas Reid12 is considered to be the leading proponent of 
presentationism in modern philosophy. However, it is important to distinguish 
between the representational theory of knowledge and the related but distinct 
representational theory of perception. The representational theory of perception 
is a doctrine maintaining that our perception of objects, rather than being direct, 
is mediated by some third-party beings external to both the subject and the actual 
objects. Those intermediaries in the process of perception were assumed to 
represent the objects (hence the name), and were variously construed, e.g. as 
simulacra by Lucretius13 (see also Dębowski 2000: 27–29) or sense-data by G. 
E. Moore14. 
 
 Finally, one should add that the very notion of representation (hence, 
mental representation) itself turns out to be quite problematic. Traditionally, 
representation is a kind of sign that stands for (‘represents’) some element of the 
external world. The ‘external world’, however, is a dubious entity both in terms 
of its aprioristic partitioning into ‘elements’, and reliable cognitive access to it; 
this provokes reservations against mental representation so conceived, especially 
from cognitive linguists (see 3.3., 4.2.3.). Also, this notion is much too narrow 
for Cognitive Science. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy agrees that a broader 
construal is necessary, embracing “…thoughts, concepts, percepts, ideas, 
impressions, notions, rules, schemas, images, phantasms, etc. — as well as the 
various sorts of <subpersonal> representations postulated by Cognitive Science.” 
(Pitt 2006) I would argue that the only truly important criterion is in fact 
stability: for example, Edward Nęcka et al. (2006: 26–27) conclude that any 
                                                 
12 Thomas Reid (1710–1796), a Scottish philosopher, proponent of “common sense” 
philosophy. 
13 Titus Lucretius Carus (99–55 BC), a Roman poet and materialistic philosopher. 
14 George Edward Moore’s (1873–1958), a British philosopher. 
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cognitive structure whose identity through time remains stable enough for it to be 
consistently deployed and redeployed counts as a mental representation, and 
mental processes are defined in terms of operations on those structures.  
 Thus, somewhat confusingly, (broadly defined) mental representations 
need not actually represent any entities from the extrasystemic reality. What a 
mental representation is, essentially, is any temporally stable entity  or postulated 
entity, individuated on the representational level of description (see below) of the 
cognitive system. Section 3.3. provides a more detailed description of mental 
representation as understood specifically in the context of this book. 
  
1.3.3. Naturalism and physical character of mind 
Cognitive Science’s approach to mind is strictly naturalistic, and it fully 
subscribes to the naturalistic consensus in the philosophy of mind. At a 
minimum, this equals a belief that the mind is a purely natural phenomenon that 
can be exhaustively studied with the methods of natural sciences, and its full 
explanation is possible, at least in principle, without any resort to non-natural 
explanatory categories. A very important immediate consequence is the 
straightforward rejection of ontological mind-body dualism (i.e. of Cartesian 
dualism). Even though functionalism – historically and even currently the most 
influential approach within Cognitive Science – abstracts away from the details 
of the physical implementation of the mind, it is still a rather obvious axiom that 
the mental must be strictly dependent on the underlying physical substrate (the 
Mind-Body problem15). 
 In the philosophy of mind, the precise nature of this dependence is debated 
(see Żegleń 2003 for an exhaustive discussion, or Jackendoff 1992 [1987] – 
Chapter 1, for a shorter review of particular positions). Still, it is commonly 
                                                 
15 Some, e.g. Chomsky (2000: 109–110), point out that the Mind-Body problem is misguided: 
for this question to be intelligible there would have to exist a satisfying theory of the ‘Body’ 
(the physical substrate), which we do not yet have. This, however, remains a minority opinion. 
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assumed that, at a minimum, it must amount to some form of supervenience16. 
The specific technical statement of supervenience can itself take several forms, 
but a common core idea it expresses is that no difference on the mental level – 
e.g. between two hypothetical minds – is possible without a difference on the 
level of the physical substrate; identity of the physical ensures the identity of the 
mental. Contemporary Cognitive Science, however, manifests a growing bias 
towards more straightforwardly reductionist or eliminative accounts, more in 
tune with (and very clearly influenced by) today’s neuroscience.  
 Similarly, Cognitive Science shows considerably less interest in the 
refractory ‘philosophical’ questions that by their nature hold little promise of 
being successfully approached with scientific methods. For example, the problem 
of qualia (the ineffable, intrinsic, subjective, first person, ‘what’s-it-like’ quality 
of individual conscious experience – e.g. the special qualitative ‘feel’ of the 
redness of a perceived red apple), while recognised as a fully legitimate problem 
within the philosophy of mind, is excluded from, or at best peripheral to, 
mainstream Cognitive Science17. 
 
1.3.4. Levels of description 
Already implicit in the above passage is the claim that cognitive systems can be 
analysed on several levels, a claim that most authors (e.g. Stillings et al. 1995: 7–
8) consider as central to Cognitive Science. The mind, understood in 
representational terms in concord with 1.3.2., is one of them (the intermediate), 
                                                 
16 The term “supervenience”, though dating back to Aristotle, was reintroduced into the modern 
academic context by the American analytic philosopher Donald Davidson (1917–2003). For 
details see Żegleń (2003: 75). 
17 The topic of qualia is a major issue in the philosophy of mind, whose best known and most 
accessible illustration is Frank Jackson’s (1982) example of “Mary The Color Scientist”. 
However, I will not develop it further because of its marginal importance for Cognitive Science 
at large.  
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the physical implementation discussed above is another, the third level being the 
system’s behaviour.  
 Cognitive Science commonly utilises the schema of three levels of 
description that are arranged in a hierarchy and are at least in principle 
translatable into one another – despite the present explanatory gaps. With regard 
to humans, the behavioural level is implemented at the mental one, and this in 
turn, at the physical, that is in the biology of the brain (cf. e.g. Green et al. 2000 
[1996]: 5–7). Thus, the brain ‘realises’ and causes the mind, and the mind causes 
behaviour. This mirrors a more general, well-known distinction, motivated by the 
computer metaphor and devised by David Marr: into computation, algorithm and 
physical rendering (discussed in Galton 1993: 122). What individuates and 
separates the levels is – rather than the differences in their ontologies – the 
presence of explanatory gaps between them, leading to the application of its own 
generalisations and methods of investigation for each of the three levels. The 
striking consequence of a partial autonomy of each of the levels is a theoretical 
possibility of abstracting the mental and reconstructing it without the necessity of 
exactly duplicating the intricacies of the underlying physical substrate. This 
insight is at the heart of functionalism and served as a chief inspiration for 
Artificial Intelligence. 
 It must again be emphasised that the assumption of distinct levels of 
description need not, and should not, lead to any ontological claims about the 
existence of distinct ‘levels of reality’. 
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Fig. 1.  Levels of description in Cognitive Science with regard to language. 
Source: Sam Scott 2006: 557–558. 
 
1.3.5. Internalism (Individualism) 
A central property of cognition is that it concerns the mental processes contained 
within the mind of an (idealised) individual. Cognitive Science has inherited this 
individualistic assumption, whereby the environment, and especially the social 
plane is seen as secondary and resultant, and the explanations of the totality of 
mental phenomena, including the knowledge of others, must be given in terms of 
the operation of a self-contained cognitive system of a single agent. This 
principle is known as methodological solipsism18. 
                                                 
18 Solipsisim (from Latin solus – alone, and ipse – self) – a philosophical stance according to 
which the cognising subject is itself the only possible object of cognition (or even the only 
existing object). 
Methodological solipsism is a principle stating that the only legitimate object of study in 
scientific psychology (and Cognitive Science) are the inner (mental) states of an individual, 
effectively proceeding as if the world external to the individual did not exist. The term was 
coined by Hilary Putnam, and the principle itself is developed at length by Jerry Fodor (1981). 
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 In one sense, the traditional Cognitive Science actually grew from the 
rejection of the external world: that is, not so much of its existence as its 
relevance. Especially on the ‘mind is computation’ view all that mattered was 
taken to be located inside the cogniser’s head or, more precisely, his 
computational mind (in case the cogniser should have a CPU rather than a head). 
This view is known by the name internalism (or individualism). Later, with 
increasing prominence of new disciplines such as situated robotics, there came 
the realisation that the idealised requirement of complete isolation from the 
environment was overstated. For example, the proponents of the extended mind 
theory, Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers (1998), point out that drawing the 
precise border between the cognitive system and its environment is normally far 
from obvious (see section 2.2.2.); and Bechtel et al. (1998: 86–97), in their 
introduction to the Companion to the Cognitive Science, conclude that a more 
promising perspective on exploring the mind is in the process of its interaction 
with the external world. 
 Nonetheless, the focus on the cognitive agent’s inner states must remain a 
key dogma. At least from the point of view of Artificial Intelligence, computer 
modelling, and robotics, this remains the only feasible approach; otherwise the 
modelling of an intelligent system would be insurmountably difficult. As 
explained by Stevan Harnad (2002), unless the task of the modeller is just 
making the programme or robot, his task becomes effectively to make a model of 
the entire world. 
 The internalistic commitment forces one to reflect upon the relation of 
Cognitive Science to the external world, especially in the context of a scientific 
perspective. Such a stance might, at least prima facie, be difficult to square with 
Cognitive Science’s strong aspirations to qualify as a genuine science. This is so 
because ‘doing science’ is sometimes thought to be based, if implicitly, on 
deeply realistic underpinnings, that is on the belief in existence of objective, 
cognitively penetrable external reality (and possibly on an even stronger 
epistemological position of naïve realism). The relation between the 
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independently cognising subject and the reality external has been worked out in 
constructivist approaches. Founded on the theorising of Immanuel Kant and 
experimental work by Jean Piaget, constructivist theories have been more 
currently developed by George Alexander Kelly19, Peter Berger and Thomas 
Luckmann, Ernst von Glasersfeld20, and John Searle. Zdzisław Wąsik (2006: 23) 
summarises the approach of social constructivism, pointing to the level of shared 
social reality collectively constructed by individual subjects:  
 
To the extent that one person employs a construction of experience which is 
similar to that employed by another, his/het processes may appear as 
psychologically similar to those of the other person. Such insights into the 
personal nature of meaning may result from the social view of language and 
communication: (a) Meaning is a human construct, and as such it is dependent 
of the person who makes it. (b) Meaning cannot be passed on as an entity in the 
same manner as meaning bearers. It does not reside in words, symbols or 
appeal signals with which individuals express their emotional and conceptual 
contents. Language therefore, must be seen as a behavioral system which 
triggers communicating activities within the cognitive domains of particular 
communicating individuals. 
 
Ernst von Glasersfeld (2008 [1984] {1981}: 7–8) remarks that the socially 
constructed reality, although intersubjectively shared, is not something existing 
in an objective and independent way: “[t]hanks to professional burglars, we 
know only too well that there are many keys that are shaped quite differently 
from ours but nevertheless unlock our doors… From the radical constructivist 
                                                 
19 George Alexander Kelly (1905–1967), an American psychologist, author of the Personal 
Construct Theory. The Reader is referred to: Kelly, George Alexander 1955. The Psychology of 
Personal Constructs Volume 1. Theory and Personality. New York: Norton. 
20 The Reader is referred to: Berger, Peter L., Thomas Luckmann 1966. The Social Construction 
of Reality. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. 
Glasersfeld, Ernst von 1995. Radical Constructivism: A Way of Knowing and Learning. London 
– Washington: The Falmer Press. 
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point of view, all of us — scientists, philosophers, laymen, school children, 
animals, indeed any kind of living organism — face our environment as the 
burglar faces a lock that he has to unlock in order to get at the loot”. 
 John Searle (1995) observes that methodological solipsism does not in and 
of itself preclude the possibility of having thoughts about multiple agency. He 
takes collective intentionality as a primitive and unreduced phenomenon: the 
collective “we intend” is primary, and is not reducible to the individualistic “I 
intend and I believe that you intend, and you intend and you believe that you 
intend”, etc. According to Searle (1995), collective intentionality is the 
fundamental property that makes it possible to create of social facts as 
distinguished from brute (physical) facts by means of constitutive rules (“X 
counts as Y in C”). On his account, the world of institutional facts has a real 
existence (translatable into the individual mental experiences of each of its 
participants), even if it is logically secondary to the world of brute facts. 
 
1.4. History 
As with most any philosophical subject, the roots of the interest in the mind – 
especially the human mind – can be traced back to the philosophers of the 
ancient world. On a certain level of generality, Cognitive Science is continuous 
with those early theories, such as the atomistic account of perception or the 
conceptions of the soul, reasoning, and knowledge formulated by Plato and 
Aristotle; on all other levels, however, it is radically different, using an entirely 
redefined set of basic notions, and altogether different methods. 
 Most sources (e.g. Buss 2004: 50–52, Chuderski 2002, Thagard 2006, 
Green et al. 2000) identify the origins of Cognitive Science with the scientific 
and socio-scientific developments of the 1950s, championed by Noam Chomsky, 
George Miller, and AI theorists, and commonly called ‘the first cognitive 
revolution’. Particularly interesting in this context are the departures from this 
convention, where the 1950s are referred to as ‘the second cognitive revolution’. 
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The ‘first cognitive revolution’ then comes to signify some earlier period in a 
way indicative of what might count as the prehistory of Cognitive Science. 
 
1.4.1. Prehistory 
Chomsky himself (2005) is inclined to see ‘the first cognitive revolution’ in the 
intellectual developments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It would 
be interesting to follow his inspiration and develop this line of thought. On the 
one hand, this period was characterised by a general change of academic 
sentiment, an effective transition from the legacy of scholasticism to the origins 
of modern science (ushered in, most importantly, by Isaac Newton21), and 
materialistic and deterministic accounts of the world (e.g. Julien La Mettrie, 
Pierre-Simon Laplace22). On the other, those two centuries witnessed a series of 
philosophical breakthroughs: the first idea of the human mind as a machine 
(Thomas Hobbes23); strong nativism of René Descartes24 and his establishing of 
the primacy of epistemology; the doctrine of epistemological empiricism 
developed by John Locke, David Hume, and George Berkeley25, with principal 
                                                 
21 Sir Isaac Newton (1643–1727), English physicist, philosopher, mathematician, and 
astronomer. The success of his classical mechanics was a driving force behind the rise in 
prominence of the scientific worldview. See Tatarkiewicz (2003 [1931]: 66–69). 
22 Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709–1751), French philosopher and mathematician, a defender 
of materialism and atheism; Pierre Simon Laplace (1749–1827), French mathematician and 
astronomer, a leading proponent of determinism. See Tatarkiewicz (2003: Vol. 2. 101–103). 
23 Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), English philosopher, best known for his naturalistic views in 
ethics and social and political theory, also a materialist and determinist. See Tatarkiewicz (2003: 
Vol. 2. 50–53). 
24 René Descartes (1596–1650), Renatus Cartesius, French philosopher and mathematician. Best 
known for his rationalistic epistemology, and also for his work in analytic geometry. See 
Tatarkiewicz (2003: Vol. 2. 32–44). 
25 John Locke (1632–1704), English philosopher and anatomist; David Hume (1711–1776), 
British philosopher and historian born in Scotland; George Berkeley (1685–1753), Irish bishop 
and philosopher. Locke, Hume and Berkeley are considered to be the three major figures of 
British empiricism. See Tatarkiewicz (2003: Vol. 2. 76–90). 
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focus on the matters of broadly understood cognition; the ‘Copernican’ 
revolution of Immanuel Kant26.  
 In contrast, Andrzej Klawiter (2004: 116) uses the term ‘first cognitive 
revolution’ in relation to the rise of scientific psychology in the nineteenth 
century in Germany. Several researchers turned out to be of significance in the 
process of extricating psychology from philosophy and establishing the former as 
a separate and rightful scientific discipline, distinguished by its own 
methodology focussed on experiment and observation. Following Keith 
Holyoak’s (1999: xli–xliii) short review, one can mention especially Hermann 
Helmholtz, a natural scientist whose achievements include a theory of colour 
vision, and Hermann Ebbinghaus, who pioneered experimental research on 
memory. The single most important figure, however, was Wilhelm Wundt, due to 
his contributions of both intellectual (rigorous methodology) and institutional 
nature (the founding of the first institute of psychology)27. His influence was 
additionally reinforced by his many students – such as Edward Titchener – who 
popularised and further developed this discipline, especially in the United States. 
  
1.4.2. Germination 
Although aspects related to the Second World War are usually neglected in the 
accounts of the later advent of Cognitive Science, quite possibly it was this 
military conflict that provided the catalysing impulse for the emergence of this 
tradition in 1950s. This was due to a confluence of a number of factors, most of 
them related to computer science.  
 Firstly, the war generated a powerful need for increasingly advanced 
military technology, leading to projects such as ENIAC, the first electronic 
                                                 
26 Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), German philosopher renowned for his groundbreaking 
contributions into ethics, aesthetics, epistemology, and ontology. Often considered to be a 
precursor of Constructivism in theory of knowledge. See Tatarkiewicz (2003: Vol. 2. 120–142). 
27 Wundt’s (and his disciples’) multifaceted importance is acknowledged by many 
commentators, e.g. Holyoak (1999), and Thagard (2006). 
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computer (as described by e.g. Vernon Pratt – quoted in Chuderski 2002: 4). 
Insights gained from the work in cryptography, computing machinery and arms 
industry proved to be seminal for the later development of Artificial Intelligence; 
among the people engaged in efforts related to military activities were such AI 
pioneers as Alan Mathison Turing (the breaking of the Enigma code28), Claude 
Elwood Shannon (fire control systems), John von Neumann (the Manhattan 
Project)29. 
 Margaret Boden (2006: 200) observes yet another factor: in 1942 a series 
of annual conferences was started under the auspices of Josiah Macy Foundation. 
The Macy conferences were originally established with a view to developing 
ways of effective prevention against outbreaks of world wars in the future. In 
practice, the seminars turned out to be a platform for exchange of ideas and 
interdisciplinary collaboration between the leading intellectual of that time, 
especially in the area of what later developed into cybernetics. 
 
1.4.3. Beginnings 
According to most commentators (e.g. Adam Chuderski 2002), the breakthrough 
year marking off the beginnings of the cognitive movement was 1956, when two 
conferences on information processing were organised in the United States. A 
summer conference at Dartmouth College, also dubbed “the Constitutional 
Convention”, brought together (among others) John McCarthy, the later inventor 
of LISP programming language; Claude Shannon, the co-author of modern 
information theory; Marvin Lee Minsky, the later director of the first AI project; 
Allen Newell and Herbert Alexander Simon, the later proponents of the strongly 
functionalistic Physical Symbol System Hypothesis, by which the mind is a 
                                                 
28 Part of the credit for the breaking of the code is due to Polish cryptographers for their 
previous inroads into this task. 
29 The pivotal role of Turing, Shannon, and von Neumann, among other early information and 
computer scientists, is discussed by Margaret Boden (2006: 200–206). 
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physically implemented system that performs manipulations on symbols30. This 
event started the field of Artificial Intelligence, which was named after the title 
of the conference. 
 Later that year, a conference was held at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology that featured the talks from Newell and Simon, the psychologist 
George Armitage Miller, and the linguist Noam Chomsky (see Miller 2003). 
Newell and Simon presented Logic Theorist that had its debut at Dartmouth; it 
was the first programme that could formally prove logical theorems and thus 
approximate human (logical) reasoning31. Miller presented his research on the 
limitations of short term memory that led to the publication of the immensely 
influential paper “The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two” (Miller 
1956). Chomsky introduced the theory of generative grammar, based on his 1955 
doctoral thesis, and later expanded in Chomsky 1957. The latter two talks 
referred to human cognitive capacities in a way that suggested a possibility of 
their computational implementation32.  
 At that time, the intellectual landscape was dominated by the 
behaviouristic tradition. Behaviourism began and was developed in the first half 
of the twentieth century, possibly as a reaction to ‘unscientific’ introspectionist 
psychology of some of the disciples of Wundt33, and to highly speculative 
theorising within the emerging Freudian tradition. Central to mainstream 
behaviourism was not so much the denying of the existence of mind (as is 
sometimes claimed), but rather the conviction that mental processes, as hidden 
inside the ‘black box’ and in principle inaccessible to objective observation, 
                                                 
30 See Boden (2006, section 6.iii.) for extensive coverage. 
31 Cf. Boden 2006 (section 6.iii.). 
32 “I left the symposium with a conviction, more intuitive than rational, that experimental 
psychology, theoretical linguistics, and the computer simulation of cognitive processes were all 
pieces from a larger whole and that the future would see a progressive elaboration and 
coordination of their shared concerns.” (Miller 2003: 143). 
33 The precise methodological status of introspection is still debated. See e.g. Eysenck and 
Keane (2000 [2002]: 3–4). 
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could not be a legitimate object of scientific inquiry – as opposed to directly 
observable input (stimulus, reinforcement) and output (behaviour). 
 Notwithstanding its popularity and successes – e.g. in therapy programmes 
and animal studies – by the mid 1950s the general behaviouristic paradigm had 
begun to receive increasing criticism. One source of such criticism were strictly 
philosophical arguments, notably from David Lewis, Peter Geach, and Roderick 
Chisholm (quoted in Żegleń 2003: 56), such as the lack of any straightforward 
link in humans from ‘dispositions’ to overt behaviour. Another was existing 
empirical research, mostly by European psychologists, that could not be 
reconciled with behaviourism. Holyoak (1999: xliii–xlv) mentions the names of 
the German psychologist Wolfgang Köhler (and the Gestalt movement in 
general), the English memory researcher Frederic Charles Bartlett, the Soviet 
psychologist and neuropsychologist Alexander Romanovich Luria (Александр 
Романович Лурия), the Swiss developmental psychologist Jean Piaget, and even 
the American psychologist Edward C. Tolman, himself a behaviourist 
researching the creation of cognitive maps in rats. A fair case can be made for the 
inclusion of the American psychologist Jerome Bruner, for his work on 
categorization (e.g. Bruner et al. 1999 [1956]). The research of the 
abovementioned scholars was difficult to interpret with a behaviouristic toolkit, 
but instead seemed to evidence the reality of underlying complex mental 
representations34. 
 Still, the decisive blow against behaviourism came from linguistics. In the 
famous review of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior, Chomsky (1959) showed that 
the reduction of human higher mental processes to the basic behaviouristic 
concepts of stimulus, response and reinforcement was inadequate, and that the 
                                                 
34 A second vein of intellectual opposition to behaviourism can be traced back to early research 
in ethology (by such researchers as the Austrian zoologist Konrad Lorenz [1903–1989], and the 
Dutch zoologist Nikolaas Tinbergen [1907–1988]), who demonstrated the existence of innate 
capacities in animals; this contradicted the basic tenets of behaviourist learning theory, which 
assumed no innate component to the learning process (see e.g. Holyoak 1999). 
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Skinnerian terms for describing verbal behaviour (e.g. controlling stimulus) were 
simply a disguise for traditional semantic terminology (e.g. reference). Further, 
he argued convincingly that the only viable account of human language 
acquisition must be constructed in representational terms. The review is today 
popularly considered to have been a watershed and a transition point. 
 However, as Thagard (2006) observes, the proper institutional foundations 
for Cognitive Science had not been laid out until the 1970s. It was then that the 
journal Cognitive Science35 first came out (1977), followed by the creation of the 
Society of Cognitive Science36 (1979) and launching of a series of cognitive-
scientific conferences (1979). In the 1980s, the first courses in Cognitive 
Sciences were started37. 
 
1.4.4. Early and classical Cognitive Science 
From today’s perspective one can speak of two traditions in Cognitive Science, 
one more aprioristic and relatively narrow, the other more recent, more empirical 
and very inclusive. Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 11–12) call attention to the fact 
that  
 
[t]he term <cognitive> has two very different senses (…). A confusion 
sometimes arises because the term <cognitive> is often used in a very different 
way in certain philosophical traditions. For philosophers in those traditions, 
<cognitive> means only conceptual or propositional structure.  
                                                 
35 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03640213 
36 http://www.cognitivesciencesociety.org/ 
37 In Poland, the development of Cognitive Science qua ‘Cognitive Science’ has been markedly 
delayed. The journal „Kognitywistyka i Media w Edukacji” (Cognitive science and the media in 
education) first came out in 1996, the Polish Society of Cognitive Science 
(http://www.ped.uni.torun.pl/kognityw/kognitywistyka.htm) was formed in 2001, and the first 
MA study programme was organised in 2005 at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. 
At the same time, the parallel developments in individual relevant fields, such as AI or 
Cognitive Linguistics, were not characterised by such a noticeable delay. 
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Such an understanding of the adjective ‘cognitive’, with consequences for what 
counted as Cognitive Science, was characteristic of the former approach, with 
which it still is sometimes associated. 
 Commentators (e.g. Żegleń 2003: 40–41) generally agree that at its birth, 
Cognitive Science was inspired by formal sciences and animated by computer 
science and AI, building on Alan Turing’s (1950) seminal statement of the idea 
of an intelligent machine. In fact, Turing’s exact claim was quite moderate, i.e. 
that – given a certain redefinition of thinking38 – no fundamental reasons existed 
for which bona fide thinking machines could not be constructed. Conversely, the 
development of digital computer architectures provided a convenient metaphor in 
terms of which human cognitive processes could be understood. 
 Thus, early visions in Cognitive Science revolved around a rather strict 
reading of the computer analogy, on which human minds worked like serial 
digital computers. The natural recapitulation of Artificial Intelligence in the 
philosophy of mind was the doctrine of functionalism, and especially machine 
state functionalism, first explicitly stated by Hilary Putnam (1975 [1960]) in his 
“Minds and Machines”. According to functionalism, the mind can be regarded as 
a kind of computer software implementable in any kind of sufficiently powerful 
hardware, the physical constitution of the latter being irrelevant. Cognition was 
regarded literally to consist in formal symbol manipulation, being in its essence 
independent of the body. 
 Such a stance had another consequence – of making cognition 
independent of the body in a related, but distinct sense. It favoured a natural 
assumption that cognition was limited to higher mental processes, such as logical 
reasoning and language, which were largely independent and in principle 
separable from ‘lower-level’ – and thus more ‘bodily’ – processes, such as 
                                                 
38 More precisely, the crucial element was the operational criterion for ‘thinking’, constructed 
along the lines of what later became known as the Turing Test: the machine should be able to 
convince human judges that it was a human being and not a machine (Turing 1950). 
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perception, proprioception, or motor control. The prototype of ‘intelligent 
behaviour’ and its default model was verbal behaviour, unconnected to its 
agent’s successfully functioning in the real, physical world39. 
 
1.4.5. Contemporary Cognitive Science 
Contemporary Cognitive Science is a continuation of early, or ‘classical’ 
Cognitive Science in most major respects: representationalism, naturalism, and 
an internalistic perspective. Without radically departing from the spirit of the 
earlier trends, it has nevertheless grown into something qualitatively different. In 
the sections to follow, I will outline – all too briefly – what I consider to be the 
main directions of departure of modern Cognitive Science from the earlier 
tradition. The reader should bear in mind the recapitulatory character of the 
sections to follow, which are focused on sketching out the directions and profile 
of changes to the Cognitive Sciences rather than detailed discussion of the 
phenomena in question. 
 
1.4.5.1. Chinese Room argument 
Arguably the most influential criticism of the idea of thinking machines (the 
‘strong’ AI view) and against functionalism has been John Searle’s argument, 
showing that thinking is not simply symbol manipulation, and illustrated with the 
thought experiment of the ‘Chinese room’ (Searle 1980: 417–419)40. The crux of 
Searle’s well-known argument consists in a simple but powerful insight that even 
                                                 
39 The functionalist equation of cognition with explicit, formal, abstract and disembodied 
symbol manipulation has been repeatedly pinpointed by George Lakoff (e.g. Lakoff and 
Johnson 1999) and formulated as a chief objection against this doctrine. 
40 The design of the experiment requires that a person knowing no Chinese is locked in a room 
together with detailed written instructions of how to perform formal operations on Chinese 
symbols meaningless to the person. This person could then transform certain strings of Chinese 
symbols (‘questions’) into other strings of Chinese symbols (‘answers’) without any genuine 
‘understanding’, but in a way that would indicate understanding and intelligence in the audience 
that would receive the answers. 
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though computers and humans could be potentially functionally equivalent, the 
very notion of function is always observer-relative. Thus, the behaviour of the 
machine or programme, regardless of what it consists in, by definition cannot be 
intrinsically meaningful, but instead is only interpreted as such by human 
observers. 
 Most scholars accept the argument; however, there is a controversy 
regarding its precise power and scope. On at least one viable interpretation, the 
effect of this thought experiment is limited to clarifying our linguistic intuitions 
regarding the use of the word ‘thinking’, with no devastating consequences 
against the general soundness of strong AI. Minimally, the argument does not 
question the validity of ‘weak’ AI, that is the idea of machines’ accurately 
simulating thought processes; as such, it does not pose any theoretical threat 
against broadly defined CS. 
 
1.4.5.2. Connectionism 
Although connectionist architectures have been proposed as early as the 1940s41, 
it was not until the 1980s that the long-dominant classical approach to AI began 
to be effectively challenged by the rapid development of this alternative 
approach: connectionism. The classical approach (termed ‘Good Old Fashioned 
Artificial Intelligence’, or GOFAI42) relied on serial but very fast computations 
over symbols performed by a single central processor. In contrast, connectionism 
relied upon architectures of neural nets compiled from large numbers of richly 
interconnected simple units, operating by the adjusting of the weights of 
connections (whether automatically – by in-built feedback mechanisms – or by 
external intervention, e.g. backpropagation), without resorting to any explicitly 
                                                 
41 McCulloch-Pitts neural nets, developed by Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts. Discussed in 
detail in Boden (2006, Chapter 4.iii). 
42 According to Wikipedia, the popular term GOFAI was coined by the influential philosopher 
of Artificial Intelligence, John Haugeland. The Reader is referred to Haugeland, John 1985. 
Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press. 
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present algorithm. Vital is the fact that the basic units in such nets are 
subsemantic: individual nodes in the net are not semantically evaluable (do not 
have their own meanings), and units of meaning such as concepts emerge as a 
result of activations of larger portions of the net43. 
 Connectionism struggles mostly with arriving at a satisfactory account of 
rule-based cognitive operations characterised by systematic productivity. On the 
other hand, the strengths of connectionism over the rival approach include more 
realistic patterns of degradation in response to error/damage (graceful 
degradation versus the catastrophic failure of classical systems), spontaneous 
generalisation of patterns, and better sensitivity to context. Nonetheless, the most 
important advantage of this approach has to do with its greater 
psychological/biological reality44. The simple example of an electronic versus a 
mechanical clock, which behave identically despite being implemented 
differently, shows that equipotentiality does not necessarily imply the identity of 
the implementing mechanism. Connectionist networks, while being very far from 
constituting viable models of the (aspects of the) actual working brain, exhibit at 
least some analogies to it. As a consequence, they display more characteristics in 
common with the brain, such as spontaneous learning by association, or graceful 
degradation (the destruction of a part of the network does not lead to catastrophic 
failure, but rather to a gradual decline in performance). 
 It is tempting to conflate the distinction between classical and 
contemporary Cognitive Science with the distinction between GOFAI and 
                                                 
43 “Information [is] stored in several interconnected units, rather than in a signle location… 
information is distributed rather than concentrated.” (James L. McClelland, cited by Waldemar 
Skrzypczak (2006: 12). 
44 The idea of psychological reality was proposed and championed by Noam Chomsky (see 
http://www.chomsky.info/interviews/1983----.htm). 
Interesting in this context is the opinion of Henryk Kardela (2006a: 197–198), who also quotes 
Anna Wierzbicka, that Chomsky himself has not remained faithful to this methodological 
principle, largely as a result of his focus on syntax to the neglect of the semantic aspects of 
language. 
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connectionism. Still, this would not be appropriate for two rather basic reasons. 
Firstly, the debate is still in progress. For instance, Ric Cooper (2000 [1996]: 45–
48), taking stock of this debate voices a representative opinion that as yet, 
connectionism has not gained the upper hand. Secondly, such a conclusion would 
fail to do justice to other important differences between classical and 
contemporary CS, which are discussed in turn45. 
 
1.4.5.3. Neuroscience 
The study of the brain has always been acknowledged as an essential element of 
the Cognitive Science jigsaw, and even early work in neuroscience was seen as 
important46. In practice, however, for a long time neuroscience failed to have any 
substantial impact on the other component fields (a fact that is iconically 
represented on the diagram b) in Fig 2.). Two main reasons are likely to have 
been responsible. Most importantly, as was already discussed, functionalism lent 
support to the idea of study of the mind at a level of description that abstracted 
away from the details of the cerebral implementation, thus making 
neuroscientific data merely supplementary. The other factor was related to the 
very limited possibilities of the study of the working brain: the situation of the 
                                                 
45 Other sources considered important for the question of the relation between classical AI and 
connectionist architectures include the foundational book by Rumelhart, McClelland and 
collaborators (Rumelhart, David E., James. L McClelland, the PDP Research Group 1986. 
Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.), as well as the volume edited by Pinker and Mehler (Pinker, Steven, Jacques 
Mehler (eds.) 1988. Connections and Symbols. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.), including essays 
from Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn and Steven Pinker and Alan Prince. 
46 For example, the 1949 book by Donald Hebb – The Organization of Behavior; a 
Neuropsychological Theory – is ranked as the 4th most influential work in Cognitive Science in 
the twentieth century, according to Millenium Project, Center for Cognitive Sciences, 
University of Minnesota: 
http://www.cogsci.umn.edu/OLD/calendar/past_events/millennium/final.html 
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brain scientist could be compared to that of “the oceanographer probing the sea 
from ashore”47. 
 The 1980s and especially the 1990s have witnessed both the decline of 
functionalism and breakthroughs in the technological possibilities for brain 
imaging (see Wójcik 2006; Medin et al. 2000 [1992]: 26–28). In particular, the 
noninvasive techniques of Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and Functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) have made it possible to formulate a much 
more accurate functional geography of the working brain; and Transcranial 
Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) has allowed the neuroscientists to directly 
demonstrate causality from the activity of specific brain circuits to particular 
behaviours48. The increase of knowledge about the brain has lead to the growing 
importance of ‘neurological reality’49, that is the requirement that cognitive 
models be made compatible with the principles of the operation of the brain. 
Moreover, it has opened new fields of cognitive-scientific study ripe for 
interdisciplinary collaboration. One good example may be research summarised 
by Gary Marcus and Simon Fisher (2003) related to the degenerative cerebral 
effects of the point mutation of the FOXP2 gene that result in a range of deficits, 
                                                 
47 A comparison used by Tadeusz Marek in a talk at the conference „Neuronauki – W kierunku 
wyjaśniania funkcjonowania człowieka” [Neurosciences – Towards explaining human 
functioning] in Kazimierz Dolny, Poland, 26.06.2005. 
48 PET measures the local cerebral blood flow (which mirrors the metabolic, and presumably 
cognitive, activity of the parts of the brain) by detecting radiation of the radioactive isotopes 
injected into the subject’s bloodstream. fMRI measures the local metabolic activity by detecting 
the level of oxygen in the blood. TMS produces a magnetic field that induces local disruptions 
in neuron excitability, simulating the effect of  ‘turning off’ and ‘turning on’ individual narrow 
areas of the cerebral cortex.  
See a short overview by Jan Wójcik (2006): http://www.kognitywistyka.net/mozg/badania.html 
A discussion of the two most popular techniques, PET and fMRI, focussing on the differences 
in methodology and functionality, is offered by Buckner and Logan (2001). 
49 See, e.g., Grodzinsky (2003) for an attempt at characterising the ways in which neurological 
data cohere with the categories devised in lignuistic description. 
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notably in the processing of syntax, building over earlier studies (e.g. that of 
Myrna Gopnik, 1997) by combining data from neuroscience, genetics, and 
linguistics. 
 
1.4.5.4. Cognitive systems are real systems 
The above statement that “cognitive systems are real systems” is intended to 
reflect the spirit of several distinct theoretical traditions that nevertheless – on 
some level of generality – share the appreciation of the fact that the only type of 
existing cognitive systems belongs to real, flesh-and-blood, biological organisms. 
The “goal” (design principle) behind those organisms was not “thinking” or 
“thinking clearly”, but successful survival and reproduction. The goal of the 
cognitive system of an organism, then, is not producing comprehensive or 
truthful representation of their environment, but producing opportunistically 
successful behaviour under the constraints of limited resources, such as time and 
scope of attention. Applicable here, in a general context, is Eleanor Rosch’s 
concept of ‘cognitive economy’ (Rosch 1988a [1978]). This bears very profound 
implications for constructing the models of cognitive systems, suggesting that, 
generally, the most fundamental function of cognition is guiding action. More 
specific implications of that outlook are, for example, that more emphasis should 
be put on subconscious but fast feedback loops (e.g. in perception) that short-
circuit conscious but slower central processes (e.g. Clark 2006). 
 As stated above, the realisation that ‘cognitive systems are real systems’ 
also directs one’s attention to the fact that they are evolved systems (i.e. having 
an evolutionary history of adaptation to specific environments – see Anderson 
2005). The basic constructional design of the nervous systems of all natural 
cognitive agents – including humans – is a result of the long process of natural 
selection for efficiency in surviving and reproducing in a given environment. 
Such considerations point to the relevance of evolutionary studies, which will be 
mentioned in 1.4.6.1., but also studies in diverse disciplines once thought to be 
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tangential to narrowly understood CS, such as animal cognition or animal 
communication. 
 Finally, (natural) cognitive systems are embodied systems. Crucially, this 
is not merely the trivial sense of having a body as a necessary physical substrate 
for the mind; in this context, embodiment means having a specific kind of body 
which directly influences one’s mental processes in specific ways50. Embodiment 
is itself a rapidly growing and already very diverse research perspective that 
merits a separate discussion; its various threads are developed in philosophy (e.g. 
the continuators of Maurice Merleau-Ponty51, such as Shaun Gallagher 2005), 
linguistics (e.g. George Lakoff 1990 [1987]), or general CS (e.g. Francesco 
Varela et al. 1999 [1991]). As a particularly important recent trend, for many 
theorists in the broadly understood ECS (Embodied Cognitive Science), for 
instance Jordan Zlatev (2007) or Michael Anderson (2005), cognition is best 
described as situated and enactive. This means that there is no fundamental 
dualistic distinction into the organism on the one hand and on the other, the 
passive, pre-given, objective world that is represented in the organism’s mind. 
Rather, as described by Francisco Varela et al. (1999: 202), “…organism and 
environment are mutually enfolded in multiple ways, and so what constitutes the 
world of a given organism is enacted by that organism’s history of structural 
coupling”. This follows the Gibsonian52 insight that the organism’s own world, 
rather than being merely indirectly represented, is directly enacted in accordance 
with its individual sensorimotor capabilities. 
 
1.4.5.5. Interdisciplinarity 
                                                 
50 Tim Rohrer enumerates ten distinct senses of the term ‘embodiment’ as used in the Cognitive 
Sciences (quoted in Kardela 2006: 227–228). 
51 Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), a French philosopher and phenomenologist. 
52 James Jerome Gibson (1904–1979), an influential American psychologist. His name has come 
to stand for an antirepresentational and interactionist perspective on perception. See Barsalou 
(1992: 17–18) for a short discussion in relation to the context of Cognitive Science. 
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Almost all sources and reference works (e.g. Bechtel et al. 1998: 94, Rapaport 
1996, Stillings et al. 1995: 1, Thagard 2006, Kalisz et al. 1996: 58) depict 
Cognitive Science principally in terms of its member disciplines. The canonical 
list consists of linguistics, psychology, philosophy, computer science with AI, 
and neurobiology, sometimes being complemented with (cognitive) anthropology 
and education, with a penta- or hexagon being a convenient means of illustrating 
the relations between them (Fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Contributing disciplines and interdisciplinary connections during three 
different stages in the development of Cognitive Science. Source: Bechtel et 
al., 1998: 94. 
 
This traditional designation no longer seems to be accurate. Contemporary 
Cognitive Science is these five or six disciplines – and much more. The reasons 
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for which the above descriptions are simplistic stem from expanding, which takes 
place whenever the original research problem during its analysis turns out to 
recursively involve sub-problems which require expertise from other fields; 
according to Klawiter (2004: 111–115), it commonly characterises Cognitive 
Science research. As a result, present-day Cognitive Science has greatly 
broadened its scope, effectively incorporating a large number of existing as well 
as newly established fields of study. 
 Again, reference to example will be useful: The MIT Encyclopedia of the 
Cognitive Sciences (1999, ed. Wilson and Keil) contains 471 short articles, 
ranging from “qualia” to “X-bar theory” to “primate amygdala” to “evolutionary 
psychology of sexual attraction”, that are in a large part difficult to subsume 
under any particular discipline label53. At a closer inspection of today’s Cognitive 
Science, one may find discipline boundaries not so much being transcended, as in 
fact dissolving. Consequently, an adequate description of contemporary 
Cognitive Science must be rather general, almost to the effect of the statement by 
Terry Winograd (cited in Rapaport 1996) – that “<Cognitive Science> is a broad 
rubric, intended to include anyone who is concerned with phenomena related to 
the mind”. 
  This inclusiveness, however, is not absolute. Not everyone “concerned 
with phenomena related to the mind” should by default count as a ‘cognitive 
scientist’. Firstly, the naturalistic commitment (1.3.3.) remains essential. In this 
context, characteristic is the omission from the Encyclopedia of the entries for 
phenomenology or Edmund Husserl, despite their unquestionable relevance in 
terms of the mind as a subject matter54. Secondly, cognitive scientists are 
                                                 
53 Still, the layout of the introductory section of the tome adheres to the classical division: the 
six major Introductions are for Philosophy, Psychology, Neurosciences, Computational 
Intelligence, Linguistics, and Culture – Cognition – Evolution. 
54 It would be imprecise to state that phenomenology has been excluded from Cognitive 
Science: rather, it has been redefined and included into strictly naturalistic projects such as 
neurophenomenology (e.g. Gallagher 2005) or heterophenomenology. 
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committed to psychological reality. For example, work on designing programmes 
or robots that could achieve human-like levels of performance on certain 
cognitive tasks (e.g. text processing or detecting objects) but would perform such 
tasks in a different way that humans would (e.g. using ‘mental’ operations 
inaccessible to humans), while counting as Artificial Intelligence, should not be 
considered Cognitive Science because it would not offer insights into how they 
are performed by real cognitive agents. 
 
 
Fig. 3.  The landscape of contemporary Cognitive Science, including 
disciplines, subdisciplines and paradigms. The list should not be treated as 
either systematic or exhaustive but rather as illustrating the inclusiveness of the 
thematic scope. 
 
1.4.6. Interdisciplinarity: methodological notes 
This is a submitted manuscript version. The publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint the 
material in any form. Final published version, copyright Peter Lang: https://doi.org/10.3726/978-3-653-05287-9 
 52 
Kalisz, Kubiński and Buller (1996: 61, italics in the original) make 
straightforward a belief that is characteristic of both early and contemporary 
Cognitive Science: 
 
Beware of false cognitivists! (…) Even though they declare their commitment 
to clarify the essence of human cognitive processes, they refrain from 
transcending the historically delimited bounds of their disciplines. (…) 
Cognitive Science must remain by its very nature interdisciplinary, or, better, 
superdisciplinary.  
 
Without any doubt, interdisciplinary cooperation has been the foundational, 
defining feature of Cognitive Science throughout its history. Johnson-Laird’s 
(1980: 71) programmatic statement that “[w]e should reject the view that 
Cognitive Science is merely a clever ruse dreamed up to gain research funds – 
that it is nothing more than six disciplines in search of a grant-giving agency” is 
based on the assumption that it is interdisciplinarity that allows Cognitive 
Science become more than the sum of its component parts. 
 Interdisciplinarity, however, is a controversial notion that tends to raise 
suspicion, not least because in today’s science it has grown to be somewhat of a 
‘buzzword’55. There are in fact strong reasons for this caution.  
 One of the few methodological postulates universally applicable to all 
kinds of scientific activity is the requirement for frequent reporting of one’s 
results to a larger forum in order to bring them under unbiased revision. 
Interdisciplinarity may become an obstacle in putting this into practice, as the 
work of such character is more difficult to assess. Another problem with 
interdisciplinary research involves the technical difficulties in the dialogue 
between disciplines: while the object of study might be common, problems often 
                                                 
55 Of course, the idea interdisciplinary research as such is not new in linguistics or the study of 
the mind. For example, Zdzisław Wąsik (e.g. 2003, Chapter 2), discussing the various senses of 
‘language’ concludes that language as obiectum reale is an inherently heteronomous entity, 
which calls for a rich variety of perspectives, and not only linguistic ones. 
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arise from the incommensurability of specific discipline methodologies. For 
example, consciousness, function, information, intelligence, and intentionality 
are only a few examples from the long list of terms that have substantially 
different meanings and operational definitions in at least two – and usually more 
– member disciplines56. Thus, on the face of it, the adoption of an 
interdisciplinary perspective is threatened by the risks of incongruity and 
conceptual-terminological confusion. In this section, I will address those dangers. 
 To begin with, it is perhaps not sufficiently appreciated that many barriers 
blocking interdisciplinary communication have been effectively obliterated with 
the rapid progress in information technology over the past decade. Formerly, a 
scientist entering a new field was constrained by the scarcity of accessible 
resources that were usually both fragmentary and outdated (if simply because of 
the editorial lag). The popularisation of electronic data transmission, together 
with increasingly sophisticated techniques of presentation, have helped to 
overcome informational isolation among disciplines, and have made it possible 
for the researchers to become acquainted on the spot with the latest academic-
level knowledge within, as well as outside, the researcher’s particular bailiwick. 
Most certainly, the necessity for an appropriate background of scholarship has 
remained fundamental. But the elimination of the basic logistic problems that 
pestered interdisciplinary cooperation has been a crucial improvement. 
 What is more, frequently enough interdisciplinarity is not a matter of 
choice, but of necessity. The science of cognition seems to constitute a 
paradigmatic example; and Merlin Donald (2004: 248) argues explicitly that „the 
human mind is too complicated for any single field to master, and in this case, 
interdisciplinarity is not a luxury, but a necessity.” Some domains of study are by 
                                                 
56 Both the reservations against the idea of interdisciplinarity and the terminological difficulties 
of interdisciplinary dialogue have been repeatedly witnessed by me during my participation in 
cognitivist conferences, especially the conferences accompanying the annual conventions of 
The Polish Cognitivist Society organised in Toruń (2002–2006) and later in Poznań (2006–
2007). 
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themselves inherently dependent on cooperation across traditional disciplines. 
Such is the nature of applied human sciences, e.g. glottodidactics or human 
resources management, which must combine psychology of the individual or of 
group relations with specialised knowledge of a particular subject. In some other 
fields, theorising must at a minimum be compatible with the key developments in 
the related areas, since an experimentum crucis in one discipline can ramify 
throughout another and even invalidate whole theoretical approaches therein. The 
above is particularly true of natural sciences operating on different levels of 
description. Still, even contemporary philosophy of mind – though itself non-
empirical – because of its highly naturalistic profile cannot afford to ignore 
current empirical findings in psychology and neuroscience; one example may be 
the immediate relevance of Benjamin Libet’s (e.g. 1999) studies to the problem 
of ‘free will’. 
 As to the benefits resulting from interdisciplinary perspective, they appear 
to be quite obvious. Interdisciplinary research has more capacity for being 
profound, comprehensive and fruitful. Communication and cooperation between 
members of distinct but related specialties might yield fresh insights and, more 
importantly, lead from predictions in one area of inquiry directly to testable 
hypotheses in another. In the following sections, I will illustrate the above points 
by reviewing two examples of different generality illustrating successful 
interdisciplinary study: one from general Cognitive Science, the other from 
cognitive linguistics. 
 
1.4.6.1. Interdisciplinarity and Modularity of Mind 
The first example concerns the idea of the modularity of mind, which – although 
latent in the writings of earlier authors and in one sense dating back to Franz 
Joseph Gall’s phrenology57 – was effectively started with the 1983 book by Jerry 
                                                 
57 Franz Joseph Gall (1758–1828) was a German anatomist and the founder of phrenology – a 
parascientific discipline popular in the early nineteenth century, founded on the assumption that 
people’s inclinations or talents could be known by the study of their skulls. 
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Fodor. Himself a philosopher of mind, Fodor used his background to synthesise 
insights from several fields of Cognitive Science; in particular, he drew on 
Chomsky’s observations on language acquisition (e.g. Chomsky 1975), as well as 
a broad range of experimental evidence from psychology, psycholinguistics, and 
neuroscience.  
 On Fodor’s (1983, 2000) account, the mind consists of sensory 
transducers, central processor(s), and several modules that link the two. Modules 
are input/output systems that are domain specific (dedicated only to their 
specialised tasks), informationally encapsulated (do not draw on module-external 
information or resources during processing), automatic, rapid, relatively localised 
in the brain, and relatively developmentally rigid (‘innately specified’); they 
relay information from the senses to central processor(s). Central cognition, 
responsible for belief-fixation, is itself nonmodular and therefore difficult to 
study and model computationally (Fodor 1983: 101–119; Fodor 2000). 
 In the following years, the results of the interdisciplinary synthesis 
completed by Fodor have fed back into the various areas of Cognitive Science, 
with the effect of: 
 
a) inducing an ongoing theoretical debate, 
b) catalysing productive empirical research,  
c) the original idea being co-opted, and further developed in different 
directions. 
 
In the overall debate, almost all disciplines of Cognitive Science provide relevant 
data, for instance language acquisition (e.g. a summary of double dissociations in 
general-domain cognitive deficits and language-specific deficits in Pinker 1995 
[1994]), developmental psychology (e.g. Karmiloff-Smith’s [1994] idea of 
                                                                                                                                               
Fodor (1983: 12–23) discusses Gall’s phrenology’s influence on the doctrine of modularity; he 
rejects the assumption of the morphology of the brain influencing the shape of the skull, but 
retain his assumption about the narrow cerebral localisation of cognitive functions. 
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“representational redescription” in the ontogeny of humans), and neuroscience 
(e.g. Buller and Hardcastle’s 2000). 
 In linguistics, the concept of modularity has recently been employed in 
models of language processing (usually with modifications: e.g. Jackendoff 
2002), and in producing conclusions regarding the evolutionary emergence of the 
human capacity for language (Bickerton, e.g. 1998). 
 The idea of the modularity of mind – although substantially transformed – 
also became to a large extent constitutive of evolutionary psychology. Modules 
are viewed by evolutionary psychologists to be specialised mental functions, 
largely innate, evolved in response to the species-specific cognitive demands 
present in the evolutionary history of Homo sapiens. On this account, also called 
‘massive modularity’, it is central cognition (higher level cognitive mechanisms, 
such as belief-fixation and decision-making) that has a modular structure. This 
contradicts Fodor’s original claim and has sparked a debate (centred on Fodor’s 
[2000] response to Pinker [1997]). 
 In turn, evolutionary psychology is itself inherently interdisciplinary. In 
addition to the core of cognitive psychology, it must rely on areas of biology as 
diverse as population biology and genetics. The key notion, Environment of 
Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA) is a theoretical construct that requires a 
synthesis of data related to extinct hominids (paleoanthropology), their material 
culture (archaeology), contemporary hunter-gatherer societies (anthropology) and 
general sociology. In terms of the ‘output’, research within the framework of 
evolutionary psychology generates testable hypotheses regarding human sexual 
strategies and mate choice (Buss 2004, chapters 4–6 and 10–11), human deontic 
reasoning (e.g. Cosmides and Tooby 2006), and rapid cognition and decision 
making (e.g. heuristic reasoning, see Todd and Gigerenzer 2000). 
 Overall, in terms of generated research and theoretical interest, the idea of 
modularity has turned out to be immensely successful, and its success has been 
directly dependent on interdisciplinary cooperation on all stages of its 
development. 
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1.4.6.2. Interdisciplinarity and Conceptual Metaphor 
The other case in point concerns the existence of (cognitively real) conceptual 
metaphor and the evidence for it supplied by Lakoff and Johnson58. On their view 
– foundational to the whole discipline of cognitive linguistics – metaphor is not 
primarily a mere way of speaking, but the main conceptual device by means of 
which we use the experiences and conceptual structures from one domain to 
make inferences about another. Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 81–88) begin by 
founding their claim on three kinds of supporting linguistic data, but supplement 
them by further, mostly extralinguistic, evidence from six major sources (some, 
admittedly, questionable, but others cogent). These are: psychological 
experiments59, historical semantic change, spontaneous gesture studies, language 
acquisition studies, sign language metaphor studies, and discourse coherence 
studies. No individual source may seem conclusive on its own, but thanks to the 
interdisciplinary perspective, a range of converging evidence has been produced 
whose collective power is compelling.  
 A striking recent confirmation of the robustness of the conceptual 
metaphor MORAL PURITY IS PHYSICAL PURITY comes from a recent study 
by Zhong and Liljenquist (2006). Especially noteworthy are the study’s strong 
interdisciplinary underpinnings, synthesising both theoretical and experimental 
evidence that cuts across all three levels of description described in 1.3.4. Zhong 
and Liljenquist cite: 
 
                                                 
58 The theoretical perspective of Lakoff and Johnson was introduced in Metaphors We Live By 
(1980), but their Philosophy in the Flesh (1999) most comprehensively discusses its 
methodological and philosophical foundations as well as consequences. 
59 The authors mention studies with nine distinct methodologies; however, at least one study 
quoted by them admits an alternative interpretation. They report improved speed in the 
recognition of the test sentence in those subjects that had been primed with a metaphorical 
sentence, as compared to subjects primed with a non-metaphorical sentence. But this effect can 
be explained by reference to purely semantic content of both the priming sentences. 
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a) literary evidence (Lady Macbeth washing her hands after crime; this could 
be extended to Pontius Pilate), 
b) cultural evidence (practices of symbolic purification common in most of 
the world’s major religions), 
c) the closely related case of moral and physical disgust (which recruit 
overlapping brain areas, involve common facial expressions, and may involve 
common behavioural reactions, such as puking) 
d) the identity of words and expressions used to refer to aspects of physical 
and moral purity. 
 
The four-part experiment by Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) complements this list 
with a fifth line of evidence: 
 
e) thinking about unethical behaviours has a very strong tendency to prime 
words and behaviours related to physical cleansing; also, the act of physical 
cleansing reduces the need for other means of restoring moral self, e.g. by 
way of atonement. 
 
In my opinion, the interdisciplinary perspective, simply indispensable in some 
cases, proves to be beneficial in many others. Even though it is burdened by 
potential drawbacks, these should not be viewed as inevitable. In particular, one 
must pay special attention to ensure that the definitions of the concepts used 
across disciplines are precise and do not allow ambiguity, and be careful to rely 
on such sources that minimise the risk of bias or obsolescence of knowledge 
brought from other areas. If the above requirements are met, and especially in the 
fields where sound foundations for interdisciplinary research have already been 
laid, advantages clearly prevail over possible dangers. 
 
1.5. Summary 
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The goal of the first chapter of this work was to introduce and explain the 
character of the ‘cognitivist perspective’ of this work. I introduced Cognitive 
Science as the modern, naturalistic, interdisciplinary study of the mind. In the 
context of Cognitive Science, language research is seen not as an autonomous 
enterprise, but rather as an undertaking highly interrelated with and having 
profound implications for other disciplines interested in information processing 
in the mind. 
 I sketched out a historical picture of the development of Cognitive 
Science, with its thematic and methodological evolution. Contemporary 
Cognitive Science was given more prominence, as opposed to an earlier, more 
historical understanding of this label. In later sections, particular emphasis was 
laid on the idea of interdisciplinary research implied by Cognitive Science, its 
efficiency, and the minimisation its associated risks. I defended the reliance on 
interdisciplinarity; this was achieved partly by an in-principle argument 
concerning the recent increase in the accessibility of academic research, but 
mostly by analysing in considerable detail two relevant successful applications of 
this idea. 
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In the second chapter of my work, I further develop questions related to the 
perspective of study. The specific goal to be achieved in this chapter is to discuss 
in detail and substantiate the crucial research decision, that is the choice of the 
psychological point of view on concepts, whereby they are understood as a kind 
of mental representation internal to individual cognitive systems. This decision is 
already implicit in the cognitivist approach presented in Chapter 1; however, as a 
fundamental issue, it will be supported by a more exhaustive argument. 
  
2.1. Existential status of concepts 
This section (2.1.) develops questions related to the ontological dimension of 
concepts. The structural framework for the contents presented in this section is 
informed by extant analyses by the philosophers of mind, notably those by Eric 
Margolis and Stephen Laurence (especially Laurence and Margolis 1999, 2007, 
and Margolis and Laurence 2006). 
 
2.1.1. I-language and E-language60 
It is commonly agreed that, when it does not contradict basic intuitions from 
natural language in any fundamental way, researchers are at liberty to define their 
notions of interest in a way that they find most theoretically productive. With 
language (analogically, concepts in language) this is not unproblematic. With 
respect to the question of how language exists, people seem to be endowed with a 
dual set of pre-theoretic intuitions, conflicting but both apparently valid: it 
                                                 
60 The distinction into I-language and E-language was introduced by Noam Chomsky (e.g. 
1986). This distinction is explained in detail below. 
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appears reasonable to accept language as existing in abstracto, independently of 
particular users, but also as a biologically grounded, ontogenetically developed 
ability possessed by individual speakers. 
 This split is reflected in theoretical approaches to language and its study, 
with Cognitive Science being firmly dedicated to the latter stance. Since the 
publication of Chomsky’s 1986 book Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, 
Origin, and Use, the above distinction has usually been presented in terms of the 
opposition between E-language and I-language. Chomsky’s (1986) terminology 
can be illustrated as follows: 
 
The studied entity Its theory The relevant science 
S0 ≈ LAD UG (Universal Grammar) 
C-linguistics 
Ss = I-language (generative) grammar 
E-language grammar [A-linguistics] 
Table 1. A simplified outline of metatheoretical distinctions in Chomsky 1986 (especially 
pages 1–52). 
 
The highlighted area in Table 1. stands for the faculty of language, comprising 
both S0 (the initial state of the language faculty) and SS (a generalised stable state 
of the language faculty), as well as the transitional states in between. These are 
the states of the faculty at different stages in the ontogeny of an individual. S0 is 
the hypothesised state of this faculty in a newborn child and for most purposes 
corresponds to the hypothesised innate, genetically transmissible and species-
specific Language Acquisition Device (LAD); its theoretical description is 
Universal Grammar (UG). I-language (internalised language) is a stable state of 
this faculty, i.e. the state in a competent native speaker of a given language; its 
theory is simply the grammar of a given language. The name for the study of the 
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faculty of language committed to psychological adequacy and thus sensitive to 
psycholinguistic data is C-linguistics (for cognitive linguistics). E-language 
(externalised language) is typically understood as the totality of actual and 
potential utterances, in abstraction from language users. A-linguistics (for 
abstract linguistics) is the enterprise to characterise E-language with maximised 
simplicity and descriptive accuracy but with no commitment to psychological 
reality61. 
 It is already evident that in the context of today, several points require 
clarification regarding the above set of terminology. Firstly, the present 
understanding of the term “cognitive linguistics”62 is strikingly and paradoxically 
different, carrying a distinctive anti-Chomskyan connotation. Currently, this 
name has come to indicate a particular paradigm within contemporary linguistics, 
one that has grown out of the dissatisfaction with, and criticism of, successive 
versions of Chomsky’s generative grammar (see also Jackendoff 2002). Today, 
cognitive linguistics and generative linguistics are popularly seen as rivalling and 
antagonistic, though they perhaps need not be63. It may be sobering to realise that 
both those approaches are ‘cognitive’ in the relevant sense, as they share the 
same central commitments of Cognitive Science: most importantly mentalism, 
and also representationalism and broadly construed computationalism (though 
the preferred character of computation may be different in each case). Indeed, 
                                                 
61 See also Jackendoff (2002: 29, footnote 6) for a brief explication of the difference between 
the distinctions into I-language/E-language, and those into competence and performance (also 
introduced by Chomsky), and into langue and parole (introduced by Ferdinand de Saussure). 
62 The notion of “C-linguistics” is proposed and discussed in Chomsky (1986: 34–36), who 
bases his analysis on the “Leading Questions” put forward in an earlier paper by the linguistic 
philosopher Scott Soames. 
63 Such is, for example, the opinion of Ronald W. Langacker (1987: 28), when he speaks of 
what he calls the “exclusionary principle”: a natural – but mistaken – tendency to assume that a 
given problem or phenomenon has only one ‘correct’ solution or approach, so that embracing it 
must imply excluding all the others. 
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from the outside perspective they are often rightly seen as variants of the same 
overarching paradigm (see, e.g., Andrzej Pawelec 2005: 41–42, 147–153). 
 A special issue that deserves mention as the reason of many controversies 
is Chomsky’s understanding of language (more precisely, “the faculty of 
language”) in a specific, syntax-centred way. Chomsky has remained adamant in 
his defence of his core philosophical conviction regarding the nature of language: 
when properly understood, the human species-specific capacity for language is in 
its essence equivalent to a generative computational core, responsible for the 
hierarchical productivity of syntax and largely dissociable from the rest of 
cognition. This has ramifying consequences. The latest large debate involving 
Chomsky concerned the topic of the evolutionary emergence of language. In this 
polemic, Chomsky, Marc Hauser and Tecumseh W. Fitch (Hauser, Chomsky, 
Fitch 2002; Fitch, Hauser, Chomsky 2005) were opposed by Steven Pinker and 
Ray Jackendoff (Pinker and Jackendoff 2005, Jackendoff and Pinker 2005) who 
attributed the bulk of the controversy not to evolutionary issues but precisely to 
the differences in the guiding assumptions on the nature of language (for critical 
discussion, see Wacewicz 2012, Wacewicz and Żywiczyński 2014). 
 
2.1.2. I-concepts and E-concepts 
Despite the abovementioned restrictedness of Chomsky’s I-language, there exist 
no fundamental reasons against using his insight and terminology to other aspects 
of the study of language, the study of concepts being of primary importance. 
Precisely this is done by Ray Jackendoff (e.g. 1999 [1989]: 305–313, 1996: 539–
542), who, on the analogy with I-language and E-language, speaks of I-concepts 
(as opposed to E-concepts) and of their study, I-semantics (as opposed to E-
semantics). 
 In his discussion of this matter, Jackendoff (1999 [1989]: 309) illustrates it 
with an apt quotation from the American philosopher of language, David K. 
Lewis: 
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I distinguish two topics: first, the description of possible languages or 
grammars as abstract semantic systems whereby symbols are associated with 
aspects of the world; and second, the description of the psychological and 
sociological facts whereby a particular one of these abstract systems is the one 
used by a person or population. Only confusion comes of mixing these two 
topics. 
 
Accordingly, two major approaches to concepts in language can be distinguished 
following the criterion given above: psychological (in this sense, ‘psychological’ 
is treated as synonymous with ‘cognitive’ and ‘mentalistic’) and 
nonpsychological (in certain contexts variously referred to as ‘philosophical’, 
‘logical’ or ‘semantic’)64.  
 The semantic perspective maintains that concepts are not psychological 
entities but rather that they exist in abstracto – independently of them being 
entertained by any particular mind. It dates back to as early as Plato’s strong 
realism about abstract ideas, being later defended notably by Gottlob Frege 
(especially 2001a [1952] {1892}, 2001b [1956] {1918}; see 2.1.3.). Still another 
influential thinker that could be named in this context is Karl Raimund Popper 
(e.g. 1978)65, whose doctrine of three worlds or ‘kingdoms’ postulated an 
independent level of existence for the world of abstract ideas (as long as they are 
in a format suitable to be expressed in language). The semantic perspective and 
thus stands in clear contrast to the psychological perspective assumed in this 
                                                 
64 See also the entry „Psychologizm w logice” [Psychologism in logic] in Marciszewski 1970: 
232. 
65 Karl R. Popper’s 1978 lecture is a follow-up developing specifically the issues related to the 
ontological status of the „three worlds” that were introduced in a previous, larger work (Popper, 
Karl Raimund 1972. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: The Clarendon 
Press.). 
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work; their respective foci of study can thus be characterised as I-concepts and E-
concepts66. 
 The two most critical observations are that, firstly, the decision between 
the study of I-concepts or E-concepts is unavoidable (but see Laurence and 
Margolis 2007 for a partly differing view), and secondly, that it is nonempirical, 
being entirely goal-driven, that is, dependent on the class of problems that are to 
be solved. As the two approaches remain clearly distinct in terms of the ontology 
of the object of study, this translates into their divergent theoretical interests. 
These are: theory of mental representation, inference and reasoning, and 
(developmental) conceptual change for the cognitive approach; and truth 
conditions, hermeneutics, and (diachronic) conceptual change for the semantic 
approach67. It is important to stress once again that no general questions of 
legitimacy arise for either perspective, only a division of research labour. 
 As stated above, the semantic and the psychological perspectives view 
concepts as two different kinds of beings. This, however, does not necessarily 
imply that their methodologies are likewise entirely dissociable, and that the one 
does not bear any relevance to the other. Firstly, the goal of the 
psychological/cognitivist approach clearly does not consist in idiosyncratic 
descriptions of individual minds, but rather in achieving some sort of 
generalisations valid (that is, valid ceteris paribus: when one excludes the 
                                                 
66 In a more historic context, of relevance at this point is the mediaeval scholastic discussion 
between the positions of realism and nominalism (with conceptualism sometimes proposed as a 
middle ground between them). The nominalist Wilhelm of Ockham (Occam), c.1288–c. 1348, is 
considered to be a central figure in this debate. 
At the same time, one must not forget that the mediaeval discussions of the problem of 
universals were partly incommensurable with today’s naturalistic ontological inquiries as a 
result of being set in a distinct theological context. 
67 This list is based on a conference talk and a book (2007) by Robert Piłat. 
Jackendoff (1996: 540–541) proposes a much broader list of the “basic questions for a theory of 
I-semantics”: 1) the nature of meaning, 2) correspondence to language, 3) correspondence to 
world, 4) brain instantiation, 5) developmental questions, 6) evolutionary questions. 
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variables identified as ‘irrelevant’) for all human minds, or at least for a large 
subset of human minds, e.g. the minds of people who participate in a given 
linguistic community. It is implicit that a certain isomorphism in all relevant 
respects must hold between individual minds. Despite concepts being mental 
entities uniquely possessed by individuals, their description must nevertheless be 
accomplished in an objective way that abstracts from concrete individuals – 
which is again analogous to the study of I-language – and exploits the assumed 
isomorphism. Secondly, concepts as vehicles of thought and as meanings of 
linguistic expressions have semantic properties arising from the relation to the 
external world: if not by reference to the elements of the external world, then at 
least by entering the causal chain in the system’s interactions with the world. 
 Nevertheless, the semantic and the psychological approaches – while 
related and to a degree mutually penetrable – show very little promise for a 
successful synthesis. In this respect, I share the opinion of Robert Piłat (Piłat 
2007: 46–52, 341)68 and reject even the limited optimism of Laurence and 
Margolis (2007). This fact reinforces even further the necessity for an 
unequivocal decision between them in any theoretically interesting study of 
concepts. 
 
2.1.3. Gottlob Frege: metaphysical views and their influence 
Finally, the equal viability of both the psychological and the semantic approaches 
to concepts requires a comment. This is the case largely because of the status of 
the logician Gottlob Frege and the enormous influence of his works, in which the 
psychological view was explicitly questioned. 
                                                 
68 In his recent comprehensive analysis of the subject matter of concepts, Piłat (2007) remains 
sceptical not only regarding the prospect of the unification of both perspectives, but also 
regarding one of the approaches ultimately superseding the other. In this author’s opinion, the 
problem area of concepts is inherently and irredeemably two-dimensional, and an account from 
only one perspective can never be exhaustive, leaving out important problems that can only be 
formulated within the other perspective. 
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 To Frege, anything that could aspire to the name of ‘concepts’ must be 
patently nonpsychological; to him, the tasks that people associate with concepts 
cannot be fulfilled by any kind of mental entities. The mental beings, which he 
terms ideas, are highly idiosyncratic and thus have little intersubjective stability; 
they are also of an imagistic (not linguistic) format, perhaps akin to percepts or 
even qualia. In short, ideas are entirely unsuited for the role of grounding 
propositional contents. This later function must be carried out by a different type 
of entity, namely senses69. 
 Even in a brief discussion of Frege, it is critical to avoid the 
terminological pitfalls resulting from the intricacies of his nomenclature, 
magnified by the troubles with translation. Fregean concepts (Begriff) are 
functions (Frege 1960a [1952] {1891}: 30) in the logico-mathematical sense, that 
is they map arguments to one of the two truth values – True, if something “falls 
under” the concept, or False, in case it does not (Frege: 1960a: 30). In and of 
themselves, they are ‘unsaturated’, that is require a proper name or its equivalent 
to become ‘saturated’, thus forming a complete sentence in the logical sense70 
(Frege 1960a: 24). Functions are linguistically rendered as predicates, e.g. ‘is a 
horse’.   
 It is sense (Sinn) that should be considered to be the Fregean category 
closest to concepts as understood in this work. This is so because senses are the 
kinds of being that have cognitive import, and they correspond 
to/underlie/constitute the meanings of names as distinguished from their 
references (Bedeutung), i.e. the denoted objects in the real world – broadly 
                                                 
69 “A painter, a horseman, and a zoologist will probably connect different ideas with the name 
<Bucephalus.> This constitutes an essential distinction between the idea and the sign’s sense, 
which may be the common property of many and therefore is not a part or a mode of the 
individual mind. For one can hardly deny that mankind has a common store of thoughts which 
is transmitted from one generation to another.” (Frege 2001a: 8) 
70 I.e. a proposition. Proposition is a fundamental term in logic and linguistics. Marciszewski 
(1970: 261) explains that „a proposition [Polish: „sąd w sensie logicznym”] is the meaning of a 
declarative sentence… that which is common to a certain class of psychological experiences”. 
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understood so as to include abstract objects. Senses make it possible to reflect the 
epistemic element of meaning, e.g. the fact that coreferential expressions with 
different senses are not substitutable in intensional contexts71. Finally, ‘meaning’ 
might itself be confusing, since the German term Bedeutung (normally translated 
as ‘reference’ – e.g. in Frege 2001a) in German literally means ‘meaning’. 
 Note that on the original Fregean account, senses can be assigned either to 
names or to complete propositions, not to classes of things. This needs to be 
mentioned for reasons of clarity, since it may be felt that senses, given such a 
limitation on one hand and the link between concepts and categorisation on the 
other, have little relevance for the discussion of concepts. Despite this potential 
reservation, when looking into the matters of ontology, another motivation must 
be seen as deciding: the fact, already observed above, that it is the level of senses 
on which meaning is cognitively available to the cogniser. Likewise, in the 
philosophical-linguistic literature it is widely accepted that in this respect, 
concepts (as discussed in contemporary literature) should be compared to 
Fregean senses rather than Fregean concepts (e.g. Peacocke 1995).  
 It appears that Frege’s concern was primarily motivated by the issues of 
stability and shareability of meaning. Undeniably, successful communication is 
possible between different people and across different points in time (e.g. 
understanding old texts). What Frege took great pains to underscore was that 
despite the presence of fine-grained individual differences in understanding, 
those differences were (to him) decidedly second-order, whereas on the level 
coarse-grained enough for logic to capture, there evidently appeared to exist “a 
common store of thought” that was invariant both through time and across 
particular natural languages (Frege 1960a, 1960b [1952] {1892}: 46 footnote 1). 
                                                 
71 For example, in „Oedipus knows that he wants to marry a” or „Oedipus thinks he sees a”, 
substituting a by b can change the sentence’s truth value even if, referentially speaking, a=b, 
e.g. a = Jocasta, b = Oedipus’ mother: „Oedipus thinks he sees Jocasta” may be true with 
„Oedipus thinks he sees Oedipus’ mother” being false. Similar cases are sometimes referred to 
as ‘Fregean puzzles’. 
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For Frege, the only way to explain this fact was through endowing senses with an 
independent ontological status. 
 Thus, on Frege’s account any mentalistic perspective on concepts (as units 
of reasoning, linguistic meanings, etc.) must be deficient in that it fails to explain 
the crucial issue of the stability and shareability of meanings. However, on the 
present analysis, this appears to be the only such difficulty. In other words, my 
claim is that the challenge from the Fregean perspective can be reduced to the 
issue of the stability and shareability of meanings and that apart from it, there are 
no other compelling reasons for the rejection of concepts as psychological 
entities. It follows that the defence of the mentalistic perspective, which is the 
aim of this part of the dissertation, should consist in removing this particular 
objection. For the purposes of this work, it is sufficient to show that a mentalistic 
view can be reconciled with all the required characteristics of concepts, including 
shareability and stability of meaning. Specifically, this can be achieved by means 
of type/token relation, and the appropriate explanation shall be offered in section 
4.2.6.  
 One could also remark that Frege’s account might play down, but does not 
eliminate the alleged instability of the cognitive aspect of meaning. For concepts, 
or senses, to play any part in cognition or language, they must at some point be 
employed by individual cognitive agents, and at this point psychology retains its 
relevance. It could be argued that when a person ‘grasps’ a sense or a complete 
thought, the very act or relation of grasping now becomes psychological and 
might be accomplished in a way highly variable from person to person. Thus, far 
from removing idiosyncrasies, such a solution merely relegates them to the 
background. 
 What is worth emphasising is that the above remarks should by no means 
be taken as carrying disparaging undertones against Frege. A responsible 
evaluation of a system of ideas can only be conducted with regard to a larger 
context; most importantly, to the theoretical goals that this system is devised to 
accomplish. In the case of Frege, these were goals related primarily to logic and 
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philosophy of mathematics, with only secondary applicability to the description 
of natural languages. It is only later that his ideas have been transplanted to 
analytic philosophy in general, where they continue to exert enormous influence. 
 
2.2. Internalist and externalist principles of content-individuation 
The argument described in the previous section is supposed to show why it is 
legitimate (indeed, necessary) for Cognitive Science to treat concepts, not as 
abstracta, but rather as mental entities internal to particular cognitive agents. 
This question is an ontological one, regarding the kind of existence that could be 
predicated of concepts. 
 A different question is methodological, and it concerns the extent to which 
it is viable to study concepts (as well as other aspects of cognition) taking into 
consideration only these factors that are purely system-internal, with the 
consequent exclusion of any system-external factors. Note that this question is 
related to, but distinct from, the former, ontological one and arises once we have 
already agreed to view concepts in the mentalistic way illustrated above: 
concepts are mental representations over which computational operations can be 
defined. 
 One of the postulates of Chapter 1, where Cognitive Science was 
introduced as a theoretical framework for this text, was that at least in 
mainstream Cognitive Science, the internalist stance was the only feasible 
perspective. Nevertheless, an extremely influential argument by Hilary Putnam 
(1997 [1975]), later followed by Tyler Burge (1979), has established a case for 
the alternative view, externalism, giving rise to an ongoing theoretical debate. 
Not surprisingly, many (e.g. Burge 1986, also Żegleń 2003: 166) share the 
opinion that the externalistic stance may call into question the philosophical 
soundness of the premises of internalistically oriented study of language and 
mind. If externalism is true and so – as Putnam (1997: 227) famously stated – 
“meanings just ain’t in the head”, then the psychologism of Cognitive Science 
might find itself on shaky ground.  
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 Of the two alternatives, internalism is the natural stance in the sense that it 
corresponds to our standard, pre-theoretical intuitions. Therefore, it is best 
defined negatively, i.e. in opposition to externalism, even if there is a co-
dependence, since externalism is a weaker position. The exposition of 
externalism, in turn, crucially depends on the thought experiment introduced by 
Putnam in his classic text. The experiment serves as an indispensable intuition 
pump72 without which it is impossible to formulate the externalistic standpoint, 
and as such, it is canonically referred to by commentators on the issue of 
semantic internalism/externalism (cf. e.g. Gabriel Segal 2000, Katalin Farkas 
2003, Joe Lau 2006). For those reasons, I begin with presenting Putnam’s 
argument in the section 2.2.1., but postpone my discussion and the consequent 
rebuttal until 2.2.3. This is due to the fact that misunderstanding regarding 
internalism/externalism is rife (cf. Farkas 2003). Numerous overlaps and 
intricacies in terminology together with the subtleties of distinctions provoke 
confusion, therefore it is necessary to clarify the terminology related to those 
issues, as well as dispel the most common misapprehensions. Precisely such will 
be the function of the intervening section 2.2.2. 
 
2.2.1. Externalism: arguments by H. Putnam 
In his 1975 classic, “The meaning of <meaning>”, Hilary Putnam constructs a 
though experiment73 in which the reader is invited to envisage an imaginary 
planet, Twin Earth (Putnam 1997 [1975]: 223). Twin Earth is Earth’s particle-
for-particle equivalent, and is fully identical to Earth in all respects, so that for all 
                                                 
72 „Intuition pump” is a term devised by the American philosopher of mind Daniel Dennett, and 
applied by him in a negative context: basically, an intuition pump is simply a rhetorical tool 
(e.g. Dennett 1998: 24). See also the next footnote. 
73 Strictly speaking, a less dignifying name of ‘speculative argument’ would be more 
appropriate. In ‘thought experiments’, the ‘experimental’ element is missing, as the outcome of 
the ‘experiment’ is left for our intuitions to decide. Consequently, thought experiments have no 
scientific value and are treated with increasing reservations within philosophy. See 2.2.3. 
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objects, persons, events, etc. on Earth, exact Twin counterparts exist on Twin 
Earth. Consequently, the above is also true of a person Oscar, who by this 
hypothesis has an exact Twin duplicate, Twin Oscar, or “Oscar2” (Putnam 1997: 
224) – as well as of his internal constitution and mental states, which by this 
hypothesis have exact counterparts in the internal constitution and mental states 
of Twin Oscar (1997: 224). The only exception from this rule, and thus the one 
and only difference between the two planets, concerns the nature of water: the 
colourless, odourless substance known to us by the name of ‘water’, found in 
rivers, lakes, seas, and oceans, forming precipitation, turning into ice or steam 
under certain well defined conditions, quenching thirst, and having the chemical 
structure H2O, on Twin Earth has exactly the same properties but a very different 
underlying chemical structure, being instead a highly complex compound, for 
convenience abbreviated to ‘XYZ’ (1997: 223–225). 
 Since Oscar and Twin Oscar are exact, particle-for-particle doppelgängers 
(but see 2.2.3.), according to Putnam (1997: 224), their bodies and thus mental 
states are identical74, as are the intensions of the words they use. Still, when 
Oscar thinks of water and uses the word ‘water’, this word refers to the liquid 
with the underlying chemical structure H2O, and when Twin Oscar thinks of 
water and uses the word ‘water’, this word refers to the liquid with the 
underlying chemical structure XYZ (Putnam 1997: 224). Even though ‘what’s in 
the head’ remains the same, the extension of ‘water’ does not, and so the 
meaning of ‘water’ is different in each case. This, together with similar 
complementary examples75, leads to the conclusion that the individuation of the 
meanings of words does not depend solely on the internal states of the cognitive 
                                                 
74 An additional assumption might be necessary regarding the identity of Oscar’s and Twin 
Oscar’s mental states (narrowly understood – see 2.2.3.), but in contemporary Cognitive 
Science and philosophy of mind this is already guaranteed by the identity of their bodies (see 
1.3.3.) 
75 Other examples adduced by Putnam include: aluminium/molybdenum (1997: 226–227), 
elm/beech (pages 226–227 and further in the text) and jadeite/nephrite (p. 241). 
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agent, but is also sensitive to factors external to that person’s body; a conclusion 
summarised by Putnam’s widely-cited dictum: “[C]ut the pie any way you like, 
<meanings> just ain’t in the head” (1997: 227).  
 Extending the example further, if both planets are imagined in the year 
1750, that is a few decades before the birth of modern chemistry, the difference 
between H2O and XYZ is undetectable (Putnam 1997: 224–225). But, at least 
according to Putnam, the difference in the meaning of the word ‘water’ obtains 
nonetheless, and the inhabitants of Earth and Twin Earth refer, respectively, to 
H2O and XYZ, even though they do not know that. This assumption is made in 
order to show the historical stability of meaning, which is dependent on a given 
word’s extension76 in the real world and independent of epistemic factors.  
 Note, too, that in its original formulation, the argument and its conclusion 
concern specifically the meanings, or ‘contents’, of words in natural language 
rather than mental states. Still, both the argument and its conclusion transfer 
naturally to the meanings (‘contents’) of concepts and, in consequence, mental 
states (e.g. Segal 2000: 24). Such a theoretical step has indeed been taken by 
Putnam himself (1995 [1981]: 18–19), with the ‘H2O/XYZ’ distinction replaced 
with the ‘elm/beech’ version. 
 
2.2.2. Common misunderstandings concerning internalism and externalism about 
 content 
Internalism as a theoretical term usually refers to one of the following: 
internalism in ethics (moral internalism), internalism in epistemology 
(internalism about justification), internalism in the philosophy of language and 
philosophy of mind (internalism about content). These three views, although 
loosely related, are distinct positions rather than varieties of one overarching 
view. The internalism relevant to the present work is internalism about content, 
or ‘meaning’. 
                                                 
76 The notion of extension (and related notions) is defined in section 3.1.3. 
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 Internalism in ethics concerns the closeness of the relation between moral 
opinion and motivation for action (e.g. Björnsson 1998: 9). It maintains that the 
two are inseparable: having a moral belief necessarily implies being motivated 
for taking a certain course of action. 
 Internalism in epistemology concerns the conditions on which a belief can 
be properly said to be justified (e.g. Conee and Feldman 2001, Goldman 2001). 
According to internalism, all factors relevant to establishing whether a given 
belief is justified are internal to the subject or, on a stronger construal, all such 
factors are consciously accessible to the subject.  
 Within internalism about content, two strains can be identified, one of 
which – semantic internalism – regards the meanings of linguistic expressions, 
the other regarding the contents of concepts, and thus of the mental states 
composed of those concepts. Nonetheless, as explained by e.g. Joe Lau (2006), 
the name semantic internalism is sometimes extended to cover internalism about 
content tout court, thus encompassing its ‘mental’ subtype as well. According to  
Lau 2006 (who also quotes Colin McGinn), both those strains are best regarded 
as essentially one theoretical position coming in two versions, with internalism 
about mental content not constituting a separate view, but rather being a natural 
extension of internalism about expressions from the philosophy of language to 
the philosophy of mind. In line with the thematic focus of this work, I will 
concentrate on the question of concepts, and consequently, on internalism about 
mental content. 
 Internalism about content is sometimes also termed individualism (cf. Lau 
2006; and Robert Anton Wilson [1999] discussed this term under such a heading 
in The MIT Encyclopedia of The Cognitive Sciences). Unfortunately, 
‘individualism’ as a term is also burdened with a broad range of quite discrepant 
meanings in many disciplines including ethics and economy. The term 
‘internalism’ will be used in the rest of this work. 
 Internalism about mental content – and, accordingly, externalism about 
mental content – can be stated in an alternative, but logically equivalent way, as 
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views regarding the question of content individuation, i.e. how the contents of 
mental states should be individuated. Whereas internalism holds that the contents 
of the mental states of a cognitive system can be individuated purely on the basis 
of factors that are internal to this system (what is ‘in the head’), the externalist 
account allows the environment to play a role in the individuation of mental 
states. This follows directly from Putnam’s contention that Oscar1 and Oscar2 
have identical psychological states but that their states have different meanings 
(1997: 224 and henceforth in that text). In other words, internalism can be 
construed as the view claiming that being in a given mental state is an intrinsic 
property of the system (as e.g. being spherical is an intrinsic property of an 
object), and not a relational property (as e.g. being someone’s wife is)77. In still 
other words – using the notion of supervenience introduced in section 1.3.3. – on 
this view, the content of a given mental state supervenes exclusively on the 
physical states/events of the system entertaining that state, and on no physical 
states/events external to that system. It follows that for any two physically 
identical individuals (most importantly, individuals whose brains are micro- and 
macrostructurally identical), they would necessarily entertain exactly the same 
mental states (i.e. states with the same contents) regardless of any relations to 
their external environments. That is, the contents of their mental states would 
continue to be the same even if they were embedded in different environments: 
physical identity of their cognitive systems would alone be enough to ensure the 
identity of the contents of the mental states. In contrast, the externalist position 
maintains that it is possible for two physically identical individuals (most 
importantly, their brains being exact, particle-for-particle physical duplicates) to 
                                                 
77 The distinction of properties into relational and intrinsic might be somewhat hard to define 
rigorously. Given enough inventiveness, any property can be argued to be a relational property, 
e.g. being black, seemingly intrinsic, can still be said to depend on a number of external factors 
such as lighting conditions or perceptual capacities of observers. Still, I assume the distinction 
to be intuitively clear, and sound enough for a productive application. 
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have different (contents of) mental states, the difference resulting from their 
being embedded in different environments.  
 The difference between the internalist and the externalist positions 
regarding content can be further explained as follows. One may assume that a 
person’s belief that, for example, ‘the cat is a kind of animal’ supervenes on a 
specific neuronal configuration A in her brain. On the internalist standpoint, if the 
configuration A is re-created in some other person, that other person will 
necessarily have the same belief, i.e. that ‘the cat is a kind of animal’, with the 
same content. On the externalist standpoint, this is possible but not necessary: it 
is at least possible that for that person to have that mental state, the re-creation of 
the configuration A may not be sufficient and that the appropriate relation to her 
environment may also be required. 
 As noted above, internalism and its rival view, externalism, often fail to be 
construed correctly, with some misconceptions being rather profound. Two 
characteristic misconceptions of this kind, almost self-evidently false but still 
relatively widespread78, are: taking internalism to claim that the environment 
produces no effect on the cognitive system, and taking externalism to claim that 
only external factors play a part in determining content. I will consider these 
major fallacies and then turn to relatively minor problems. 
 Internalism does not stipulate that the external environment has no effect 
on the cognitive system and its mental states. Unless one proposes the cognitive 
agent to be a Leibnizian monad79, it is trivially true that the environment does act 
                                                 
78 A good example is the relevant entry, in the popular reference work Wikipedia, either 
incomplete or imprecise, or erroneous (permanent link): 
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Internalism_and_externalism&oldid=79791497#Sem
antics 
79 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), a German philosopher and mathematician, the 
author of the theory of monads. In Leibnizian philosophy, monads are the basic, atomic 
elements of the universe. The interactions between monads are only apparent and lack any real 
causal character since each monad is a totally self-contained whole, thus being perfectly 
independent of any other monads. 
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causally on the cognitive agent, thus affecting him in diverse ways; denying this 
would turn internalism into a clearly untenable position. Internalism remains 
neutral with regard to what kinds of external influences lead to what kinds of 
mental states. For instance, a person may acquire the belief that ‘the cat is a kind 
of animal’ through inferring it himself from previously learned knowledge, or, in 
a fortuitous, but still nomologically possible way, through electrical stimulation 
of the cerebral cortex. The influence of the environment is relatively indirect in 
the former case, very direct in the latter, but is clearly present in both. All such 
cases are perfectly compatible with internalism as long as at any specific point in 
time the person in question has this belief exclusively in virtue of what is inside 
his body, without any additional requirement of standing in a particular relation 
to his environment. 
 Externalism, in turn, should not be construed as claiming that the content 
of a mental state is determined solely by external, relational factors. While 
internalism requires that all determinants of the content of a mental state must be 
system-internal, externalism does not insist on the exact opposite; for externalism 
to hold, it suffices that at least some determinants are system-external. Everyone, 
including externalists, must agree with the trivial fact that it is system-internal 
states that play the decisive role in determining content, and any statement to the 
contrary is easily disproven. Two people (not to mention e.g. a person versus an 
animal or an object), despite being embedded in identical spatiotemporal 
environments, could nevertheless have drastically different mental states 
precisely in virtue of the differences in their internal constitution, in particular in 
their cerebral tissues (e.g. one of them being a stroke victim) or in their current 
electrical activity of their brain (e.g. one being asleep). 
 Furthermore, as observed by e.g. Lau (2006), there are problems 
concerning the scope of internalism and externalism. Neither view lays claims to 
being valid for the totality of concepts, and, consequently, for all mental states. 
Mental states whose contents are logically or analytically true, e.g. (believing, 
hoping, fearing, etc. that) ‘a cat is a cat’ or ‘no lie is true’ favour the internalist 
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approach, as there seems to be no environmental difference capable of rendering 
such content true for one person but false for another person – even 
independently of the physical identity of those persons. On the other hand, for 
contents involving various forms of overt indexicality80, e.g. including deictic 
concepts such as HERE, THIS, YOUR, etc., internalism appears to be 
insufficient. The content of the mental state ‘The keys are over there’ 
undoubtedly depends partly on the spatial location of the person entertaining that 
state. What follows, the meanings of such concepts, and consequently of the 
propositional contents they figure in, are strictly dependent on the external 
contexts, and hence ‘broad’, or ‘wide’81. 
 Finally, externalism about mental content frequently becomes associated 
with varieties of the “extended mind” theory, developed by Andy Clark and 
David Chalmers (e.g. Clark and Chalmers 1998), whose consequences lead to so 
called ‘active externalism’82. The association is not unfounded (in fact, it is 
explicitly encouraged by Clark and Chalmers), but here it is important to 
appreciate the differences between the standard (i.e. ‘passive’) and ‘active’ 
versions of externalism, especially in the context of their relation to ‘standard’ 
internalism. 
 Active externalists subscribe to Putnam’s dictum that “the meanings ain’t 
in the head”, but they understand it in a markedly different sense. For example, 
when a person performs a cognitive operation (mental, thus system-internal 
operation), she may choose to exploit certain physical features of her body and/or 
                                                 
80 Indexicality is the essence of externalism: an equivalent way of formulating externalism about 
the contents of ‘standard’ lexical concepts is by proposing that they contain a covert indexical 
component (cf. Putnam 1997: 233–235). 
81 Strictly speaking, theoretical strategies can be proposed that qualify or amend that last 
conclusion. This, however, need not concern us here, since deictic concepts do not constitute 
standard lexical concepts and therefore are peripheral to the interests of this work. 
82 Cf. a short discussion by Żegleń (2003: 166–167) who also classifies ‘active externalism’ as a 
kind of externalism in general, but stresses the qualitative difference between the ‘active’ and 
‘passive’ kinds. 
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her environment in order to aid herself in the completion of those tasks. Clark 
and Chalmers (1998: 8–9) give the example of rotating objects in a game of 
Tetris, or adding numbers; this can easily be extended to other examples such as 
planning the next move in a game of chess, doing the shopping, etc. Physical 
instead of mental rotation or calculating the sum with the help of one’s fingers or 
a pocket calculator instead of purely mentally – and analogically, moving the 
actual piece instead of deciding the next move without looking at the chessboard, 
and relying on one’s notebook (or, in future, a memory chip) instead of one’s 
‘hippocampal’ memory – are almost invariably more effective, and may 
sometimes be indispensable for achieving the goal. Thus, Clark and Chalmers 
assert that human cognitive processes extend beyond the body, and that the mind, 
although conceived in a physicalist way, certainly extends beyond the brain. In 
other words, for some purposes it is more fruitful to think of the cognitive system 
as comprising not just the central nervous system, but the whole body, plus 
perhaps certain reliably present features otherwise classified as elements of the 
‘external environment’. 
 In my opinion, rather than lending support for standard externalism, active 
externalism is best seen as addressing a separate question, and one that is neutral 
regarding the status of internalism, namely, the question of the boundaries of the 
cognitive system. If the boundaries of the cognitive system become extended to 
embrace its body and some of its immediate environment, the meanings may not 
be in the head, but arguably remain inside the cognitive system. Such a construal 
does not invalidate internalism in any way because it allows the contents of the 
mental states to be individuated purely system-internally and independently of 
system-external relations83. 
                                                 
83 Two more ancillary considerations seem relevant about the compatibility of internalism with 
the „extended mind” approach. Firstly, it should be noted that its proponents are usually very 
modest in extending the boundaries of the cognitive system and do not claim that „the mind is 
everywhere” (see e.g. Anderson 2005). Secondly, the extended mind approach is generally 
considered to be more successful in dealing with low-level cognitive processes such as 
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2.2.3. Case against externalism 
A relatively direct, but at the same time somewhat less interesting, way of 
rehabilitating the internalist focus of (broadly constructed) Cognitive Science is 
through making partial concessions to externalism: agreeing to its overall 
validity, but questioning its scope. Content, it may be claimed, can be conceived 
of in two ways, ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’84, each having certain theoretical 
usefulness. One variety (call it ‘wide’ or ‘broad’ content) indeed has truth-
conditional criteria of individuation, which means that it is sensitive to external 
factors and differs for Oscar and Twin Oscar in Putnam’s ‘H2O/XYZ’ thought 
experiment described in 2.2.1. But this does not eliminate another notion of 
content (call it ‘narrow’ content), one which retains purely psychological criteria 
of individuation (i.e. remains locally supervenient; Segal 2000: 18) and stays the 
same for both Oscar and Twin Oscar (e.g. Botterill and Carruthers 1999: 132, 
137). The notion of narrow content reflects the fact, fundamental to the 
construction of the externalist argument, that Oscar and Twin Oscar are 
psychologically identical in important ways, or in Putnam’s (1997: 221) own 
words, are in the same psychological state85. 
 The key consideration is the putative sameness of Oscar’s and Twin 
Oscar’s mental states in terms of their causal powers, in the sense of their roles 
in the mental life of the individual. It is very hard – and perhaps even impossible 
– to imagine any difference in behaviour between Oscar1 and Oscar2 that could 
be occasioned by the difference in the wide contents of their mental states. Their 
different ‘broad’ contents notwithstanding, it is uncontroversial that their 
                                                                                                                                               
perception or motor control, but less successful for higher-level, „representation hungry” 
problems engaging linguistic or conceptual operations (see e.g. Clark 2006). 
84 For a discussion of wide versus narrow content see, e.g., Segal 2000. 
85 Although on a rigorously externalist interpretation transferred to mental contents, he would 
not be allowed to say this, since the mental states of the ‘twins’ have different potential truth 
values, and so are different (‘wide’) states – see Farkas 2003: 190. 
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behaviours connected to water-related mental states will be identical: if 
Oscar/Twin Oscar is thirsty and he believes there is water in the glass, this belief 
will prompt him to behave in the same way (drink water) regardless of whether 
his mental state refers to H2O or XYZ. Psychological explanations, by their very 
nature, are defined over what is cognitively accessible to the subject, hence over 
contents that are narrow86. 
 Accordingly, the straightforward but also less interesting possibility for 
defending the programmatic focus of Cognitive Science on the internal 
environment of the cognitive agent – rather than on the many possible aspects of 
its relation to its external environment – is by declaring that Cognitive Science 
simply does not need to be interested in wide contents. However, a more 
interesting alternative consists in the repudiation of externalist claims, which can 
be achieved through denying the validity of the central thought experiment that 
lays the foundations for the entire externalist position. 
 
 As already noted in the sections above, in terms of their theoretical status 
a certain disparity holds between internalism and externalism. The former 
position has the advantage of being the default view that one naturally accepts in 
the absence of contrary evidence – indeed, it was only after Putnam’s (1997 
[1975]) paper that an alternative to it could be formulated. In contrast, 
externalism requires that our original intuitions be reformed, which is achieved 
by the means of the thought experiment described above. Therefore I conclude 
that the case for externalism, to a very considerable extent, stands or falls with 
the validity of the quoted argument: if it can be targeted for convincing criticism, 
externalism loses its main rationale. 
                                                 
86 Cf. Segal (2000: 121): “I think that psychology as it is practiced by the folk and by the 
scientists, is already, at root, internalist… The basic apparatus of psychology does not mandate 
externalism. So ascriptions of content that are made when practicing good, correct psychology 
are already internalist: the contents they attribute are already narrow”. 
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 It can be demonstrated that Putnam’s ‘H2O/XYZ’ thought experiment 
displays numerous shortcomings of various gravity. Some of these are of serious 
nature; they will be discussed in turn and proposed to form conclusive evidence 
against this type of thought experiments, thus invalidating at least one strain of 
externalistic theory. Other faults are related to the experiment’s ‘packaging’, not 
its conceptual core. They are relatively minor and could be repaired or eliminated 
simply by restating essentially the same experiment in a different way. Still, the 
status of the ‘H2O/XYZ’ experiment as externalism’s flagship example requires 
that such limitations be addressed as well.  
 Firstly, one may consider a relatively trivial objection mentioned by many 
commentators (e.g. Lau 2006, Segal 2000): it is not technically possible for 
Oscar and Twin Oscar to be physically identical in the way proposed in Putnam’s 
argument. This is due to the fact that the bodies of people contain water, that is 
H2O on Earth and, presumably, XYZ on Twin Earth. The fact that body water 
accounts for more than half of a person’s weight makes the difference between 
Oscar and Twin Oscar rather significant. This, of course, is a minor objection, 
but at the same a symptomatic one, since it hints at more fundamental underlying 
limitations.  
 In what follows, however, I formulate and develop several reservations of 
a much more serious nature. The first such objection, when put bluntly, is that if 
its conclusions are to be applied to the real world, the experiment makes little 
sense. When one is willing to follow the proposed situation to its immediate 
logical consequences, it turns out to generate a series of unacceptable side 
effects. A ‘world’ is a holistic system, wherein the substitution of one element for 
another is likely to result in a domino-like cascade of non-trivial corollaries. For 
example, replacing all H2O with XYZ would in fact require the replacement of 
all compounds capable of producing water in chemical reactions, such as acids 
and bases, with some XYZ-compatible counterparts, and eventually supplanting 
entire chemistry with a new one (with ramifying consequences for physics, 
biology, etc.). The alleged conceptual possibility of the experiment exploits 
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human epistemic limitations: it is ‘conceptually possible’ only to the extent to 
which people are unable to immediately think of all the relevant consequences 
ensuing from the experiment’s design. 
 As an illustrative example, I propose to consider a different thought 
experiment, involving a Twin Earth exactly like our own in every respect, 
including, for instance, the form and exact contents of physics textbooks – but 
lacking the phenomenon of gravity. The unacceptable consequences may be 
somewhat more immediately evident in this latter case, but both experiments are 
essentially the same – both are conceptually possible only in the sense that it is 
indeed possible to formulate them verbally without immediate discomfort. In 
short, Putnam’s ‘H2O /XYZ’ experiment is very clearly nomologically 
impossible87. 
  In fact, acknowledging the legitimacy of arguments framed in terms of 
twin worlds has the unpleasant consequence of leaving no nonarbitrary ground 
for discrediting other counterfactual arguments, however absurd. Consider 
Putnam’s contention that after the discovery of the chemical structure of water 
(H2O) no change to the meaning of ‘water’ took place: ‘water’ had referred to 
H2O even before the invention of modern chemistry because on Earth, the liquid 
in question had always had the structure ‘H2O’ (Putnam 1998: 108–109, 
reasserted in Putnam 1995: 24). But actually, there is no way of knowing this 
with absolute certainty. One can at least imagine the possibility that before 1750, 
water on Earth might have been XYZ, only to turn miraculously into H2O several 
years later. This possibility, however grotesque, is on the whole no less 
improbable than Putnam’s original example. Giving credit to Twin Earth 
                                                 
87 Similarly, it is not at all clear whether it is possible that a substance could have a total 
spectrum of phenomenological properties (not just some of them) identical to those of H2O, but 
a different chemical structure. According to Thomas Samuel Kuhn (cited in Segal 2000: 25), it 
is at least very likely that H2O is the only nomologically possible chemical structure capable of 
displaying precisely those properties. The same point is made and then further developed by 
Fodor (1994: 28–30). 
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eccentric experimental design automatically prevents one from discarding such 
bizarre considerations as nonsensical. 
 More importantly and more productively, Putnam’s argument can be 
shown to rely on invalid intuitions derived from referential semantics. In my 
opinion, the problem with Putnam’s argument originates from his fallacious 
assumptions regarding the privileged status of natural sciences in describing 
reality: to Putnam, properties as described by a natural science such as chemistry 
seem to have a different, and ‘stronger’, standing that those accessible 
phenomenally. On Putnam’s view, properties of the latter type do take part in the 
formation of meaning by entering the words stereotype (Putnam 1997: 230, 247–
252, 269), but they are ‘weaker’ in that do not decide about the word’s extension. 
Extensions are drawn along the lines established by a natural science (here: 
chemistry; but see the reservation below). In other words, Putnam presupposes 
that the way in which all samples of H2O belong to the same type is in some way 
more important or more basic than the way in which all samples of liquids-
having-the-phenomenal-properties-of-water belong to the same type. 
 I consider such a presupposition to be fundamentally misguided. The 
chemical constitution of a sample of liquid is never decisive and may be marginal 
to its being appropriately classified as water, except in a very limited, technical 
sense. For instance, standard samples of the liquid naturally referred to as water 
always have H2O content lower than 100%, sometimes significantly. One such 
example is the sea: consider for instance “[t]he sea is water” offered by De 
Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 145) as an example of a trivially true, 
informationally void sentence. At the same time, substances higher in H2O 
content that e.g. the sea might not be water. Bottled H2O containing only trace 
amounts of artificial sweeteners and dyes is a drink, not water. A 0,0000003‰ 
solution of botulinum toxin would be poison, and most definitely not water, 
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despite being almost absolutely pure H2O (although the causal history might be 
relevant here as well, cf. Chomsky’s [2000: 127–128, 148–149] ‘tea’ example88). 
 Note, too, that pure H2O is actually not water. It is pure water or distilled 
water (the latter may be considered lexemic), and at least some of its functional 
and thus inferential properties are dramatically different from those of water. As 
opposed to water, distilled water should not be drunk in excessive quantities 
(possible adverse health effects due to mineral depletion), as opposed to water, 
distilled water does not conduct electricity, etc. Yet another distinction concerns 
the state of aggregation: steam or ice is H2O, but according to our most 
straightforward, everyday linguistic intuitions, it is not water. In fact, it has been 
shown experimentally (a study by Barbara Malt, quoted in Ahn et al. 2001: 64–
65) that as a matter of everyday language use, there is only somewhat loose 
correlation between a substance being called ‘water’ and it’s H2O content, and by 
no means a strict correspondence. 
 Some (but not all) of the above reservations could be countered by the use 
of hedges, e.g. stating that “steam is really/actually water”. Such indeed is 
Putnam’s strategy when he notes that “water” is a natural kind term having a 
continuum of senses that are nevertheless grouped around a ‘true’, core sense 
(1997: 239–40). On closer inspection, however, this solution turns out to be the 
question, since it stipulates that a ‘true’ or ‘core’ is established by a natural 
science; it does not reflect prototypical language use but instead requires 
accepting precisely the presuppositions about the privileged status of 
scientifically-based explanations reviewed above. Chomsky (2000: 148) 
complains of the specialised, technical character of the terms “extension, 
reference, true of, denote” as applied by Putnam, but it appears that his 
                                                 
88 “Suppose cup1 is filled from the tap. It is a cup of water, but if a tea bag is dipped into it, that 
is no longer the case. It is now a cup of tea, something different. Suppose cup2 is filled from a 
tap connected to a reservoir in which tea has been dumped (say, as a new kind of purifier). What 
is in cup2 is water, not tea, even if a chemist could not distinguish it from the present contents of 
cup1”. (Chomsky 2000:128). 
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reservation can be extended to cover Putnam’s treatment of the term ‘water’ 
itself. Putnam’s analysis cannot be made to work unless one has already 
presupposed the validity of the scientistic vision of modern chemistry as ‘carving 
nature at its joints’, and agreed to restrict one’s use of ‘water’ to a compatible 
technical sense (however it is worth adding that on closer inspection even this 
‘technical sense’ turns out to be deeply problematic89).  
 For the reasons identified above, chemistry and science in general is better 
considered as revealing properties that, while also meaning-constitutive, are not 
of any special status and should be treated on a par with those contained in the 
word’s or concept’s stereotype. Such a reformulation allows one to follow a 
different set of intuitions and simply classify H2O and XYZ together as kinds of 
water (or kinds of the functional kind water, to use Fodor’s [1994: 31] term) – 
much like brackish water and clear water are kinds of water90. 
 The reanalysis along the above lines is also more productive, as it makes it 
possible to deal with a vast array of cases inexplicable on Putnam’s account. The 
first type of relevant examples are the words or concepts that, despite functioning 
exactly like ‘water’, have extensions that are chemically heterogeneous (for 
                                                 
89 But even in this specialised context water and H2O turn out to be macro- and 
microstructurally heterogeneous. For example, Weisberg (2006: 343) in the conclusion of his 
paper writes that “…there is no single kind for water that is useful in all chemical contexts. In 
particular, we have seen that the set of substances with molecular formula H2O is often not a 
very useful chemical kind. It fails to make distinctions among substances that both chemists and 
ordinary language users would want to make”. 
90 Note that such a possibility is admitted by Putnam: „if H2O and XYZ had both been plentiful 
on Earth, … it would have been correct to say that there were two kinds of water. And instead of 
saying that ‘the stuff on Twin Earth turned out not to really be water’, we would have to say ‘it 
turned out to be the XYZ kind of water” (1997: 241).  
This, in turn, highlights another problem with Putnam’s argument, namely the totally arbitrary 
restricting the ‘referential world’ of a person to the planet they inhabit, rather than, say, the 
whole universe (embracing both Earth and Twin Earth), or a single continent or country 
(excluding parts of the planet Earth). 
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instance, Chomsky [2000: 149] mentions ‘fire’, ‘earth’ and ‘air’). Another type 
are ‘empty’ words/concepts, such as those of fictional entities, that seem to lack 
any traditionally conceived reference (Segal [2000: 34–36] mentions ‘ether’, 
‘phlogiston’, ‘ghost’). 
 
2.3. Summary and conclusion 
The second chapter of this thesis was devoted specifically to defending the main 
theoretical decision – the choice of the mentalistic perspective on the topic of 
concepts – and dealing with the consequences of such a step. I introduced the 
division into I-semantics and E-semantics as two equally legitimate but largely 
incommensurable research perspectives. I traced back the motivation for E-
semantics to the influential work of Gottlob Frege, whose views I also briefly 
sketched out. 
 Subsequently, I turned to the debate between the philosophical positions 
of externalism and internalism regarding mental content. Due to intense 
terminological confusion it was necessary to precede the proper discussion of this 
topic by clarifying the notions in question. 
 Finally, I undertook to defend the validity of the internalistic position. 
This was achieved by restoring the authority of the pre-theoretic intuitions – in 
support of internalism – that was undermined in the wake of Putnam’s influential 
arguments for externalism based on the Twin Earth thought experiment. I 
adduced several lines of evidence as well as isolated observations that exposed 
the construction of Putnam’s argument as deeply deficient and fallacious. 
 Among the unexplored issues are those related to the precise extent of the 
tension between the two perspectives on concepts – that is, the precise 
distribution of questions that can be formulated and successfully answered within 
one perspective, but not the other. Especially illustrative in this context is “The 
Problem of Ignorance and Error” as described by Laurence and Margolis (1999: 
21–23, 34–35, 47–48): a requirement that a theory of concepts should be able to 
explain the fact that it is possible to possess a given concept despite being 
This is a submitted manuscript version. The publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint the 
material in any form. Final published version, copyright Peter Lang: https://doi.org/10.3726/978-3-653-05287-9 
 88 
ignorant of its fundamental properties or even having erroneous beliefs about 
them. For example, the belief that smallpox is caused by “evil spirits or divine 
retribution” (1999: 21) does not rule out the very possession of the concept 
SMALLPOX itself. Laurence and Margolis – having already stated their 
mentalistic assumptions – list the above problem as a major difficulty for most 
theories they consider. However, “The Problem of Ignorance and Error” seems to 
arise directly from the normative aspect of concepts, i.e. is what should count as 
real smallpox, as ‘fixed’ by external reality independently of people’s beliefs. 
Normativity, in turn, constitutes an aspect of ‘concepthood’ that does not appear 
to be able to be reconciled with a mentalistic perspective. Therefore, it remains to 
be established whether problems such as that of ignorance and error should count 
as genuine issues for a mentalistic theory to grapple with, or rather, should be 
assigned as E-semantic problems that from a mentalistic standpoint qualify as 
simply irrelevant. At a very minimum, some division of labour between the two 
perspectives is unavoidable. 
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Introduction and notation 
In the second part of this work, I consider questions related to the object of study. 
In the third chapter, I introduce and concisely characterise the topic of concepts 
and the phenomenon of categorisation in general terms before proceeding to a 
discussion, mostly synchronic but also diachronic in scope. In this way, I relate 
the present work to historical as well as contemporary research on the above 
theoretical objects, placing my work in the necessary context against which it can 
be assessed. Chapter 3 is concluded by a short discussion of another notion vital 
from the perspective of the whole text, namely that of mental representation. In 
Chapter 4, the subject is narrowed down to the viewpoint of Cognitive Science. 
 An important proviso is in order at this point. Arguably, a comprehensive 
discussion of concepts and categorisation is impossible to achieve in any finite 
text, much less in this modest work. This theoretical problem, when not 
accompanied by adequate qualifications, is one of troublesome generality: it is 
simply too immense to be approached academically. In particular, the issue of 
concepts, being fundamental to a number of linguistic and philosophical 
traditions, is highly heterogeneous and contains numerous veins that are only 
nominally relevant to the present work. For this reason, it is necessary to give 
priority to in-depth, rather than in-breadth, concerns, in order to narrow this topic 
down to manageable proportions. 
 One major consequence for the layout of the present work is the decision 
to place more extensive historical considerations in Chapter 5. This results 
directly from the focus of this work. In Chapter 5, where the cognitivist context 
for concepts and categorisation has already been established, a historical 
overview can be linked to, and seen as continuous with, recent theorising 
supported with empirical data. 
 Consequently, a more detailed scrutiny of concepts in the specific 
understanding of this work belongs in the fourth chapter of the dissertation. 
Another issue that deserves mentioning at this point is that of the facts of 
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language use. Although I set off by invoking the Oxford English Dictionary 
definitions of the relevant words, the facts of language use – in the sense of E-
language – are not the focus of the present work. The semantics (qua E-
semantics, see e.g. Jackendoff 1989: 74) of the words concept and 
categorisation, as well as of their counterparts in languages other than English, 
constitutes an altogether different theoretical problem; consequently, it will be 
excluded from this thesis. 
 At the same time, it cannot be questioned that natural language has an 
important role in the development of technical scientific vocabulary, namely, by 
providing powerful checks on the validity of the chosen terms. Generally, if there 
is a tension between the technical use of a given word and its use in the 
vernacular, it should be resolved in favour of the vernacular: when the intended 
technical meaning violates certain basic intuitions from everyday use of the 
word, it is a very strong indication that the term should be changed (rather than 
our intuitions reformed). Hence, I will be satisfied to conclude that my 
understanding of the key terms, developed further in the text, does not stand in a 
radical disagreement with the applications of the respective words by language 
users – but will not go into this issue in any depth.  
 The risk of confusion resulting from the discrepancies between the 
everyday use and the ‘dedicated’ technical use – defined precisely in the Chapter 
4 – is aggravated by the existence of two levels of description: meta-level versus 
object level. The above concerns dictate the need for staking out the distinctions 
with care. For a large part, this goal is achieved through the notation: regular 
spelling for denoting objects in the extralinguistic reality (dog), upper case letters 
for concepts (DOG), single quotation marks for linguistic units, such as words 
corresponding to concepts and objects (‘dog’) (but note that they are also used as 
distancing quotes); double quotation marks are used for actual citations from 
other sources or for complete formulas, and italics are used for emphasis (but 
also for words of foreign origin). The word ‘concept’ itself normally appears in 
this work as a technical term with the meaning regulated by the definition 
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presented in the fourth chapter. Wherever the word ‘concept’ is meant in the 
popular sense, roughly equivalent to ‘conception’, ‘notion’ or ‘idea’, this should 
normally be clear from the context. Usually this distinction is also helped by the 
notation: compare ‘the concept of ‘x’’, e.g. ‘the concept of ‘identity’’ (‘concept’ 
used in the popular sense, to the effect ‘conception of ‘identity’’) and ‘the 
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3. Concepts, categorisation, mental representation.   
Preliminary definitions and discussion.  
Historical background. 
 
Introduction and caveats 
The character of the third chapter of the present work is largely introductory. In 
this chapter, the main objective is to provide an initial discussion of the key 
terms, that is of concept and category/categorisation, as well as of several other 
ancillary but important terms, notably mental representation. The considerations 
that figure in this part of the text are of both diachronic and synchronic nature 
and are designed to sketch a preliminary conceptual geography of the subject. 
 This introductory overview does not (as it cannot) make any pretence to 
comprehensiveness. It is a constructionally necessary element, offering the 
Reader a theoretical background against which the more specific concerns of the 
rest of this work can be defined. However, it should be borne in mind that neither 
historical nor contemporary general characterisation itself lies among the primary 
research objectives of this work; it is meant as a necessary starting point for the 
development of subsequent chapters. As remarked above, because of the size and 
heterogeneity of the subject, it was necessary to profile the discussion in order to 
retain focus and the integrity of the work. 
 
3.1. Concepts 
3.1.1. Preliminary definitions 
The relevant entry in the Second Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary 




2. a. Logic and Philos. The product of the faculty of conception; an idea of a 
class of objects, a general notion or idea. 
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b. Hence in weakened use, a general notion or idea…91 
 
Whereas such a rendering strikes one as rather unspecific, it can be argued that 
the generality of the definition reflects the wideness of application of this word, 
both in common use and in the supposedly more disciplined academic discourse. 
 The earliest recorded use of the word concept in the English language 
dates back to the year 1556; 1663 for the sense 2.a. quoted above. ‘Concept’ is of 
Latin origin, having been formed from Latin ‘conceptum’ (neuter of 
‘conceptus’), from past participle ‘concipere’, ‘to conceive’. This form can be 
further traced back to ‘capere’, to take, and ultimately, to the Indo-European root 
‘kap’, to grasp. This illustrates an interesting point about the pattern of historical 
meaning transfer, by which vocabulary originally describing the tactile modality 
extends in meaning to cover other sensory modalities, and eventually mental 
actions or states (first described by Joseph Williams 1976; for a discussion of 
implications for the formation of conceptual metaphors see Aleksander Szwedek 
2000, 2002). 
  
3.1.2. Historical note 
The English word ‘concept’, as remarked above, was first recorded in writing in 
the sixteenth century, which, in the context of over twenty five centuries of the 
Western intellectual tradition, can almost be considered a recent coinage. It is 
already evident that theoretical reflection on topics related to concepts 
considerably predates the entering of this word into the English language. As is 
                                                 
91 The Second Edition of the OED (Oxford English Dictionary on CD-ROM, version 3.0) 
represents the word concept with one verbal (with an obsolete meaning equivalent ‘to 
conceive’) and one nominal entry, the latter comprising three senses, further divided into the 
total of eight sub-senses. Sense 1, obsolete and equivalent to conceit, has four sub-senses 
(“thought, idea”; “disposition, frame of mind”; “imagination, fancy”; “opinion”); sense 2, in 
addition to 2.a. and 2.b. quoted above, lists the use in attributions and combinations as a distinct 
sub-sense 2.c.; sense 3, labelled as nonce use, is “an original draft or rough copy”. 
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the case with the better part of major themes in occidental thought, the roots of 
this reflection can be traced to classical antiquity.  
 In the light of the above, it is particularly difficult to pick out any specific 
areas in the history of philosophy that would correspond directly to the modern 
understanding of concepts: most topics in the history of philosophy can be 
successfully argued to coincide with concepts in one way or another. Still, some 
selections are inevitable. Generally, contemporary research on concepts in the 
mentalistic sense can be said to be continuous with historical investigation of 
ideas92. In the non-mentalistic sense, it roughly succeeds to the study of word 
meanings93. I accept the above as useful simplifications and guiding assumptions 
for the overview below. 
 
3.1.3. Discussion 
In addition to the diverse uses of the word concept in popular idiom, this term 
has developed a wide range of more technical uses in linguistics, psychology, 
philosophy, and neighbouring disciplines. 
 Probably the most comprehensive definitions of the term ‘concept’ have 
been developed in the logico-philosophical tradition. Marciszewski (1970: 213) 
determines that concept in the logical sense is the meaning of a common name 
(which he defines separately as a name that can function as a predicate in an 
atomic subject-predicate sentence). Marciszewski further explains that concept in 
the logical sense should be distinguished from concept in the psychological 
sense, which is a mental experience consisting in representing something in a 
non-intuitive (non-sensory) way, i.e. so that sensory images do not belong to the 
                                                 
92 Cf. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy: “The term [‘concept’ – SW] is the modern 
replacement for the older term *idea, stripped of the latter's imagist associations, and thought of 
as more intimately bound up with language.” (Rundle 1995: 146) 
93 Cf., e.g., Wojtak 1998, who reviews the problem of the relation between concepts and lexical 
meanings from a linguistic point of view, coming to a conclusion that the two, while not 
identical, are nevertheless very closely related. 
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content of this representation, even though they may accompany it (1970: 213). 
Antoni Podsiad (2000: 633–635) distinguishes concepts in the psychological-
epistemological sense (as distinct from concepts in logic and concepts in 
methodology). A concept is a “purely mental presentation of something with its 
immanent content, a word of thought (verbum mentis), or a cognitive-intellectual 
form (species intelligibilis; a picture). Such a presentation can refer to something 
general, or to something specific but in a general way, and is a result of the 
process of abstraction”94. Podsiad (2000: 634) further distinguishes formal 
concept (an act of nonintuitive or nonimagistic presentation) from objective 
concept (purely intentional correlate of the act of presentation). A linguistic 
correlate of a concept is a name, and both concepts and names have their 
proprietary contents and extensions (2000: 634). 
 A crucial distinction related to concepts is that between concepts and 
images. This is stressed most forcefully by Leon Zawadowski in his critique of 
early associationist psychologism in linguistics (1966: 234–238), where he 
emphasises the qualitative difference between conceptual and imagistic content. 
Similarly, Zdzisław Wąsik (1987: 113) underscores the contrast by juxtaposing 
the definitions of concept – “the meaning (connotation) of a name, a mental 
counterpart of a set of features typical of objects to which the name refers (its 
designates)”95 – and image  – “psychological process consisting in bringing to 
consciousness the pictures of objects and situations not presently impinging on 
the sensory organs of a man, based on past perceptions and fantasy”96.  
 At this point, it is useful to establish several definitions and ancillary 
distinctions that pervade the academically informed discussions of concepts97. 
                                                 
94 Podsiad (2000: 633–634), transl. from Polish – SW. 
95 Wąsik (1987: 113), transl. from Polish – SW. 
96 Wąsik (1987: 113), transl. from Polish – SW. 
97 The Reader is directed for further, more extensive reference especially to: 
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 The terms denotation, designation, and reference are frequently treated as 
synonymous or nearly synonymous; the distinctions between them do not figure 
prominently in the context of this work, but it is prudent to have them all spelled 
out. Podsiad (2000: 172) defines designation in logic as a semantic function that, 
by means of its sense, indicates an object of which it can be truthfully predicated; 
designation in linguistics, as opposed to signification, is the referring of the 
consciousness of a language user to specified classes of objects by means of the 
conventional signs of this language. A designate of a name is an object 
designated by this name (in this sense of that name) (Podsiad 2000: 173). 
Marciszewski (1970: 51) explains that “[a] designate of name N in language L, 
given a certain sense of that name, is every object of which this name can be 
predicated preserving truth”. 
 Reference is the most general term of the three, being also common in 
everyday use in addition to its more technical applications. According to 
Marciszewski (1970: 196) reference is any (case of) referring of a sign to the 
reality that this sign is about. Reference is dually defined by Podsiad (2000: 581), 
as 1) (in logic) that which is meant by a sign, and 2) (in linguistics) one of the 
two basic functions of language, consisting in indicating that which a sentence is 
about, thus making it possible to identify and reidentify the object. 
 Denotation is frequently meant in the general sense of reference above. 
Marciszewski (1970: 47) defines denotation as 1) the extension of a name, i.e. 
the set of all designates of a name (including past, present, future, and possible 
designates), 2) the class of all presently existing designates, 3) object of any type 
referred to by a categorially appropriate expression (not necessarily a class). 
                                                                                                                                               
Ajdukiewicz, Kazimierz 1949. Zagadnienia i kierunki filozofii. Teoria poznania, metafizyka 
[Issues and directions in philosophy. Epistemology, metaphysics]. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo 
Czytelnik. 
Ajdukiewicz, Kazimierz 1960. Język i poznanie. T. 1, Wybór pism z lat 1920–1939 [Language 
and cognition. Selection of papers from the 1920–1939 period]. Warszawa: Państwowe 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe. 
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Denotation is specified by Podsiad (2000: 169–169) as the semantic relation 
between expressions of a language and the objects described in this language, 
which consists in this expression referring to a specified object; it may also mean 
a denotatum, i.e. a denoted object. Denotation is contrasted with connotation. 
 Connotation in logic is the characteristic content of a name, consisting of 
its necessary and sufficient properties such that any person knowing those 
properties is able to correctly decide whether any given object is a designate of 
that name (Marciszewski 1970:111). According to Podsiad (2000: 454), 
connotation is the set of properties characteristic of the designates of a name, i.e. 
those by means of which one can assign those designates to that name’s 
extension. Connotation in the logical sense was introduced by the British 
philosopher John Stuart Mill98, who considered it to be synonymous with 
meaning (see Podsiad 2000: 968). Still, it is necessary to distinguish that notion 
from connotation in the psycholinguistic sense, which Gary Leech terms 
affective meaning: “[t]he connotations of a language expression are semantic 
effects that arise from encyclopedic knowledge about its denotation (or referent) 
and also from experiences, beliefs, and prejudices about the contexts in which the 
expression is typically used.” (quoted in Keith Allan, 2006: 41) 
 A distinction similar in nature to connotation and denotation is that into 
extension and content. Podsiad considers extension to be a synonym of 
denotation (2000: 214, 953), and defines it as a distributive set of all designates 
of a name, as well as of the concept expressed by that name (2000: 953). 
Marciszewski (1970: 360) explains that “the extension of a name N (with a sense 
S, in a language L) is the class of such objects of which one can predicate 
truthfully in L by means of the name N in the sense S”; and also treats extension 
as synonymous with denotation. A term contrastive to extension is connotation 
(in the logical sense), or sometimes content, when it is defined as a set of 
                                                 
98 John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), a British philosopher, politician and economist. 
Notwithstanding his contributions to logic, he was more widely known for his liberal socio-
economic philosophy and the utilitarian doctrine in ethics. 
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properties common to all of the designates of the name (and of its corresponding 
concept), and only to them (Marciszewski 1970: 333, Podsiad 2000: 901). 
Intension or intensional specification (i.e. through enumerating a name/concept’s 
criterial properties) can also be used in this contrastive sense, as opposed to 
extension or extensional specification (i.e. through enumerating all of the 
name/concept’s designates), but it is only rarely done so. 
 
 Below, there follows a list of properties that are typically and relatively 
uncontroversially ascribed to concepts. In view of the breadth and diversity of 
literature related to this topic, the character of this reconstruction has been 
motivated principally by the concerns of representativeness. Consequently, I 
have decided to base this reconstruction primarily on a number of recent English 
reference works99, as well as established Polish reference works100, with brief 
complementary information based on other representative sources. As a result, I 
have arrived at an introductory characterisation of concepts that constitutes a 
minimal, and as far as possible, theory-neutral background for the further 
discussion of this topic; I have reserved a more in-depth treatment for the 
forthcoming sections of this work, where nearly all of the points raised here will 
be developed and revised. The Reader should also bear in mind that the items 
                                                 
99 Brown, Keith (ed.) 2006. Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, Second Edition. Oxford: 
Elsevier. 
Craig, Edward, Luciano Floridi (eds.) 1998. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, CD-ROM 
Edition. London – New York: Routledge. 
Wilson, Robert Anton, Frank C. Keil (eds.) 1999. The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive 
Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Zalta, Edward N. (ed.) 2006. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2006 Edition). 
100 Marciszewski, Witold (ed.) 1970. Mała encyklopedia logiki [A concise encyclopaedia of 
logic]. Wrocław – Warszawa – Kraków: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich. 
Podsiad, Antoni 2000. Słownik terminów i pojęć filozoficznych [A dictionary of philosophical 
terms and notions]. Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Pax. 
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enumerated below have been isolated as distinct points only analytically, while in 
fact being closely interrelated and mutually dependent. 
 
3.1.3.1. Concepts have semantic character. 
Concepts are semantic units, that is, they are the units of meaning. Two things 
are implied by this statement. Firstly, concepts are units, that is, they are discrete 
elements, countable entities distinct from one another, items, quanta. What 
follows, the totality of a conceptual repertoire is traditionally construed not as an 
analogue continuum but as list of separate, distinguishable items. This property 
would seem implicit in their description and thus normally taken for granted. 
 Secondly, concepts are semantic entities (or “semantically evaluable 
entities” – Mandik and Eliasmith 2006). Particular concepts correspond to 
particular and countable contents, or more colloquially, to particular and 
countable meanings101. This trait is better understood in a juxtaposition with 
individual nodes in a connectionist network, which generate meanings 
collectively, but are not individually semantically evaluable, that is they do not 
correspond to meanings in a one-to-one fashion. Unlike them, concepts are not 
‘subatomic’ constituents, but rather each concept can be assigned its own 
meaning (at least in principle if not in practice). Such an understanding of 
concepts is common to mainstream linguistics, philosophy and cognitive 
psychology and as such will be adopted in this work.  
 Alternatively, concepts can be thought of as ‘abilities’ or ‘behavioural 
dispositions’ possessed/displayed by particular organisms. This latter 
understanding is largely incompatible with the former and will only marginally 
be referred to further in the text (this problem is discussed in Laurence and 
Margolis 1999: 6; see also 4.2.3.)102. 
                                                 
101 Alternatively, we can say that concepts have meanings or that they themselves are meanings 
(of linguistic expressions) (Rey 1998; Hampton 1999: 176). 
102 The dispositional accounts of meaning are beginning to be revived in embodied and enactive 
approaches. However, these approaches are themselves located on the peripheries of broadly 
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3.1.3.2. Concepts are elements of relation of signification. 
In linguistic semiotics, meaning is often explained by means of the relation of 
signification103; concepts are elements of the relation of signification. Concepts 
are intermediaries between (conventional) signs and their significata, i.e. signs 
signify things by means of mediating concepts (Lyons 1996 [1977]: 96–97). 
 Typically it is assumed that signs signify broadly understood objects in the 
real world, including physical objects, but also abstract objects, events, relations, 
etc. However, especially in the context of this work it should be borne in mind 
that the cognitivist conceptions of language reject ontological realism (cf. 
                                                                                                                                               
understood Cognitive Science (and in opposition to narrowly construed CS), precisely because 
of their questioning the representational assumptions that are central to mainstream Cognitive 
Science. 
103 The relation of signification is a paradigmatic means of explaining meaning in linguistics and 
semiotics. Most contemporary discussions follow Ogden and Richards (1969 [1923]) in 
visualising this relation as a triangle. Although the original terms used by Ogden and Richards 
were ‘symbol’, ‘thought’/’reference’ and ‘referent’ (fig. 4), most commentators (e.g. Schulte 
1997: 46 – fig. 5) employ other terms, including ‘concept’. 
Note, however, that there are numerous conceptions of ‘meaning’ in linguistics and semiotics – 
for example, Zdzisław Wąsik (2006: 32–33) distinguishes as many as fourteen distinct 
conceptions of ‘meaning’. 
              
Fig. 4          Fig. 5 
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Muszyński 2006: 48–51); thus in such conceptions signs (qua linguistic signs) 
must refer not to ‘real’ objects but instead to objects as construed by the 
cognitive agents (see e.g. Jackendoff 1996). 
 
3.1.3.3. Concepts correspond to units of language. 
The format of concepts is language-like, i.e. it is – to some degree – isomorphic 
with natural language104. Some of the aspects and consequences of this statement 
will be mentioned later in this section. One particular aspect that is important in 
the light of the relation of signification is that concepts correspond to words (or 
more precisely, lexical items) in natural languages (Rey 1998). Spelling out the 
precise fashion of this correspondence, however, is fraught with difficulties that 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 Two issues need to be shortly mentioned at this point. Firstly, the default 
understanding of concepts is as simple lexical concepts; that is, the linguistic 
units to which they correspond are single content words/lexemes (cf. James 
Hampton 1999: 176), which perhaps can be extended to embrace lexicalised 
phrases or ‘entries in the mental lexicon’ in general105. But there is at least one 
distinct variety of concepts that does not correspond to content words, i.e. logico-
mathematical concepts that correspond to certain function words. 
 Secondly, most scholars (e.g. Fodor 1998, Rey 1998) distinguish between 
simple and complex concepts, the latter being formed by the combination of the 
former, thus corresponding not to words but rather to clauses and phrases. Unless 
explicitly stated otherwise, in this work ‘concept’ is meant to refer to simple 
lexical concepts. 
 
3.1.3.4. Concepts are mental entities. 
                                                 
104 One of the many ways of describing a concept is as a “word of thought (verbum mentis)” 
(Podsiad 2000: 633); see also Rundle 1995: 146. 
105 The term „mental lexicon” (analogically, „entries” in the mental lexicon) is understood here 
in the sense of Jean Aitchison (1996 [1987]). 
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Concepts are typically thought of as mental entities, i.e. such that exist in the 
minds of individual humans. However, there are important traditions in both 
linguistics and philosophy that treat concepts as external to and abstract from any 
individual human being. This recurring question, absolutely fundamental from 
the ontological point of view, has been discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
 It may be noted that even in theories that construe concepts as abstract and 
non-mental, concepts must nonetheless be somehow made epistemically 
available to individual cognitive agents, i.e. they must at least be grasped, 
possessed, accessed, etc. by individual minds. 
 
3.1.3.5. Concepts are building blocks of propositions. 
Concepts are the elementary building blocks of propositions (Rey 1998; Millar 
1994: 674), or the contents of complete, well-formed declarative sentences that 
assert or deny106. Therefore, concepts can be thought of as the main constituents 
of knowledge. In approaches to knowledge in which all knowledge is supposed to 
be propositional (c.f. the traditional, if not universally accepted, philosophical 
definition of knowledge as ‘justified true belief’), all knowledge is also 
conceptual, i.e. concepts are the only kind of its constituents. 
 
3.1.3.6. Concepts are stable and redeployable. 
Concepts are stable, that is, they retain their identity through time. They inherit 
this property from their being mental representations, which have stability as a 
criterial feature (Nęcka et al. 2006: 26–27; Eysenck and Keane 2002: 284). 
                                                 
106 As already noted, Marciszewski (1970: 261) defines ‘proposition’ [Polish: „sąd w sensie 
logicznym”] as “the meaning of a declarative sentence… that which is common to a certain 
class of psychological experiences”.  
Eysenck and Keane (2002: 245) explain that “propositional representations are considered to be 
explicit, discrete, abstract entities that represent the ideational content of the mind. They 
represent conceptual objects and relations in a form that is not specific to any language… or to 
any modality…”. 
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Stability and redeployability come as relatively natural on non-mentalistic 
accounts of concepts, especially if concepts are considered to be eternal and 
immutable, e.g. in the Platonic/Fregean107 approach (nevertheless, to the extent 
that concepts are expressed by the words of language, there remains the question 
of historical semantic change). This is also natural on those mentalistic accounts 
that envisage concepts as structureless (e.g. Fodor 1998 and elsewhere; but it 
must be made clear that to Fodor, the identity of a concept is independent of its 
epistemic content, which is explained in Chapter 6). Still, on the majority of 
developmental accounts (e.g. Carey 1999), concepts must be capable of 
undergoing far-reaching modifications to their constituent structure (e.g. during 
ontogeny) without changing their identity, i.e. without being transformed into a 
numerically different concept. 
 By virtue of being stable and static, concepts can serve as basic units in 
many computational models of mind (or at least higher cognitive processes, such 
as language processing), still dominant in today’s Cognitive Science (see e.g. 
Pinker 1995 [1994]: 55–77). On the other hand, concepts – like other kinds of 
static mental representations – are seen to be unfit for the task of faithfully 
modelling cognition in dynamic approaches to the mind (see e.g. Port and Van 
Gelder 1995). 
 As a direct consequence of their stability, concepts are redeployable 
(Mandik and Eliasmith 2006, Rey 1998), so that the same concept can occur in 
different thought episodes, contributing the same ‘meaning’. For example, when 
one considers inference, the same concept can reappear in distinct inference 
processes – both in the instances of the same type process and in the instances of 
type-distinct processes – each time with a predictable outcome108. 
                                                 
107 See the introductory discussion in sections 2.1.1. and 2.1.2. 
108 A special case is that of a concept being redeployed within the same thought episode; e.g. the 
concept STAR, underlying the word ‘star’, in the sentence „The little star’s beside the big star” 
(Jackendoff 2002: 61–63); this illustrates additional constraints on the models of the neural 
realisation of concept activation. 
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3.1.3.7. Concepts are shareable. 
Concepts are not idiosyncratic – a concept possessed by an individual is not a 
unique entity ‘endemic’ to this particular individual. Rather, concepts are 
shareable, i.e. a large number of individuals, ideally a whole linguistic 
community, must be capable of sharing the same concept, in a way variously 
described as ‘grasping it’, ‘possessing it’, ‘connecting to it’, ‘participating in it’, 
etc. This characteristic of concepts plays a fundamental role in explaining the 
ability of humans to understand others, both in linguistic communication and in 
folk psychology (see 3.1.3.12.). 
 The above property, taken at face value, leads to an immediate clash with 
some of the other features ascribed to concepts, principally their being mental 
representations. A viable way of reconciling shareability with a mental character 
is via postulating the distinction into concept tokens and concept types. This 
strategy is developed in 4.2.6.1. 
 
3.1.3.8. Concepts are non-imagistic. 
An extremely important aspect of concepts is that they are abstractions over 
individual acts of experience, a property that makes them distinct from percepts 
in that their content is non-sensory, non-imagistic (Podsiad 2000: 633–634, see 
also the discussion in section 3.1.3.). Perception should not be identified with 
sensation (or, to be more exact, sentition, or sensory stimulation) since the latter 
is basic and continuous signal reception, whereas the former is categorised and 
discrete, with individual percepts available to consciousness as units in 
introspection; the process of perception involves a considerable degree of active, 
top-down re-construction which draws on the agent’s goals and background 
knowledge109. Perception, however, is still directly dependent on the immediate 
                                                 
109 For an overview of the ‘active’ character of perception, manifest in perceptual constancies, 
gestaltive phenomena, etc., see e.g. Nęcka et al. (2006: 295–296). In general, this aspect of 
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sensory data. Percepts are concrete and can be assigned individual spatiotemporal 
indexes: changing the time, place or person to which a percept occurs results in a 
different percept. The content of percepts is sensory. In contrast, the content of 
concepts is abstract; e.g. the concept DOG does not depend on any specific 
mental image of a dog, nor any other particular (bit of) sensory experience. 
 Of course, perceptual content is not by definition excluded from 
participating in conceptual content in various ways. Indeed, such participation 
may be common, as indicated by the way in which the human brain works, e.g. 
the fact that parsing sentences with sensory contents causes activations in the 
relevant parts of the sensorimotor cortex110. Still, it must be emphasised that 
imagistic content cannot be on its own constitutive of concepts111. 
 
3.1.3.9. Concepts are general. 
Concepts are general in that they do not correspond to particular events, 
instances, or individuals. Traditionally, they have been usually taken to 
correspond to classes of things, rather than particular, specific things (Chlewiński 
1999: 12); bona fide concepts are of types, not individuals. Thus, the concept 
DOG will correspond to a class of dogs – either all actually existing (present, 
past and future) dogs or all existing as well as possible dogs – while the 
representation of an individual Fido would not have the status of a true concept. 
Alternatively, individuals can be considered to form classes with exactly one 
member, which would legitimise a more inclusive construal of concepts to 
                                                                                                                                               
perception is emphasised by the so called „New Look” theorists – see a critical discussion in 
Fodor 1983: 66–90) 
110 For instance, Vittorio Gallese and George Lakoff report activations in hand areas on the 
motor and sensory homonculi in the cerebral cortex in parsing sentences containing the word ‘to 
grasp’ (Gallese and Lakoff 2005). 
111 See e.g. Arthur Markman (1999: 190–191), and especially Leon Zawadowski (1966: 236–
238). 
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incorporate singular representations as well (Prinz 2006). This, however, is a 
slightly nonstandard understanding of the term in question. 
 
3.1.3.10. Concepts enable categorisation. 
From the abovementioned relation between concepts and classes of things it 
follows that concepts play a role in categorisation. As it stands, this statement is 
rather vague; exactly how it should be interpreted closely depends on the use of 
the terms ‘categorisation’ and ‘category’ in a given text. Concepts can be said to 
enable humans to categorise, they can be said to be categories themselves, or to 
be the intensional112 specifications of categories (detailed discussion in 4.2.4.). 
The mutually defining relation between concepts and categorisation in Cognitive 
Science is best illustrated by the fact that in this field they are almost invariably 
discussed together, an issue that will also recur in the later parts of this 
dissertation. 
 
3.1.3.11. Concepts support inferences. 
Since concepts are the units over which the process of inferencing is defined, 
they make it possible for the cognitive agents to draw inferences (e.g. Hampton 
1999: 177, Haman 2002: 18). One can speak about concepts supporting 
inferences in two distinct ways.  
 Firstly, concepts enable drawing inferences in a trivial, content-
independent way, merely in virtue of being the units on which the process of 
inferencing runs. For example, the classic syllogism ‘if x is a y, and y is a z, then 
x is a z’ utilises the corresponding concepts X, Y, Z, even though its correctness 
does not hang on what those concepts are; it is thus supported by these concepts 
in a way fully independent of their respective contents.  
 More interestingly, concepts – construed as ‘capsules of knowledge’ – 
support inferences in a content-dependent way that brings into play the details of 
                                                 
112 Cf. the definitions of intension, extension, connotation and denotation discussed in 3.1.3. 
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the semantic structure of the concepts in question. For instance, if the object x is 
a knife, then the knowledge of the semantics of the corresponding concept 
KNIFE (‘knives can be used for cutting’) makes it possible to draw the inference 
that ‘x can be used for cutting’. 
 
3.1.3.12. Concepts are units of folk-psychological explanations. 
One specific area of interest where both inferences and propositional attitudes are 
productively employed is supposed to be the so-called ‘theory of mind’113, that is 
the ability to perceive others as self-governed, intelligent agents and make sense 
of and predict their behaviours. In other words, concepts underlie folk-
psychological explanations (see e.g. Cain 2002; discussed in more detail in 
4.2.3.2.). 
  
3.1.3.13. Concepts combine in productive and systematic ways and underlie 
compositionality of though and language. 
Conceptual structures – in the ‘marked’ sense of ‘structures built from concepts’ 
(rather than the default sense ‘internal structures of concepts’) – have logical 
properties: concepts are invoked to explain the logical properties of thought. 
These are mirrored by, and visible in, linguistic structures, which are assumed to 
inherit them from thought. The logical properties in question are productivity and 
systematicity114. 
 Productivity115 permits both the production and comprehension of 
complex expressions without previous exposure to at least one token of a given 
                                                 
113 ‘Theory of mind’ is a misleading, but extremely well established name for this cognitive 
ability (at least in ethology, evolution of language, and comparative and developmental 
psychology). See also footnote 159 in section 4.2.5.1. 
114 Brifely explained in, e.g., Fodor 2001. 
115 Productivity is meant here in a general rather than specialised sense of productivity in word 
formation (see Plag 2006). 
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complete complex expression. Because of productivity, it is enough to know the 
simple expressions and the rules of their combination. 
 Systematicity is characteristic of a system of signs to the degree that the 
elements in the system combine to form complex expressions in ways that are 
regular and predictable. For example, when knowing the meaning of ‘a y’ (e.g. 
‘angry man’) and ‘b z’ (e.g. ‘nice girl’) one is normally able to predict the 
meanings of ‘b y’ (‘nice man’) and ‘a z’ (‘angry girl’). 
 Those two properties constitute very strong arguments for the 
compositionality in human languages, supposedly derived from the underlying 
compositionality of human conceptual thought (cf. Fodor 2001). It must be noted 
that especially in natural languages, as opposed to artificially constructed 
languages, compositionality admits a great variety of counterexamples (e.g. 
Pinker and Jackendoff 2005). Still, the received view (with the possible 
exception of the proponents of extreme pragmatics-oriented accounts) is that no 
theory of language and conceptual thought can be made to work without 
somehow accounting for their compositionality. 
 
3.1.3.14. Concepts are normative. 
A property that many scholars, especially philosophers, deem constitutive of 
being a concept is normativity (e.g. Peacocke 1995, Chapter 5). The requirement 
that concepts be normative means that each concept must carry with it the criteria 
for its correct application. The very notion of ‘correctness’, in turn, presupposes a 
possibility for error, i.e. for misapplying the concept, as well as a viable way of 
judging correctness. Consequently, normativity implies the social dimension of 
concepthood: it is argued that the standards for correct application cannot be 
purely subject-internal (e.g. following the well-known Wittgensteinian ‘Private 
Language Argument’116), but must instead be externally and intersubjectively 
constituted. 
                                                 
116 Perhaps best illustrated by the ‘beetle in the box’ example and the following paragraphs 
(Wittgenstein 1953: 100–102). 
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 From the above review of the properties ascribed to concepts by diverse 
theoretical perspectives it should already be clear that many of them are 
implicitly or even explicitly conflicting. As it has been repeatedly stated, arriving 
at a single, unified, fully theory-neutral technical construal of the term ‘concept’ 
is probably impossible. 
 
3.2. Categories, categorisation 
3.2.1. Preliminary definition 
In general terms, categorisation117 is the act or process of classifying, of placing 
something in a category or ascribing something to some group of similar entities, 
according to a non-random underlying principle. In a broader sense, 
categorisation may refer to the ability or function of performing this act or 
executing this process, or to the area of study concerned with the systems of 
categories, their formation, and application.  
 The Oxford English Dictionary (Second Edition) lists the word 
‘categorization’ under the entry ‘categorize’, which is defined as follows: “To 
place in a category or categories; to classify… Hence categorization, the action 
of categorizing; classification.” ‘Categorisation’ is of course derived from the 
verb ‘to categorise’, itself a derivate from ‘category’; this last word is so defined 
in OED: 
 
 1. Logic and Metaph. A term (meaning literally ‘predication’ or ‘assertion’) 
given to certain general classes of terms, things, or notions... c. Hence in more 
general use... 2. a. A predicament; a class to which a certain predication or 
assertion applies. b. A class, or division, in any general scheme of 
classification...  
                                                 
117 Throughout the work, I adhere to the traditional British spelling (‘categorisation’ with an ‘s’) 
rather than to the American alternative, also recently gaining foothold in Britain: 
‘categorization’ with a ‘z’. This seemingly trivial difference has one rather crucial consequence, 
namely that both spellings should be remembered about during database searches. 
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 The dictionary also offers a short description of the use of ‘category’ by 
Aristotle (sub-sense 1. a.) and Kant (1. b.). The etymology is given as: adaptation 
of Latin categoria, adopted from Greek κατηγορία: accusation, assertion, 
predication; abstract noun from κατήγορος: accuser.  
 
3.2.2. Categories 
The term ‘category’ in its theoretical sense has an ancient origin, having been 
first introduced by Aristotle. Categories, as reflected by its later classification in 
Organon, is a text on logic, and consequently, ‘category’ (also called 
‘predicament’) is thought of as a primarily logical notion (but see Rijk 1988). It 
referred to the most abstract kinds; anything that could be either the subject of an 
assertion or its predicate, when considered on the highest level of generality, 
could be assigned to one of the categories. In more modern terminology, 
‘category’ can be explained by reference to the notion of inclusiveness – 
categories can be understood as classes with maximum possible inclusiveness. 
The method of linguistic analysis – extracting information about the structure of 
the world through the analysis of language used to describe it – led The 





                                                 
118 “Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, 
place, time, position, state, action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of 
substance are 'man' or 'the horse', of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits long' or 'three cubits 
long', of quality, such attributes as 'white', 'grammatical'. 'Double', 'half', 'greater', fall under the 
category of relation; 'in a the market place', 'in the Lyceum', under that of place; 'yesterday', 'last 
year', under that of time. 'Lying', 'sitting', are terms indicating position, 'shod', 'armed', state; 'to 
lance', 'to cauterize', action; 'to be lanced', 'to be cauterized', affection.” (Aristotle [Categories 
1b25]) 
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 The logical context notwithstanding, the application of the term ‘category’ 
was metaphysical: categories provided the fundamental taxonomy not so much of 
logical description, as of reality itself. In other words, the world was supposed to 
have an intrinsic categorial structure, the discovery of which was an essentially 
metaphysical endeavour. This position is known as ‘categorial realism’. 
 Since misunderstanding is rife, an important note is in order, namely, that 
categorial realism must not be confused with realism on Universals. In 
Categories, Aristotle directly opposes Plato’s extreme realism on Universals by 
stating explicitly that only primary substances (individuals, e.g. a particular man 
like Socrates) truly exist, while both secondary substances (species, e.g. Homo 
sapiens) and other categories are metaphysically dependent; if primary 
substances did not exist, neither secondary substances nor other categories could 
exist. 
 Aristotle’s Categories was an inspiration for a number of discussions, 
developments and revisions by ancient and scholastic authors. However, the only 
other equally influential system of categories was that expounded in Immanuel 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Kant 2003 [1781]) in the late eighteenth 
century. 
 Kant’s account, although explicitly drawing on Aristotle, was also 
radically different. In Kant – much like in Aristotle – the categories were not 
mere instruments of description, but Kant differed from the Stagirite in that he 
did not see categories as classes inherent in reality itself. Instead, he proposed 
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that the system of categories was intrinsic to the cognitive agent, being part of its 
cognitive equipment119. Thus, categories were not present in experience or 
somehow derived, abstracted or constructed from experience by the agent. 
Rather, their status was transcendental. They belonged to the cognitive faculty of 
the understanding (Verstand), being one of the a priori, formal conditions for 
cognising any possible objects of experience. It was only through the application 
of a conception of the understanding that the manifold given in intuition 
(Anschauung) could be synthesised into a coherent object of thought, and thus 
experienced120. Categories were the ‘pure’ concepts of the understanding, being 
the most general and devoid of any sensory content. 
 Kant (2003 [1781]: 68–69) singled out twelve categories which could still 
be grouped in four superordinate classes: 
 








c) of Relation 
– Of Substance and Accident (substantia et accidens) 
– Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect) 
– Of Community (reciprocity between the agent and patient) 
                                                 
119 Cf. also the discussion in Tatarkiewicz (2003: Vol. 2. 129–132). 
120 More accurately, categories and other conceptions of the understanding were requisite for 
whatever cognition could be present in all ‘finite’ (human-like) minds. This limitation did not 
hold in relation to the hypothetical ‘infinite’ (god-like) mind, which could rely purely on 
intuition (e.g. Rolewski 2002: 83). 
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d) of Modality 
– Possibility – Impossibility 
– Existence – Non-existence 
– Necessity – Contingence 
 
The Kantian system of categories retained Aristotelian spirit in so far as it 
remained a system of fundamental distinctions, even though the distinctions no 
longer pertained to the subject-external world, but rather to the necessary (but not 
subject-external) forms of all possible experience. It must be borne in mind that – 
however elegant – the Kantian classification remains purely stipulative, with no 
pretence to either psychological reality or experimental validity. Several 
commentators (e.g. Władysław Tatarkiewicz, 2003: 128) have noted that the 
orderly arrangement of the categories into four triples121 itself hints at the 
motivation behind such a classification being mostly intra-theoretical. 
 
More contemporarily, the notion of (ontological) ‘category’ has not found 
extensive application. One influential discussion of the notion of category, in the 
light of the so-called category mistakes, is that by Gilbert Ryle122 (1951 [1949]: 
22–25). While considering the different types of existence that can (indeed, 
should) be predicated of material and mental objects, he proposes what 
effectively amounts to a linguistic method of testing for two concepts belonging 
to distinct categories. The criterion is the presence of “absurdities” in sentences 
such as “she came home in a flood of tears and a sedan-chair” (1951: 22) or 
“…three things are now rising, namely the tide, hopes and the average age of 
death” (1951: 24)123; in the second example, the tide, hopes, and the average age 
                                                 
121 Kant (2003: 68–69). 
122 Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976), a British philosopher and leadig proponent of philosophical 
behaviourism. 
123 This effect is described in contemporary linguistic theory as zeugma. 
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of death belong to three distinct ontological categories, and it would be a 
category mistake to consider them to have the same status in this respect. 
 In the Cognitive Sciences, two distinct contemporary applications of the 
notion of ontological category could be found. The one involves the field of 
cognitive developmental psychology (Soja, Carey, Spelke 1993 [1991]), referring 
to the repertoire of apparently inborn, fundamental distinctions that the infant 
draws upon to bootstrap word learning (thus overcoming the difficulty illustrated 
by the famous Quineian ‘Gavagai’ example124). The other is Jackendoff’s (1992 
[1987]: 149–160) linguistic analysis leading this scholar to distinguish “elements 
that serve as primitive <parts of speech> of conceptual structure”, which 
“…include at least [OBJECT], [PLACE], [PATH], [ACTION], [EVENT], 
[SOUND], [MANNER], [AMOUNT], and [NUMBER], as well as possible 
others such as [PROPERTY], [SMELL], and [TIME].” 
 
3.2.3. Categorisation 
In discussing categorisation and categories one is immediately faced with a 
question of logical priority. The word ‘category’ is morphologically simpler and 
also seems to be conceptually prior (‘categorisation’ is possible only when one 
possesses a category to which the categorised entity can be assigned). However, 
in accordance with the cognitivist perspective presented in Chapters 1 and 2, my 
deliberate decision is to prioritise categorisation as a cognitive task accomplished 
by cognitive agents. The consequence of such a standpoint is an understanding of 
categories as tools for achieving this task, rather than abstract objects of 
theoretical description. 
                                                 
124 A classic argument to the effect that a word in an unknown language (e.g. „Gavagai!”) 
exclaimed by a native on seeing some object (e.g. a rabbit) cannot be conclusively shown to be 
a name for that object in that language, since an infinite number of alternative interpretations are 
always possible, at least in point of logic. Originally by the American logician Willard Van 
Orman Quine (1908–2000); discussed in the word learning context e.g. by Pinker (1995: 417–
419). 
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 In this work, categorisation in its core sense is understood, rather broadly, 
as the act or process of assigning some stimulus to a given category. One 
terminological remark is necessary. The interpretation of the word 
‘categorisation’ based on popular use admits conflicting intuitions that result in 
its questionable application to category formation. ‘Categorisation’ is indeed 
sometimes used in the sense of category formation even in specialised literature 
(e.g. Nęcka et al. 2006: 101–103, Aarts 2006). Such a conflation may result from 
speaking about ‘categorisation’ to denote a general area of theoretical interest, 
rather than a specific psychological process. In the context of an individual 
cognitive agent, e.g. a human child, this leads to the question of ontogenetic 
priority between categorisation and categories, as it seems to suggest, incorrectly, 
that (mental representations of) categories are formed by the process of 
categorisation. While category acquisition/learning/formation is clearly different 
from categorisation, it is also clearly related. On some accounts category 
formation might be the reverse of categorisation; for example – as noted by 
Laurence and Margolis (1999: 11) – if categorisation is assumed to consist in 
checking for the required criterial features as posited by the classical approach, 
category learning may “run in reverse”, consisting in assembling the features that 
form the category. 
 Typically, categorisation is presented in discussions as a high-level 
phenomenon, that is, a conscious phenomenon whose elements are accessible to 
introspection and readily verbalisable (e.g. Kalisz et al. 1996: 37–42). The above 
is true for conceptual categorisation as opposed to perceptual categorisation; and 
is especially prominent under the so-called classical approach, where the entire 
process is usually open to verbal reconstruction (e.g. ‘the physical entity in front 
of me is a biped, and is featherless, therefore I can classify it as a man’). At the 
extreme end of the spectrum are legal verdicts or taxonomical decisions, which 
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are instances of a laborious, time-consuming and fully explicit categorisation 
process resting on the overt application of formal, codified rules125. 
 Linguistics is the area for which categorisation so construed – i.e. as a 
high-level, consciously accessible process – is particularly important. An oft-
quoted passage from William Labov illustrates the centrality of the notion in 
question (2004 [1973]: 68): 
 
[i]f linguistics can be said to be any one thing it is the study of categories: that 
is, the study of how language translates meaning into sound through the 
categorization of reality into discrete units and sets of units. This categorization 
is such a fundamental and obvious part of linguistic activity that the properties 
of categories are normally assumed rather than studied. 
 
In his paper, Labov is concerned with lexical categorisation in the sense of 
staking out the ‘boundaries’ for word meanings (which Labov understands 
denotationally), the sense compatible with the subject matter of this work. 
Nonetheless, Bas Aarts (2006) points out that within linguistics in general, the 
term ‘categorisation’ has a range of diverse meanings. John R. Taylor in the 
introductory section of his book Linguistic Categorization (1995 [1989]: 1) 
highlights one prominent alternative – a common strictly linguistic understanding 
of ‘categorisation’ is, on the metatheoretical level, concerned with establishing 
the repertoire of terms of the metalanguage. 
 By contrast, categorisation as studied in psychology, for instance 
perceptual categorisation of abstract shapes, need not involve in any essential 
way either language or language-dependent units such as concepts (a 
representative example of such a construal of this notion is perceptual 
                                                 
125 But even there the actual decisions are mediated by informal factors and are much more 
impressionistic than it might at first appear. Consider for example the notorious disagreements 
with respect to assigning particular fossil specimens of extinct hominids to biological taxa; as 
well as establishing the distinctions into taxa themselves (e.g. as reflected in the cladists versus 
phenetists debate). See also section 5.2.4. 
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categorisation of abstract shapes in humans and baboons – cf. Delphine Dépy et 
al. 1997). In an even more fundamental sense, any instance of principled (non-
random) reduction of information complexity, or any instance of systematic 
‘many-to-one’ mapping, is an instance of categorisation. Lakoff and Johnson 
(1999: 18) give the example of the human eye, where the ratio of light receptors 
on the retina to the neural fibres connecting the retina to the brain is of the order 
of 1:100. Since many inputs are ‘classified’ together, this counts as an example 
of categorisation. 
 An interesting case in point is the relatively recent discovery in primates 
of the so-called mirror neurons126. In the stereotypical example of a grasping 
action, the repertoire of possible moves is continuous along more than one 
dimension – for example with respect to the speed of movement, the trajectory of 
the arm, the trajectories of the fingers and thumb, and so on. Still, the reaction of 
a mirror neuron is categorical – the neuron’s firing or not is a binary ‘zero or 
one’ decision. This is an example of a direct neural implementation of a high-
level semantic distinction; note, too, that it does not involve either language or 
implicit languagelike representations. 
 Thus, categorisation is an absolutely fundamental, universal and pervasive 
low-level phenomenon that not only permeates all cognition, but also provides a 
basis for all behaviour in general127. Harnad (2002) in particular stresses its 
essentially sensorimotor nature. Categorisation is our intrinsic capacity: 
                                                 
126 Mirror neurons are a relatively recent but extremely important discovery in neuroscience. 
The function of mirror neurons can be interpreted as performing the classification of actions as 
‘the same’ or ‘different’: they fire both when an animal does a certain action and when it 
witnesses ‘the same’ action performed by a conspecific. See e.g. Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004 
for a review. 
127 Such a conclusion might initially strike one as much too strong. However, in drawing it I 
follow numerous authors important to Cognitive Science, as is illustrated by the quotations 
below: 
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... to sort the blooming, buzzing confusion that reaches our sensorimotor 
surfaces into the relatively orderly taxonomic kinds marked out by our 
differential responses to it -- including everything from instrumental responses 
such as eating, fleeing from, or mating with some kinds of things and not 
others, to assigning a unique, arbitrary name to some kinds of things and not 
others... It is easy to forget that our categorisation capacity is indeed a 
sensorimotor capacity. In the case of instrumental responses... what we tend to 
forget is that these nonarbitrary but differential responses are actually acts of 
categorisation too, partitioning inputs into those you do this with and those you 
do that with. 
 
But categorisation is an overarching concept with a very broad meaning and far-
reaching implications for all domains of human life. Viewed from the everyday 
rather than cognitive-psychological perspective, categorisation is implied by such 
common operations and phenomena as cataloguing, stereotyping, social classes, 
etc. It is a relatively recent realisation that categorisation as visible in language is 
                                                                                                                                               
Stevan Harnad (2005: 21): “[t]o put it most simply and generally, categorization is any 
systematic differential interaction between an autonomous, adaptive sensorimotor system and 
its world.” [italics in the original] 
George Lakoff (1990 [1987]: 5): “There is nothing more basic than categorization to our 
thought, perception, action, and speech.” 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1999: 17) “[e]very living being categorizes. Even the 
amoeba categorizes the things it encounters into food or nonfood, what it moves toward or 
moves away from. The amoeba has no choice as to whether to categorize; it just does. The same 
is true at every level of the animal world. Animals categorize for food, predators, possible 
mates, members of their own species, and so on.” 
Eleanor Rosch (1999: 61): “One of the most basic functions of living creatures is to categorize, 
that is to treat distinguishable objects and events as equivalent.” 
Ray Jackendoff (1990 [1983]: 77): “More generally, the ability to categorize is indispensable in 
using previous experience to guide the interpretation of new experience… Thus an account of 
the organism’s ability to categorize transcends linguistic theory. It is central to all of cognitive 
psychology.” 
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in fact only one aspect of a much more basic phenomenon. This realisation of the 
continuity between language and the rest of cognition, both in the matter of 
categorisation and outside it, was what has since underlain fast-developing 
research in cognitive conceptions of language (see esp. Lakoff 1990 [1987]).  
 Note that categorisation is not the only basic, low-level cognitive process. 
It should be distinguished from recognition, i.e. classifying128 two instances as 
instances of numerically the same individual, without necessarily assigning the 
individual to a broader class, and is dependent on discrimination (individuation), 
i.e. being able to detect discrete chunks in the input that could function as units in 
further processing. In the case of learned (not innate) categories, it is also 
dependent on memory. On the other hand, memory and discrimination are 
equally dependent on categorisation, and recognition, too, always seems to 
involve categorisation of the recognised individual at some level. 
 Categorisation is what introduces discreteness into any cognitive system. 
Although it is well known that categories allow diverse kinds of ‘fuzzy’ effects, 
such as hesitation, inconsistent classification of the same object by different 
agents129, or by the same agent at different occasions, etc., at any given time a 
categorisation decision is a binary decision: something either is a member of the 
category or is not. A good illustration of the discreteness of category borders is 
the phenomenon of categorical perception (described by Stevan Harnad, e.g. 
1987), whereby the inherently continuous spectrum of variation of a stimulus is 
perceived as forming a set of relatively discrete categories with only very small 
regions of the spectrum perceived as intermediate between any given two 
categories. For instance, almost any point on a colour spectrum is likely to be 
classified by subjects as an exemplar of some particular colour, while very few 
will tend to be classified as unspecified (Harnad 1987). Similarly, most vowel 
                                                 
128 ‘To categorise’ and ‘to classify’ have the same meaning when ‘to classify’ is understood as 
‘to assign [something] to a class’ rather than ‘to form a class or a system of classes’. 
129 E.g. McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978); see also Chapter 5 in general. 
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sounds will be perceived as a particular vowel from the subjects’ native 
language, with only very few sounds perceived as genuinely indeterminate.  
 Categorical perception further enhances the principle of exaggerating 
within-category similarity and between-category dissimilarity: the subjects in an 
experiment typically judge two exemplars of colour shades to be much more 
similar to each other when they belong to the same colour category than when 
they belong to distinct categories, even though in both cases the pairs of 
exemplars are ‘objectively ’equidistant, in the sense of being equidistant on the 
colour spectrum (Harnad 1987). 
 
A historical overview of the topic of categorisation constitutes a separate major 
part of this work, and is presented in Chapter 5. 
 
3.3. Mental representation 
Mental representation is another key notion of the work; it will loom large in the 
remaining chapters of this text. 
 In most general terms, a representation is something that represents, i.e. is 
about things other than itself; by virtue of this fact, representations have 
meaning, or content (Egan 2006: 553). Mental representation is, ipso facto, a 
kind of representation: accordingly, it is realised by a physical vehicle 
(representation bearer) and has content, that is, represents something distinct 
from itself, is about something: an object, event, or ‘state of affairs’ in the world. 
In addition, as a result of being ‘mental’, mental representation requires a 
cognitive system to which it is internal130. 
 David Pitt (2006) observes that mental representation, despite being a 
proprietary notion of the philosophy of mind, has had particular importance to 
Cognitive Science ever since the conception of this (super)discipline. It is worth 
reiterating that the transition from a behaviouristic to a cognitive viewpoint 
                                                 
130 Cf. Żegleń (2003: 26): „…representation is information about something, encoded in a 
system”. 
This is a submitted manuscript version. The publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint the 
material in any form. Final published version, copyright Peter Lang: https://doi.org/10.3726/978-3-653-05287-9 
 122 
resulted from a general conviction that human behaviour must be explained, not 
exclusively in terms of externally observable stimuli and responses, but rather in 
terms of underlying mental representations (see Chapter 1). Today, the 
representational theory of mind (in cognitivist literature often referred to as 
RTM131) provides the unifying framework for mainstream Cognitive Science, as 
it was explained in Chaper 1. 
 It has also been argued (most influentially by Hilary Putnam 1981) that 
representations presuppose interpreters, following the claim that nothing can be a 
representation ‘intrinsically’ purely by virtue of its physical properties, such as a 
structural homomorphism with the represented object, some similarity to it, etc. 
On this view, the relation of representing requires an external observer – an 
interpreter – whose presence is constitutive of this relation: ‘representation is in 
the eye of the beholder’. This, however, gives rise to severe difficulties. If the 
relation of representing requires an interpreter, then mental representations 
require an internal, personified interpreter located, as it were, ‘inside’ the mind 
(the problem of Homunculus132). More generally, to the extent that interpretation 
itself depends on representations, the relation must postulate an endless chain of 
interpreters, resulting in infinite regress. 
 The traditional philosophical accounts of representation have resolved the 
above difficulty by appealing to the notion of intentionality133: an intrinsic, 
                                                 
131 E.g. Margolis and Laurence 2006. 
132 Exposed by e.g. Daniel Dennett (1998: 224–225), and also Vilyaneur Ramachandran in his 
second Reith Lecture, accessible from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith2003/ram/lecture2.ram 
133 The term ‘intentionality’ was introduced into modern philosophy of mind by the German 
philosopher Franz Clemens Brentano (1838–1917), being adopted by this thinker from the 
works of mediaeval scholastics. Intentionality was a central notion in the philosophy of many of 
his students, notably the German philosopher Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (1859–1938), 
and the Polish philosopher and logician Kazimierz Jerzy Adolf Twardowski (1866–1938). See a 
discussion in Żegleń (2003: 151–158). 
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inherent power of the mind to be directed at something, hence being about it, 
representing it. However, intentionality is a semantic notion. Following the 
naturalistic consensus in Cognitive Science and philosophy of mind discussed in 
Chapter 1, whereby all valid descriptions must remain within the bounds of a 
naturalistic vocabulary, intentionality cannot enter explanations, but must be 
naturalised (see theories of content below)134.  
 Bearing all of the above points in mind, one may follow the strategy of 
Urszula Żegleń (2003: 26) who defines representation as “information about 
something, encoded in a system”. Given that ‘information’, ‘encoding’ and 
‘system’ are notions applicable in the natural sciences, such a construal allows 
one to avoid presupposing intentionality, and thus produce a naturalistic notion 
of representation suitable for Cognitive Science. 
 As is generally agreed, mental representations are physical entities, being 
realised by physical bearers. This issue and the related issue of the ‘reality’ of 
mental representations will be examined in detail in Chapter 4, in the context of 
discussing concepts as a kind of mental representations. 
 Mental representations have contents, by which they are type-individuated 
(i.e. representations having the same contents are necessarily representations of 
the same type). The notion of content is closely related to the notion of meaning 
in linguistics, and it too is notoriously elusive to definition, for precisely the same 
reasons. 
 Contents, or ‘meanings’, of representations must also be somehow 
‘grounded’ or ‘fixed’. At least three major naturalistic theories (in philosophy of 
mind called semantics) have been developed regarding the determination of 
                                                                                                                                               
Despite having identical pronunciation and almost identical spelling, intentionality must not be 
confused with intensionality. The relevant distinction is clarified in a short text by William J. 
Rapaport: http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/~rapaport/intensional.html 
134 More radically, Jackendoff (2002: 20–21) considers the term ‘representation’ itself to be 
“intentionality-laden” and postulates its replacement (together with other similar terms, such as 
‘symbol’, or even ‘mind’) by neutral terminology, such as ‘cognitive structures’. 
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content: informational, teleological, and functional-role (summarised in Botterill 
and Carruthers 1999: 161–190): 
 
a) informational – on the point of view of informational semantics, the 
content of a mental representation is determined by the causal relations 
between the mind and the world: a mental symbol A, with the content A, 
is reliably triggered by exemplars of the category ‘a’ in the world; the 
coincidence of instances of A and a (e.g. representations of cars and real 
cars) is causally correlated and supported; 
b) teleological – according to teleo-semantics, the content of a mental state A 
(mental state is the relation of an agent towards a complex representation, 
typically a propositional attitude such as believing that x, desiring that x, 
etc., where x is a propositional representation) is determined by the 
function of the mental state which has been selected in evolution. This can 
be enhanced by recourse to counterfactuals (the function that would have 
been selected, e.g. representing cars, if a given organism had had an 
evolutionary history in a given environment); 
c) functional-role – functional role semantics proposes that contents of 
mental representations be determined by their actual or potential causal 
interactions with sensations, mental states, and behaviour; in other words, 
content of the representation depends on the function that it has in the 
system. A mental representation of a car would be this particular 
representation that would be reliably tokened in the system’s mental 
processes leading to appropriate behaviour in relation to cars. 
 
The above account is to some extent biased towards linguaform mental 
representations that enter propositional attitudes, in concord with the traditional 
application of representational terminology in folk psychology. However, 
theories within Cognitive Science make use of numerous other sorts of mental 
representations, including images, impressions, schemas, image-schemas, scripts, 
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frames, or computational rules. Not all kinds of mental representations have to be 
consciously introspectible – some of them may be subdoxastic and therefore not 
accessible to introspection. 
 Finally, it must be underscored that the notion of mental representation as 
used in Cognitive Science departs from the minimal definition stated above in 
rather fundamental ways. Mental representations is used very broadly, to cover 
all kinds of stable postulated cognitive structures, including ones that do not have 
externalised repraesentata (do not correspond to any entities in the world 




In the third chapter of my work, I described in general terms and then discussed 
three theoretical notions central to the present work: ‘concept’, ‘categorisation’, 
and ‘mental representation’. 
 Firstly, I characterised the notion of ‘concept’ descriptively, by identifying 
a range of general properties that are uncontroversially predicated of concepts 
and supplying a short comment on each of these properties. A more detailed 
consideration of concepts in the particular sense most relevant to the scope of the 
present work constitutes a larger theoretical task and, as such, was left for 
Chapter 4. 
 Secondly, I focused on the notions of ‘category’ and ‘categorisation’. 
After a short historical discussion, I established a more specific and more 
contemporary understanding of the latter notion, in line with contemporary 
Cognitive Science: as ‘the act/process of grouping distinguishable stimuli 
together by treating them as equivalent’. 
 Finally, I addressed the notion of ‘mental representation’ as one having a 
major role in this work. In this section, the more traditional – intentional – 
understanding of ‘mental representation’ was highlighted, but one that was 
transferable from the philosophy of mind to Cognitive Science. In particular, the 
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main theories of content (i.e. ways of giving meaning to mental representations) 
were shortly reviewed. 
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4. Concepts in Cognitive Science135 
 
 
In the third chapter, I provided a possibly general, if not fully theory-free, 
introductory characterisation of concepts and categorisation. But it has already 
been remarked that it is impossible to investigate either concepts or categories in 
any depth while remaining neutral on a number of philosophical issues, 
particularly in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. The goal of this 
chapter is to clarify these basic commitments. 
 In this chapter, I stipulate and briefly discuss the minimal requirements for 
a theory of concepts in Cognitive Science: understanding concepts as mental 
(internal) representations that are capable of serving a number of cognitive 
functions. I also take two important definitional decisions that are not likewise 
uncontested. I propose that categories are most fruitfully approached when 
regarded as mental representations and that concepts are a subset of so 
understood categories: namely, concepts are categories with lexical correlates. 
These two issues are accordingly offered a more detailed treatment, with the 
latter claim being given a sound footing in a broad range of empirical work.  
 
4.1. Scope of study 
The scope of this work is delimited to concepts that underlie everyday words, 
that is, roughly, to categorematic concepts. Categorematic concepts can be 
defined as each having a meaning of its own and corresponding to words that can 
function as subjects or predicates of propositions136.  
 The focus of this thesis is on ‘standard’ simple lexicalised semantic 
concepts, i.e. content concepts that correspond to commonly used open-class 
                                                 
135 The content of an earlier version of this Chapter served as a basis for (Wacewicz 2010). 
136 ‘Categorematic’ is defined by Podsiad (2000: 434–435) as „[in traditional logic] a name of 
terms that fulfil an autonomous semantic function, such as e.g. nouns” [trans. SW]. 
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lexical items, especially monomorphemic lexemes; typically, nouns, verbs, and 
adjectives.  
 A further bias of this work is towards the analysis of concrete object 
concepts expressed by single-morpheme common nouns (e.g. CHAIR or 
BACHELOR). Such is the case for two reasons. Firstly, concepts for concrete 
objects are the prototypical kind of concepts and seem to be psychologically and 
ontogenetically (e.g. Landau et al. 1998) primary to other kinds. More 
importantly, as a consequence of its theoretical character, this work is largely 
reliant on existing literature which has itself been focused mostly on concrete 
object concepts. This is partly the result of methodological difficulties related to 
the study of other kinds of concepts, as acknowledged by e.g. Rosch (1988a) or 
Douglas Medin et al. (2000).  
 Syncategorematic137 concepts are ones that lack meanings of their own 
and are correlated with words that cannot serve as subjects or predicates. 
Concepts that correspond to function words are excluded from the present study. 
This concerns especially concepts underlying words that express grammatical 
relations (e.g. articles, pronouns, prepositions) and, most importantly, logico-
mathematical concepts (AND, OR, etc.). 
 The distinction into content (lexical, open class) words and function 
(closed class) words is a sound and widely accepted one, but because of the 
character of this work, it can be relied on only insofar as this distinction is also 
cognitively real. Indeed, very strong empirical evidence confirms the reality of 
this qualitative difference. Function words are processed differently from content 
words, being accessed as unitised wholes rather than composed from graphemes, 
giving rise to a range of psycholinguistic effects, including the missing-letter 
effect (first described in a study by Alice F. Healy, referred to by Greenberg and 
Koriat 1991 – the reader finds it difficult to detect a particular letter when it 
appears in a function rather than content word). What is more, function and 
                                                 
137 ‘Categorematic’ is defined by Podsiad (2000: 851) as „[in traditional logic] a name of terms 
that fulfil a semantic function only when appearing together with other terms…” [trans. SW]. 
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content words have a very different cerebral status: they involve different 
patterns of activation (much more localised for function words, e.g. Pulvermüller 
2002: 115–119), different types of activation (Brown et al. 1999), different 
patterns of breakdown in aphasic patients (largely mirroring the 
agrammatic/anomic distinction – Pulvermüller 2002: 69–73), access to function 
words betrays a right visual field bias (i.e. left hemisphere bias), etc138. 
 Highly schematic words that might or might not be classified as 
syncategorematic (e.g. VERY, GOOD) receive only peripheral treatment. 
Similarly, metalinguistic (VERB, SENTENCE) or highly abstract theoretical 
concepts in general (INCOMMENSURABILITY, PRIMOGENITURE) stand 
outside the primary focus of this work. Ad hoc concepts (as described by 
Laurence Barsalou, 1983) and goal-derived concepts, as well as larger, 
decomposable concepts in general (RELATIONS TO NOTIFY IN CASE OF 
DEATH, COLOURLESS GREEN IDEAS) are likewise excluded in so far as 
they are clearly compositional and do not correspond to individual lexical items. 
 ‘Lexical items’ – construed as the entries in the idealised mental lexicon – 
rather than ‘words’, are the linguistic unit of choice to correlate with concepts. 
Firstly, this does justice to the intuition that a set of different inflectional word 
forms (‘bake’, ‘bakes’, ‘baked’) can rest on one and the same concept. Secondly, 
this preserves the possibility of simple concepts consisting of more than one free 
morpheme (e.g. BLACKBOARD, RED HERRING) when they correspond to 
compounds or longer idiomatic expressions that have a largely noncompositional 
                                                 
138 Some of the differences can be explained in terms of word frequency, but most effects 
remain robust even when word frequency is controlled for. Many researchers (e.g. Friederici et 
al. 2000) suggest that the distinction into function/content words may largely derive from a 
more fundamental distinction into abstract (highly schematic) and concrete (imagistic) words. 
This in turn seems to be in line with the position of cognitive grammar (e.g. Langacker 1987). 
Regardless of whether this is the case, the distinction into function and content words remains 
very well motivated. 
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semantic structure and are stored as complete units in the mental lexicon rather 
than being compiled online. 
 This division might be surprising at first sight. The status of 
‘concepthood’ may seem to depend on a decision of a lexicographer, which not 
only looks arbitrary, but also refers to an externalised individuation criterion – 
rather than a mentalistic, system-internal criterion called for in a cognitivist 
approach. I hope to have convincingly resolved this difficulty by the end of this 
chapter. 
 
4.2. Concepts in Cognitive Science. Concepts as lexical categories 
4.2.1. Introductory remarks 
Deciding on a given perspective inevitably means committing oneself to a set of 
assumptions, some of which will be contestable. Rather than leaving such 
assumptions covert or, worse still, being equivocal on them, I would like, firstly, 
to state them explicitly and, secondly, to shortly justify their selection in order to 
provide a sound foundation for the rest of my work. Some of the assumptions, 
such as a mentalistic rather than semantic understanding of concepts, follow 
directly from the main methodological choice, i.e. the fundamental commitment 
to the cognitivist perspective. Others result from explanatory economy and 
convenience, and a few issues are merely identified, but left as open questions. 
 As stated above, the overarching perspective assumed in this work is that 
of Cognitive Science. The exposition of the cognitivist perspective and the 
motivation for it has been offered in Chapter 1, which is devoted to these issues 
in full. 
 As a direct result, the understanding of concepts is cognitivist:  the central 
assumption about the mental and individual, rather than mind-external and 
abstract character of concepts has been discussed in detail and defended in 
Chapter 2 (esp. 2.2.1., and 2.2.2.). This is not to suggest that inside Cognitive 
Science this understanding is unitary, clear and unproblematic. 
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 The source of the difficulty is much the same as in the discussion of 
concepts in general: Cognitive Science is broad and diversified enough to have 
itself generated a richness of distinct interpretations of the term ‘concept’139. 
These problems are further aggravated by the natural practice of many authors140 
not to address explicitly what exactly their use of this term should amount to, but 
rather to leave it implicit. Also, similar problems arise for categories and 
categorisation in their mutual relation with concepts. In Cognitive Science, and in 
cognitive psychology in particular, concepts and categorisation are routinely 
discussed together (examples are Barsalou 1992, Eysenck and Keane 2002 
[2000]; Medin et al. 2001 [1992]; Medin 1998; Hampton 1999; and many others) 
to the extent of almost forming a unitary theoretical problem; still how exactly 
concepts are distinct from, dependent on, or basic to categories and 
categorisation – is hardly ever spelled out in detail (a notable exception is 
Barsalou 1992: 170–172). Such widespread practice of use of the term ‘concept’ 
in a non-technical, intuitive sense illustrates the fact that even within Cognitive 
Science, a unitary definition that could be universally embraced is impossible to 
achieve. 
 
4.2.2. What is ‘a concept’? Conditions on theories of concepts 
Since ‘concept’ is a theoretical term (thus, a ‘postulated entity’), the question of 
what it is to be a concept is in principle translatable into a set of conditions on a 
theory of concepts. One clearly articulated set comes from Fodor (1998: 23–34), 
who lists five “non-negotiable” conditions for a mentalistically oriented theory of 
concepts: 
 
                                                 
139 One illustration might be the concluding paragraph of the entry “Concepts” in The MIT 
Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences (Hampton 1999: 178): “The proliferation of different 
models for concept representation reflects the diversity of research traditions, the many different 
kinds of concepts we possess, and the different uses we make of them.” 
140 Pinker and Prince 1999 [1996] is just one example. 
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1. concepts are mental particulars, 
2. concepts are categories,  
3. concepts are compositional, 
4. many concepts are learned  
5. concepts are public (shareable)141. 
 
The alternative – or complementary – way of characterising concepts is in terms 
of functions to whose fulfilment they are typically invoked (e.g. in Solomon et al. 
1999; Medin and Smith 1984; Medin et al. 2001; Rey 1998; Prinz 2006; cf. also 
footnote 138 above). The most important ones, being also the most frequently 
listed, are categorisation, inference and reasoning, and communication/word 
meaning. Others include reference determination, representation, learning, 
understanding, explanation, planning, prediction; they can be seen as secondary 
in that they largely follow from the previous set, and also seem to overlap one 
another. 
 Another widely embraced constraint on ‘concepthood’/concept possession 
is the generality constraint, first formulated as a criterion by the philosopher 
Gareth Evans (1982: 100–105). The generality constraint stipulates that if a 
subject is in possession of a concept A, then they should be able to meaningfully 
combine this concept with all other (semantically relevant) concepts in their 
repertoire; it is a condition of the possession of the concept A that the subject be 
able to entertain all (sensible) thoughts that are comprised of the concept A 
together with any other concepts possessed by this subject. It is assumed that the 
thoughts in question are limited to thoughts that have truth conditions; in any 
                                                 
141 A few remarks are in order to prevent possible misunderstandings. Firstly, the ‘non-
negotiable’ criteria are so called because compromising them would amount to a departure from 
the representational theory of mind, and hence to a departure from what Fodor assumes to be the 
point of view of Cognitive Science. Secondly, by ‘concepts’ Fodor means both simple and 
complex concepts, and (4) concerns complex concepts, thus preserving the possibility of most 
or all simple concepts being innate. 
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case, the constraint should be qualified to bar inappropriate combinations that 
would result in thoughts that are not well formed or nonsensical, e.g. because of 
category mistakes. Evans himself concedes that the generality constraint might 
be merely “…an ideal to which our actual system of thoughts only approximately 
conforms” (1982: 105), but it remains an evaluative criterion nonetheless. 
 It has been suggested, especially in reference works (e.g. Prinz 2006, 
Hampton 1999), that the requirements on a theory of concepts are usually too 
extensive (even within the mentalistic perspective). That is, it might be 
unreasonable to expect one and the same type of cognitive structure to support all 
of the above functions, and consequently, that it would be more fruitful to study 
some of the functions in separation, with the application of different theoretical 
models. Undoubtedly, particular theories of concepts necessarily involve certain 
trade-offs, i.e. theories that excel at explaining one aspect will struggle with 
another (e.g. prototype models might be good at explaining rapid categorisation 
but poor at explaining reflective rule-based inference, and vice versa for classical 
models). However, it appears to be the most theoretically interesting to assess 
particular accounts of concepts on the basis of their overall performance ‘across 
the board’. 
 Below, I develop the criteria sketched above, addressing the most 
important aspects as well as ensuing problems. I rely on Fodor’s enumeration as 
the main guideline, treating other listed issues as subsidiary. 
 
4.2.3. Concepts are mental representations. 
The practitioners of Cognitive Science are agreed on viewing concepts as mental 
representations (c.f. Fodor 1998; Laurence and Margolis 1999; Margolis and 
Laurence 2006; Solomon et al. 1999). Note that this is a nonempirical statement, 
prejudged by the assumed theoretical outlook. As a general statement, it leaves 
much room for qualifications and particularisation, but in its core does not appear 
to be contestable. When it is questioned, it is either done from a position with 
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different large-scale theoretical commitments and therefore incompatible with 
Cognitive Science, or the reservations are merely terminological.  
 Thus, for example, speaking of the “representations of concepts” from the 
standpoint of Cognitive Science must be seen as either indicative of the semantic 
perspective or actually referring to the specific implementation of conceptual 
structure, usually on the physical (cerebral) level, i.e. to the representation of 
concepts in the brain (this is done by e.g. Van Loocke 1999, or Shanks 2000 
[1996]: 302–305). Otherwise, this would embody terminological confusion. As 
understood in Cognitive Science, concepts themselves are mental 
representations.  
 Understanding concepts as ‘abilities’ in any form betrays behaviourist 
leanings and thus also seems to go against the grain of Cognitive Science. This is 
certainly the case if this position leads to the elimination of the mental. 
Alternatively, if the mental is retained, the ‘concepts as abilities’ view need not 
conflict with the view of Cognitive Science, and given an appropriately broad 
definition of mental representations (see 1.3.2., 3.3.), could in principle be 
accommodated within it: abilities would then depend on the underlying mental 
representations142. 
 Finally, criticisms might be targeted at the notion of mental representation 
itself. For example, Ray Jackendoff is unsympathetic towards ‘mental 
representations’ as well as other similar terms, finding such vocabulary to be 
hard to reconcile with a naturalistic outlook, and to be suggestive of a 
                                                 
142 Such is the opinion of Laurence and Margolis (1999: 6, footnote 3): “Yet another alternative 
is the view that concepts are not particulars at all, but are, instead, behavioral or psychological 
abilities. We take it that behavioral abilities are ruled out for the same reasons that argue against 
behaviorism in general (see, e.g., Chomsky 1959). However, the view that concepts are 
psychological abilities is harder to evaluate. The chief difficulty is that more needs to be said 
about the nature of these abilities. Without a developed theory, it’s not even clear that an appeal 
to abilities is in conflict with the view that concepts are particulars. For example, such abilities 
might require that one be in possession of a mental particular that is deployed in a characteristic 
way.” 
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misleadingly realist semantics143 (Jackendoff 2002: 20–21); he proposes to speak 
of ‘cognitive structures’ instead. However, this problem, although not trivial, 
again seems to be nominal rather than substantial: for example, Henryk Kardela 
(2006b) has suggested that this difficulty can be addressed by employing the 
term ‘functional representation’. 
 
4.2.3.1. Concepts are physically instantiated. 
If concepts, as defined above, exist only internally to a cognitive system, and if 
cognitive systems must be realised physically, it would follow that concepts must 
have some kind of physical reality behind them. This question is a version of the 
single most important problem in contemporary philosophy of mind, namely, the 
mind-body problem. Following the naturalistic consensus in Cognitive Science 
(see Chapter 1), Cartesian mind-body substance dualism is universally or nearly 
universally rejected, and philosophers and cognitive scientists are agreed that the 
mental is dependent on (or ‘grounded in’, or ‘realised by’, or ‘implemented in’) 
the physical. In other words, the mind must have a physical substrate on which it 
is closely dependent. A number of proposals on the nature of this dependency are 
discussed in literature, ranging from strong reductionism to epiphenomenalism to 
forms of supervenience (see 1.3.3., 4.2.3.1., 4.2.3.2.); however, that the mind as a 
whole is physically instantiated is a dictum foundational to Cognitive Science, as 
well as mainstream philosophy of mind. 
 Still, the above claim does not logically imply microreductionism, that is a 
claim that particular concepts are physically instantiated. The latter statement, 
i.e. that individual concepts have their specific physical correlates within a 
cognitive system, is a different and much stronger one. ‘Concept’ does not 
belong to the physical/physiological vocabulary, but is patently a 
mental/psychological term. Accordingly, concepts must be individuated 
                                                 
143 Gallese and Lakoff (2005) seem to be sceptical of the very term ‘concept’ for essentially the 
same reasons. 
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primarily on the psychological level144, and finding a parallel mechanism of 
concept individuation on the physical/physiological level, although clearly 
desirable, is not strictly necessary. Thus, the two above statements: (‘the 
cognitive system is a physically realised system’ versus ‘individual concepts have 
their specific, distinguishable physical correlates’) should not be confused, 
because they have a different status: the one is a theoretical dogma, the other an 
empirical statement that cannot be prejudged in advance. What is important is 
that even though Cognitive Science is obligatorily committed to the former 
claim, it does not require being likewise committed to the latter claim and may 
remain neutral in this respect. 
 However, the existence of a relation linking concepts to some distinct 
physiological units does appear plausible145. Such a speculation is based on a 
wealth of experimental observations, including data from aphasiology (selective 
damage to particular conceptual domains or selective disruption of semantic 
hierarchy, e.g. Eysenck and Keane 2002: 302–303) and animal studies (e.g. 
Wessberg et al.’s successful isolation of the neural correlates of representations 
of particular motor actions in owl monkeys [cited in Prinz and Clark 2004: 
66])146. 
 Finally, the very notion of ‘independent individuation on the physical 
level’ requires a comment. The most intuitively appealing possibility: that (the 
activations of) concepts correspond to (the firings of) individual neurons (the so-
                                                 
144 Cf. the distinction into three levels of description reviewed in 1.3.4. 
145 For instance, the latest version of George Lakoff’s theory explicitly proposes to understand 
concepts in terms of neuronal structures: “The job done by what have been called “concepts” 
can be accomplished by schemas characterised by parameters and their values. Such a schema, 
from a neural perspective, consists of a network of functional clusters.” (Gallese and Lakoff 
2005: 467; italics in the original). 
146 Admittedly, the examples are very far from conclusive: conceptual domains are not 
individual concepts, and findings related to motor representations need not generalise to 
conceptual representations. What they indicate, however, is that the search for the neuronal 
correlates of concepts is a viable enterprise.   
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called ‘grandmother neurons’147) is in fact the least viable one. Concepts as 
described on the psychological level do not have to correlate with static, 
topological properties of the brain, such as individual neurons, synapses, or 
individual neural networks. Instead, as pointed out by Jean-Pierre Changeux 
(1997 [1983]: 137–138)148 ‘independent individuation’ might involve other 
variables, including dynamic properties, such as frequency of impulses, etc. 
 
4.2.3.2. Concepts are real. 
Admitting that the independent individuation of concepts on the physical level is 
an open question might be perceived as detracting from concepts: allowing a 
possibility that they are in some sense ‘not real’. Such a line of thought stems 
from our everyday intuitions about criteria of existence: the primary 
understanding of something that exists is as a physical object with a definite 
shape and measurable properties. While it is customary to readily attribute 
existence to other kinds of entities, such as states, events, and abstractions, their 
existence is not usually considered to be similarly sound. 
 In reply it could be pointed out that the term ‘concept’, in so far as it is 
part of a theoretical vocabulary of a scientific discipline, does not need any 
additional motivation: its criteria of reality would be set up entirely by the 
philosophy of science. As is commonly agreed, these are most importantly 
predictive power, explanatory power, and formal ‘elegance’ (parsimony).   
                                                 
147 An informal expression capturing the simplistic but not totally mistaken idea that there are 
individual neurons that fire when, and only when, there is a perceptual or conceptual process 
involving a particular person, e.g. one’s grandmother – cf. e.g. Vilyaneur Ramachandran’s Reith 
Lectures: http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith2003 
148 More generally, a given concept could be traced down to a particular activation state in n-
dimensional state space of the activation states of the whole brain or one of its functional units, 
or with a distinct spatiotemporal pattern of brain activation – as long as the correlates are simple 
enough to be themselves reliably individuated on the physical level. 
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 Thus, concepts are real precisely to the extent that they are postulated by 
successful scientific theories149. 
 From this point of view, finding a pattern of reliable implementation of 
concepts in the physical substrate would support concepts simply by additionally 
extending their predictive and explanatory application in theories. But I think it 
safe to conclude that even without it, the notion of ‘concept’ is extremely well 
founded in (cognitive) linguistics, psychology and philosophy (of mind), to the 
extent of being practically indispensable for those disciplines. At the very least, I 
propose to view concepts as postulated entities of extremely high explanatory 
and predictive power, and therefore legitimate objects of study.  
 One particular existing theory that is strictly dependent on concepts is so 
called ‘folk psychology’. Folk psychology is, roughly, commonsense 
explanations or predictions on which humans base their everyday interactions 
with other human beings. This theory employs generalisations of the following 
form:  
 
if X desires p and if X believes that (if X does q, then p), then – ceteris paribus 
– X will do q 
 
For example: 
– if Peter wants to see a lion  
– and if Peter believes that if Peter goes to the zoo, then he will see a lion, 
– then – all other things being equal – Peter will go to the zoo.  
  
The proponents of folk psychology, most prominently Fodor (1994 and 
elsewhere; for a summary see Cain 2002), remark that folk psychology is not 
only successful, but is also the only known method for predicting and accounting 
for human actions.  
                                                 
149 In this respect, the status of concepts would be no different from the status of the notions 
employed by paradigmatic empirical sciences, such as physics. 
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 Folk-psychological explanations rely on concepts, because they have a 
propositional format, and propositions are composed of concepts (cf. section 
3.1.3.12.). By this token, the success of folk psychology lends support to realism 
about concepts. It is important to note, however, that this relation is not 
symmetrical, and the reverse need not necessarily be true. A commitment to the 
reality of concepts does not by itself entail a similar commitment to the reality of 
folk psychology. For example, Botterill and Carruthers (1999, Chapter 2) note 
that one may still reject on other grounds such as doubtful criteria of 
individuation of attitudes (e.g. ‘hoping’ from ‘expecting’, etc.). 
 
4.2.4. Concepts are categories. 
In cognitive-scientific literature, there is no clear consensus on the application of 
the terms ‘concepts’ and ‘category’ and on their mutual relation; as a 
consequence, they tend to be used rather loosely and to a large extent 
interchangeably (see e.g. Żegleń 2003: 234; Chlewiński 1999: 47–48; Medin et 
al. 2001: 367; Mervis and Rosch 1981). This last case might result from the 
authors’ intentional decision to treat these terms as synonymous, but in other 
cases this might be due to their treating the distinction as irrelevant and 
smoothing over it, or due to a failure to make the distinction in the first place. In 
short, the distinction between ‘concept’ and ‘category’ is often principally 
nominal, with the corresponding distinction in substance either missing or highly 
obscure. 
 There appear to be three main lines along which to differentiate between 
concepts and categories150. The first option is to decide that a concept is the 
intensional specification of a class of entities, whereas a category is its extension 
                                                 
150 See also Barsalou (1992: 170–172) for a slightly different list of possibilities: 1. a category is 
the extension (denotation) of a concept; 2. a category is the representation of a concept’s 
exemplars in memory; 3. a category is the representation of a concept’s kinds of exemplars.  
The last two options are different from, but consistent with, the view that I defend in this 
chapter. 
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– the class itself – the set of all individual entities in the ‘real world’ that ‘fall 
under’ that concept. If so, then the relation between them is that of 
representation: concepts are representations (mental or otherwise) of categories. 
Note that this proposition makes no commitments either regarding the status of 
concepts (abstract versus mental) or their structure. Although the classical 
structure of necessary and sufficient conditions is the most natural one, it is by no 
means the only option; for example, Hampton (1998) underscores the fact that a 
prototype representation can in principle be as efficient and precise in 
determining extension. The status of categorisation as a cognitive process could 
still be salvaged by the assertion that cognitive agents form mental 
representations of the categories in the external world. 
 On the radical version, it might be postulated that categories are inherent 
in the structure of the real world: the world comes as ‘preformatted’ into 
categories that exist independently of the cognising subject. This preexisting 
structure would be the same for all cognitive agents, and the role of those agents 
would be limited to discovering this structure. Categorisation decisions could be 
easily divided into correct and incorrect on the sole basis of being in concord 
with this structure. 
 I take it that such an extremely realistic view is untenable on a number of 
philosophical grounds and has long been discredited as a non-contender (e.g. 
Schulte 1997: 49–51). This view is also impossible to reconcile with the 
empirical results of linguistic and psychological research on categorisation (e.g. 
fuzziness and typicality effects; see Taylor 1995). It is also generally discarded in 
Cognitive Science151. 
                                                 
151 For example, Douglas Medin (1998: 94) opines that “[m]ore generally speaking, concepts 
and categories serve as building blocks for human thought and behavior. Roughly, a concept is 
an idea that includes all that is characteristically associated with it. A category is a partitioning 
or class to which some assertion or set of assertions might apply. It is tempting to think of 
categories as existing in the world and of concepts as corresponding to mental representations of 
them, but this analysis is misleading. It is misleading because concepts need not have real-world 
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 However, the view of categories as sets of real world entities can be 
reformulated in a less radical and more commonly advanced version. Categories 
would still be groups of external (objective) entities, but the principles of 
assigning them to those groups would be subject-dependent. Categories would 
then be constructed in the process of interaction of the mind and the world. For 
example, the world could be seen as naturally divisible into entities objectively 
characterised by certain qualities, but categories – as the ways of grouping those 
entities – would only arise by the application of certain rules by the cognising 
agents. 
 But such a position is still not immune to criticism. Firstly, the problem of 
subject-independent reality, far from being solved, is simply moved one level 
down the hierarchy, from categories to qualities. Just as the existence of 
objective, predefined, subject-independent categories is problematic, similarly 
problematic is the existence of objective qualities, or attributres, on which 
categorisation could be based152.  
 Secondly, it is unclear whether anything is gained by such a redescription. 
The wording ‘category representation’, on the face of it, suggests the strong 
version of the view, with categories having some existence independent of their 
representations. Thus, categories would have to be relatively stable, both inter-
subjectively (between different subjects), and temporally (for the same subject on 
different occasions). Experimental data (discussed in 5.2.3.) show that this is not 
the case, and people not only differ in their categorisation decisions, but also are 
inconsistent through time.  
 Thirdly, a direct, unmediated epistemic access to the world in general, and 
hence to the ‘objective’ qualities of things in particular, is in principle 
impossible. As Jackendoff (1990: 78) puts it: 
                                                                                                                                               
counterparts (e.g., unicorns) and because people may impose rather than discover structure in 
the world. I believe that questions about the nature of categories may be psychological questions 
as much as metaphysical questions.” 
152 Such also seems to be conclusion of Eleanor Rosch (1988a: 319). 
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[s]ince there can be no judgment without representation, categorization cannot 
be treated simply as the organism’s comparison of some component of reality 
“a” to a preexisting category of dogs. Rather, the comparison must be made 
between the internal representations of a and of the category of dogs. 
 
The second option is to place concepts and categories on the same ontological 
level, but consider them to be somehow differing in scope. For the reasons just 
sketched, cognitive linguistics follows exactly this strategy, viewing both 
categories and concepts as mental representations. Jackendoff (1990: 77–106) 
treats categories as mental structures synonymous with concept types and 
subsuming particular concepts tokens. For example, a representation of a 
particular dog would count as concept token, and it would exemplify the concept 
type (i.e. category) DOG. The problem with this terminology lies with ‘concept 
tokens’ which involve a counterintuitive use of ‘concept’153.  
 Another, slightly different, suggestion is offered by (Tabakowska 2001: 
32–33). In the terminology used there again both concepts and categories are 
mental representations. However, concepts represent both individuals and 
classes, whereas categories represent classes only. Thus, concepts are more 
inclusive than categories: a category would be a subtype of concept. This is a 
well motivated proposal; nevertheless, I will not follow it for two basic reasons. 
Firstly, there is a strong intuition, consistent with the traditional use of the term 
‘concept’, behind considering concepts to represent classes, or types, rather than 
individuals. More importantly, it appears that it is concepts that are a subset of 
categories, not vice versa. There are numerous categories that are clearly not 
conceptual by any usual standards – notably perceptual categories, which are 
typically contrasted with conceptual ones (see below). 
                                                 
153 This difficulty disappears when ‘concept token’ is substituted by ‘mental representation of an 
individual’. However, this would then prevent the analysis of categorisation in terms of the 
type-token relation. 
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 The third option – the one chosen in this work – is to do justice to this 
intuition by ‘tying’ concepts to language. On this stance, again, both concepts 
and categories are treated as mental representations, but with the former being a 
subset of the latter. In other words, all concepts are categories, but not all 
categories are concepts – only those having a lexical correlate. The infinite 
number of nonconceptual categories can be best illustrated by the classes of 
stimuli used in the studies of perceptual (usually visual) categorisation tasks. For 
example, one may consider the practically infinite number of the representations 
of the classes of abstract shapes (e.g. Sigala et al. 2002 – see Fig. 6; Bruner et al. 
1999 [1956]; see Eysenck and Keane 2002: 281), walking styles (Davis 2001), 
etc. that can be formed by either adult humans, infants, or animals. Such 
representations of classes of perceptual stimuli lack most of the properties that 
theories typically require concepts to have: for example, they lack a rich 
inferential potential and the ability to enter propositions. As a result, they cannot 
be called ‘concepts’ without seriously violating our intuitions. Consequently, 




Fig. 6. Sample stimulus used in visual categorisation tasks – Sigala et al. 2002: 
188. 
 
Admittedly, this last definitional decision also has its drawbacks. However, it 
seems to preserve the intuitions related to the understanding of categorisation that 
are most relevant from the cognitive-scientific perspective. 
 
4.2.5. Concepts have lexical correlates. 
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The question of the lexical correlates of concepts coincides in various ways with 
the broad-ranging ‘language and thought’ dispute: whether, and if so, in what 
ways and to what extent, language influences thought. This debate looms large in 
today’s Cognitive Science, but shows little promise of being conclusively 
resolved; indeed, it takes so general forms that it is far from clear that this debate 
is so resolvable even in principle. I would like to avoid a larger-scale 
entanglement in this theoretical problem and focus on the specific question of the 
postulated constitutive relation of language (i.e. lexical items) to concepts. 
Before doing so, however, it will be useful to take stock of the debate, since the 
highlights of how language impacts thought will turn out to be relevant in 
subsequent sections in reinforcing the target argument. 
 
4.2.5.1. Influence of language on general cognition 
The inescapable general conclusion is that language enhances and influences 
cognition in a number of ways, including both the obvious and the more 
interesting ones. Recently, many of the threads in this discussion have been 
backed up with strong experimental evidence. 
 
a) (quite trivially,) in modern societies there exist a range of cultural 
constructs that can only emerge – and be acquired – within social reality 
that itself relies on a framework laid out by language (e.g. Pinker and 
Jackendoff 2005: 206)154. It follows that certain concepts are in principle 
unattainable by nonlinguistic organisms. In contrast, language users can 
                                                 
154 “Vast domains of human understanding, including the supernatural and sacred, the specifics 
of folk and formal science, human-specific kinship systems (such as the distinction between 
cross- and parallel cousins), and formal social roles (such as “justice of the peace” and 
“treasurer”), can be acquired only with the help of language.” (e.g. Pinker and Jackendoff 2005: 
206) 
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draw upon the pool of collective experience of their community in ways 
that allow them to guide their behaviour more successfully155. 
b) at least some (but by no means all) of human problem solving is 
dependent on the presence of ‘inner speech’; it is not only describable by 
words and sentences of one’s natural language, but is actually rendered in 
such stricte linguistic structures. Whether or not this phenomenon can be 
implicit, i.e. operating below the threshold of consciousness, is a matter of 
controversy. Still, there are many familiar examples where problem 
solvers rely on explicit use of language, such as ‘talking to oneself’.  
One widely-cited experimental example of a situation where being a 
language user (as opposed to a nonlinguistic creature) predicts 
performance on a simple spatial cognition task comes from Elisabeth 
Spelke’s laboratory (Hermer-Vasquez et al. 1999)156. 
c) more generally and fundamentally, language helps ‘discretise’ otherwise 
continuous cognition: divide it into distinguishable quanta. Abstract 
entities, relations, events, and processes become objectified157, thus 
providing the basic units – corresponding to linguistic units – on which 
computational processes can operate. These units remain stable in the 
absence of a co-occurrent perceptual stimulus and are easy for retrieval 
                                                 
155 For developed arguments, see in particular Daniel Dennett 1994, and Stevan Harnad 2002. 
156 The experimental design required the subjects to integrate two kinds of information: 
geometric (long versus short wall) and colour (blue or white wall) in order to succeed on 
100%of trials; relying on only one kind of information ensured success on 50% of trials. The 
rates of success of both rats and prelinguistic children were close to the latter figure (suggesting 
no integration), whereas adults were successful on almost all trials (suggesting integration). 
However, when the adults were engaged in a concurrent verbal shadowing task that placed 
heavy demands on their linguistic processing, their performance dropped to levels indicating the 
lack of integration of kinds of information (Hermer-Vasquez et al. 1999).  
157 ‘Objectified’ not in the sense of becoming objective, but in the sense of Szwedek (e.g. 2002), 
that is in terms of the metaphor of concrete, physical objects. 
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from long term memory, and maintenance, combination and manipulation 
in short term memory. 
This insight, historically reaching back at least to Enlightenment 
philosophers such as John Locke158, has been more recently developed by 
a number of researchers in Cognitive Science, e.g. Jackendoff (1997)159. 
Empirical evaluation is hard to achieve, but relevant experimental data 
include studies such as that of enculturated chimpanzees faced with the 
task of grasping the relation “the same”: a prerequisite for success seemed 
to be the ability to assign a (quasi-)lexical label to this relation (Thompson 
et al. 1997). 
d) language enables or at least enhances metacognition (‘thought about 
thought’): it makes it possible to form the (explicit) representations of 
representations (e.g. Jackendoff 1997: 202–205). This has ramifying 
consequences, of which the most important is perhaps the link to Theory 
of Mind: representing the representational states of others160. An 
                                                 
158 Locke analyses this aspect of importance of language for mental processes in his Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding (1999 [1690]). 
159 „Language is the only modality of consciousness that makes perceptible the relational (or 
predicational) form of thought and the abstract elements of thought. Because these elements are 
present as isolable entities in consciousness, they can serve as the focus of attention, which 
permits higher-power processing, anchoring, and perhaps most important, retrievable storage of 
these otherwise nonperceptible elements.” (Jackendoff 1997: 205) 
160 Theory of Mind (ToM) is a somewhat unfortunate but extremely well established name for 
the socio-cognitive ability of humans and certain higher primates to perceive others as self-
governed (non just self-propelling) and rational agents capable of entertaining their own, 
independent mental states, i.e. beliefs, desires, fears, hopes, etc. Developed Theory of Mind 
implies the ability to meta-represent, i.e. to have mental states about the mental states of others 
(e.g. ‘I know that John thinks that beer is in the fridge’). 
Although in reality it describes an extremely complex and graded set of cognitive abilities, 
‘Theory of Mind’ serves as a useful, if simplistic, label that can be ascribed in a binary all-or-
none way. In such cases, the traditional litmus test for the presence of ToM in a creature has 
been the creature’s performance in false-belief tasks. A success in a false-belief experiment 
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experimental indication of a strong relation between Theory of Mind and 
language is the pattern observed in false-belief studies, with language 
competence predicting performance on false belief tasks rather than the 
opposite way (Hale and Tager-Flusberg 2003; Lohmann and Tomasello 
[quoted in Jordan Zlatev, 2007]). 
e) developmentally, lexical labels facilitate the formation of categories: 
consistent use of a given word to describe examples of a certain salient 
aspect of reality helps to highlight commonalities between such elements 
and leads to the formation of an appropriate category. Without lexical 
labels acting as catalysts, category formation is delayed or not achieved at 
all. (This is different from points a) and c) where the ‘referents’ in the 
world are nonsalient and may be in principle unattainable without 
language). 
For example, Sandra Waxman and Dana Markow (1995) show that in 12-
month human children, words serve as inducing stimuli to form categories 
of simple objects; the observed effect was the strongest with nonbasic-
level categories.  
 Even more strikingly, a recent study by Gary Lupyan (2006) identifies the 
 same kind of effect in human adults. 
f) the scope of at least some categories (the range of perceptual inputs that 
are categorised together) appears to depend partly on the way in which the 
corresponding word functions in a given language community. That is, the 
discontinuities on which categorisation is based depend – in addition to 
more fundamental perceptual, etc. factors – also on ‘Whorfian’161 factors 
related to the use of a given natural language. 
                                                                                                                                               
requires being able to realise that another individual has an incorrect piece of information, and 
being able to predict this individual’s behaviour that results from its acting on this incorrect 
information. For a review of ToM in nonhuman primates see e.g. Heyes 1998. 
161 From the American linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897–1941). The so-called ‘Whorfian 
perspective’ becomes relevant in the following section, where it is addressed. 
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Colour categorisation has traditionally been the area most intensively 
researched in relation to the Whorfian ‘language influences thought’ 
hypothesis. While no significant effects have ever been experimentally 
established, there is convergent evidence from a large number of recent 
studies that a person’s natural language does in fact exert some influence 
on their colour categorisation (for instance, Davidoff 2001; Gilbert et al. 
2005)162. At the same time, one must admit that the effects are rather 
subtle. 
 
Far from being an exhaustive overview, the above is simply a possible 
classification oriented towards the implicit influence of individual lexical units. 
An example of an alternative classification of the ways in which language 
“augments human computation” is the frequently quoted one developed by Andy 
Clark (1998): 
  
– memory augmentation 
– environment simplification (language facilitates categorisation), 
– coordination and the reduction of on-line deliberation (language 
facilitates explicit planning),  
                                                 
162 Davidoff reviews, among other experiments, three cross-cultural ones (perceived subjective 
similarity, category learning, and recognition memory) and concludes (2001: 386): „Put 
together, these three new cross-cultural studies suggest that categorical perception shows the 
influence of language on perception. At the very least, our results would indicate that cultural 
and linguistic training can affect low-level perception... However, more than that, the results 
uphold the view that the structure of linguistic categories distorts perception by stretching 
perceptual distances at category boundaries”. 
Gilbert et al. (2005) found that colour discrimination was affected by the difference in the 
names of contrasted colours when the colours were presented in the right half of the visual field 
(thus processed by the ‘linguistic’ left hemisphere), but not in the left visual field. This effect 
was diminished when the subjects were assigned a verbal tasks related to verbal processing, but 
lasted when the task given engaged non-verbal working memory to a similar extent. 
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– taming path-dependent learning (learning from others in addition 
to from personal experience),  
– attention and resource allocation (written and spoken words as 
external memory enhancements),  
– data manipulation and representation (explicit manipulation of 
written text to structure one’s argumentation). 
 
4.2.5.2. Concepts as dependent on lexical correlates 
The target question of the necessary relation between concepts and their lexical 
correlates, though dependent on the general problem sketched above, is a 
different and much more specific one. It must be emphasised that this question is 
not an empirical one that would lend itself to experimental verification or 
falsification. Rather, the issue is essentially analytical, being a matter of the 
coherence of terminology, its concord with intuitions from natural language, and 
– indirectly – of agreement with larger bodies of experimental results, by setting 
up a sound framework for their interpretation. 
 As remarked above, I propose that concepts are only those mental 
representations that are correlated with lexical items (separate entries in the 
mental lexicon). Roughly, mental structures that are not readily expressible in 
single words (or, less typically, short idiomatic constructions) are thus not 
considered to be concepts – although they still may play significant roles in 
conceptual structures. Representations that have a nonverbal nature, that is 
sensorimotor representations such as images, maps, sketches, sensations, motor 
schemas, proprioceptive schemas, etc. can of course enter conceptual structure in 
various ways and configurations (or at least are not in principle excluded), but 
they cannot be concepts, in that without some linguistic component they cannot 
exhaustively form complete structures of individual concepts. 
 This definitional decision is directly motivated by the uncontroversial 
statement that words (or more precisely: lexical items) express the meanings of 
concepts. However, its implications are much broader: it equals a strong claim 
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that the two subsets of mental representations: those with lexical correlates and 
those without, are in some way qualitatively different.  
 Such a view is controversial, and faces a strong opposition in mainstream 
Cognitive Science. For example, it is common for linguists and psycholinguists 
(such as Pinker 1995 [1994], Jackendoff 1997) to assume that conceptual 
structure is prior to language, and though possibly differing in range and 
richness, does not differ dramatically in kind between linguistic and nonlinguistic 
creatures. Most influentially, a similar position was argued by the philosopher 
Jerry Fodor (1975), who insisted that a preexisting structure of (innate) concepts 
was a logical requirement for the process of language acquisition to take place at 
all. 
 The arguments against lexical correlates as being constitutive of concepts 
proper hinge on two main points. Firstly, nonlinguistic creatures can nevertheless 
have advanced cognitive systems whose mental operations one is naturally 
inclined to describe as ‘conceptual’. Secondly, the possibility of successful cross-
cultural communication is most readily explicable in terms of people of different 
cultural/linguistic backgrounds having the same ‘concepts’ that only differ in 
their overt phonological realisations (and perhaps in marginal aspects of 
meaning). 
 
4.2.5.3. ‘Concepts’ in nonlinguistic organisms 
Increasingly many studies in comparative psychology show that numerous 
aspects of animal cognition must be given interpretations that rely upon complex 
mental representations. The most prominent examples – alongside ones such as 
avian navigation or sophisticated principles of food caching, recaching and 
retrieval by food-storing birds – come from primate social cognition. For 
instance, the primatologists Robert Seyfarth and Dorothy Cheney (2001) report 
that highly gregarious baboons can mentally represent and update both the 
relations of kinship and hierarchical social status. Due to the problem of 
combinatorial explosion, in groups of as many as eighty individuals this is 
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impossible to achieve by means of one-by-one associations, i.e. storing each 
relation as a separate memory entry; the monkeys must instead employ 
sophisticated computations defined over ‘concepts’ such as FAMILY or 
DOMINANCE. 
 Similarly, human infants are cognitively complex creatures who from their 
earliest days display advanced understanding of the surrounding world (in ways 
roughly consistent with the Piagetian163 account, but at even younger ages). 
Consequently, infant cognition is routinely described in conceptual terms: it is 
customary in developmental psychology to speak of a child’s ‘concept’ of 
objecthood, number, identity, self, animacy, causation, force, etc. (examples are: 
“infant’s concept of occlusion”, Renée Baillargeon 2001; “infant’s concept of 
twoness/number”, Karen Wynn 1993 [1992]). 
 
It is indeed undeniable that both prelinguistic children and at least some animals 
do possess advanced mental representations. Still, my reply to the above 
examples is to deny that these representations have the status of bona fide 
concepts, and to describe them as ‘proto-concepts’. The reason behind such a 
decision is that the presence of a lexical label, especially one frequently used in 
communication, exerts a profound effect on the functional characteristics of a 
given mental representation.  
 Thus, I argue that bona fide concepts differ from proto-concepts possessed 
by animals and infants – as well as from non-lexicalised representations in 
human adults – in the following profound ways (some of which are direct results 
of the correlations with lexical labels): 
 
a) concepts become available for explicit inference (in a way described in 
4.2.5.1. b), 
                                                 
163 Jean Piaget (1896–1980), Swiss psychologist. Piaget was author of an extremely influential 
constructivist account of human cognitive development in which this process was seen in terms 
of successive domain-general stages. 
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b) concepts become stabilised, which facilitates their storage, retrieval, and 
manipulation (in a way described in 4.2.5.1. c), 
c) concepts become further stabilised by their frequent activations caused by 
the use of the corresponding lexical items in communication, 
d) concepts are even further stabilised by their frequent pre-activations 
caused by the use of semantically or phonetically related lexemes (as 
evident in the phenomenon of semantic and phonetic priming; see e.g. 
Aitchison 1996 [1987]: 109), 
e) concepts support compositionality in that they can enter very elaborate 
complex representations as their building blocks. While it can in principle 
be imagined that the mental representations in animals and children might 
have this quality as well, there is no evidence in favour of such a 
conjecture. On the contrary, what evidence there is points to the opposite. 
The very first linguistic utterances by children are holophrastic (Bancroft 
1995: 64) in a way suggesting limited compositionality of the underlying 
representations. In contrast, in normal human speech only very rarely do 
individual words form complete utterances: they almost invariably come 
as elements of larger compositional structures. 
f) most concepts are domain-general in the sense that they can enter 
reasonings related to any subject. In contrast, the mental representations in 
infants and animals seem to be domain-specific, i.e. limited to a particular, 
narrow range of contexts. There is no evidence whatsoever that the 
complex computational processes invoked to explain e.g. avian navigation 
or primate social cognition generalise beyond their proprietary domains. 
 This mirrors the generality constraint (Evans 1982 – see 4.2.2.), which 
 does not seem to be met in the case of infants/animals. 
g) concepts are of a palpably different level of generality than some of the 
mental representations ascribed to animals and prelinguistic children. The 
latter are more general, lacking the rich inferential content of concepts; on 
the other hand, they are more closely dependent on sensory imagery. It 
This is a submitted manuscript version. The publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint the 
material in any form. Final published version, copyright Peter Lang: https://doi.org/10.3726/978-3-653-05287-9 
 153 
seems that the mental representations of ‘causality’, ‘objecthood’, 
‘occlusion’, etc. in children and animals can be more appropriately 
explained, not in terms of concepts, but rather in terms of image schemas 
(for such suggestions concerning infants see Mandler [cited in Jordan 
Zlatev: 2007], and animals – Marc Hauser 1997 [1996]). 
 
 In short, the overall changes to a mental representation resulting from its 
becoming correlated with a lexical ‘tag’ have a qualitative dimension and make 
the ascription of a different status fully legitimate164. 
 
Also, it is important to spell out an additional condition for ‘concepthood’, 
already implicit in the above argument; namely, that the lexical label correlated 
with a mental representation be part of a richer communicative system. While 
even a very simple organism can easily internalise an association between an 
arbitrary sign and a class of inputs, such a mechanical stimulus-response pairing 
is something very different from a word of human language165. Most 
significantly, as remarked in point e), lexemes are not autonomous, holistic 
utterances, but units functioning almost exclusively as parts of larger structures; 
both the existing paradigmatic and the potential syntagmatic relations between 
lexemes are meaning-constitutive. In addition, the frequency and stability of the 
communicative use of a lexical label seems to be necessary to support some of its 
influences, listed above, on the associated cognitive structure (entrenchment 
effects). 
                                                 
164 Some thinkers, such as Daniel Dennett (1996) and Euan MacPhail (1998), argue for a still 
much more profound divide between linguistic and language-less creatures. According to them, 
language is absolutely foundational in the development of the central notion of self. Hence, 
consciousness as we know it cannot be meaningfully attributed to nonlinguistic creatures. Such 
a stance meshes with the argument presented above, but does not follow from it as a necessary 
consequence. 
165 See especially Terrence Deacon (1997: 65–67), who takes paradigmatic and syntagmatic 
relations between signs to be constitutive of their symbolic character. 
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 In short, although one cannot ignore extant research that documents the 
richness and sophistication of cognition in nonlinguistic creatures, one can still 
qualify cognition in such creatures as nonconceptual. Very characteristically, this 
is precisely what many theorists of animal/infant cognition do. The chief 
proponent of the notion of ‘nonconceptual content’, José Luis Bermúdez (e.g. 
2003), identifies advanced cognitive operations available to nonlinguistic 
creatures and to an extent downplays the significance of language for thought. 
Still, he endorses what he calls “the Priority Principle”, that is the linguistic 
criterion in the divide between concepts and ‘nonconcepts’166. 
 
There remains the final objection of a practical nature: the proposed line of 
demarcation between concepts and nonconcepts would disallow many of the 
intuitively correct uses of the term ‘concept’. This objection could be valid if the 
term in question was consistently used in cognitive-scientific literature in a 
deliberate and disciplined fashion. Since it is not, the objection can be addressed 
by invoking the loose/strict distinction, characteristic of many technical terms. 
The practice of using a term in a loose sense does not itself rule out the 
possibility of using it fruitfully in a strict sense. 
 Indeed, if one wants to preserve the possibilities of employment of the 
term ‘concept’ rigorously in academic discourse, there appears to be no 
alternative to the distinction suggested above. The ‘lexical’ way of distinguishing 
concepts from nonconceptual mental representations seems to be the only 
principled way of doing so, remaining the only way of making this term 
manageable and suitable for disciplined theoretical use. 
 
4.2.5.4. Concepts are not language-specific. 
                                                 
166 This also serves to show that ‘the lexical criterion’ does not suggest the radical and heavily 
criticised ‘linguistic model of thought’, whereby all (higher) mental processes are defined over 
word-like units; quite the opposite, the very presence of nonconceptual (i.e. non-linguaform) 
content directly points to the existence of the other kinds of cognitive mechanisms. 
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One of the traditional roles of concepts has been to serve as building blocks of 
propositions in an essentially language-neutral way (which is to say, 
independently of any given ethnic language). Also, the possibility and everyday 
practice of effective translation as well as effective communication across 
different natural languages appear to be founded on a common repertoire of 
concepts in the speakers of those different languages. Assuming a more direct, 
‘Whorfian’ link between concepts and words of a natural language would seem 
to run counter to these ideas, and thus such a decision demands additional 
support. 
 I offer what I take to be a successful reply in three steps. Firstly, it is an 
empirical fact that the particular natural language that a person speaks does 
impact that person’s cognition (see 4.2.5.1. point f)). Even though the magnitude 
of these effects should not be overestimated, they are nevertheless impossible to 
dismiss completely. 
 Secondly, the implicit assumption that provokes the inconsistency is that 
in order for successful communication/translation to exist, the source and target 
concepts must be identical. While this assumption does not find any empirical 
support, there is substantial evidence to the contrary. For example, data from 
developmental psychology show unequivocally that communication between 
children and their caregivers takes place in spite of very far-reaching differences 
in their concepts167. 
 Thirdly, and most importantly, the apparent clash between the facts of 
cross-linguistic communication/translation and the ‘linguistic’ character of 
concepts holds only given an extremely strong reading of this linguistic 
character. Most rebuttals of the ‘Whorfian’ relation between language and 
thought, including the influential criticism by Pinker (1995), focus largely on 
strong linguistic determinism168. In fact, unless one assumes the patently 
                                                 
167 See Carey (1999 [1991]). 
168 The doctrine of linguistic determinism has been traditionally illustrated by the famous 
quotation from the American linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956: 213): “We dissect nature 
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indefensible interpretation on which thinking is literally performed in words, 
there appears to be no direct contradiction between the possibility of 
communication/translation and linguistically influenced concepts. (See 
Wacewicz 2008 for a discussion). 
 Still, the definitional requirement that a mental representation correspond 
to a lexical item in order to count as a concept does not equal a commitment to 
any such strong views. As mentioned above, the actual structure of a particular 
lexical concept can include various other kinds of representations. What forms of 
representations participate in concepts, and in what ways, is a different empirical 
question169. On such a view, a substantial overlap between the internal structures 
of concepts (counterparts) in the members of two linguistic communities is 
sufficient for effective communication/translation to take place. What is more, 
the assumption of a moderate degree of non-overlap has the virtue of explaining 
frequent cases of irremovable difficulties in communication/translation. 
Alternatively, one may construe the differences in the concepts of speakers of 
two distinct natural languages simply as magnified interpersonal differences 
between speakers of the same language – a conceptualisation which also 
naturally leads one to the conclusion defended in this section. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and types that we isolate from the 
world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the 
contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be 
organized by our minds – and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds. We cut 
nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are 
parties to an agreement to organize it in this way – an agreement that holds throughout our 
speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language.” 
It might perhaps be noted that, although indisputably effective, the quotation is very hard to 
interpret in any way that would allow for some more precise definition, as is the doctrine itself. 
169 Indeed, the definitional decision linking concepts to lexical items (or otherwise establishing 
precisely how they should be understood) seems to be itself a prerequisite for this question to be 
answerable. 
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4.2.6. Concepts are shareable/concepts subserve communication. 
According to a consensus in Cognitive Science, concepts are aggregates: they 
are, roughly, bodies of ‘knowledge’; they are comprised of and, in principle, are 
decomposable into, smaller or more primitive elements. A direct consequence is 
that concept possession/mastery is gradable, rather than being a matter of binary 
all-or-none decision. This, in turn, constitutes grounds for employing the notion 
of concept overlap/similarity to account for the concepts’ role in communication 
in precisely the manner sketched out in the previous section. 
 The above consensus is contested by the minority camp of conceptual 
atomists, notably Jerry Fodor (esp. 1998). Indeed, the shareability of concepts –
fundamental to linguistic communication, folk psychology, etc. – is Fodor’s chief 
motivation in taking this controversial stance. Fodor’s atomistic position will 
receive detailed treatment in Chapter 6. 
 
4.2.6.1. Concepts as types and concepts as tokens 
One specific worry related to Fodor’s influential argument should be addressed at 
this point. As pointed out by that researcher (e.g. Fodor 1998: 30–39), the notion 
of ‘concept similarity/overlap’ is by nature a dependent notion, having a logical 
prerequisite in the form of ‘concept identity’. In other words, it is impossible to 
judge similarity between two concepts without knowing what it would be like for 
those concepts to be identical. The notion of the same concept must be present at 
some level, if only as a yardstick for judging the similarity between particular 
individual concepts. 
 This, however, is clearly at variance with the mentalistic commitment. 
Since concepts are supposed to be mental representations possessed by 
individuals, each concept is instantiated in a particular, individual mind, and 
realised by the ‘hardware’ of a particular brain. Quite obviously, it is impossible 
for two distinct individuals to share a numerically identical concept (cf. e.g. 
Aydede 1998). 
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 Laurence and Margolis (1999: 5–8, 75–79) see this difficulty as superficial 
and readily solvable by the application of type-token distinction. To them, while 
individual concepts are necessarily different as concept tokens, they might still 
exemplify the same concept type. Consequently, to deny that two distinct 
individuals could possess ‘the same’ concept “…would make as much sense [as] 
to say that two people cannot utter the same sentence because they cannot both 
produce the same token sentence. Clearly what matters for being able to utter the 
same sentence, or entertain the same concept, is being able to have tokens of the 
same type” (1999: 7). 
 Whereas I agree that the type/token relation is ultimately the right 
solution, I suggest that it is far less clear that its functioning is as unproblematic 
as implied by the analogy offered by Laurence and Margolis. The case of 
sentences is relatively unproblematic because they are type-individuated in virtue 
of their physical, nonsemantic characteristics (shapes and composition of their 
constituents). Concepts, however, are ontologically different. Type-individuation 
of concepts is something non-obvious; rather, it is precisely what a successful 
theory of concepts strives to describe. 
 The problem appears to have its roots in the admission of the public 
character of concepts, which might not be a viable option for a cognitively 
oriented researcher. The existence of bona fide ‘public’ concepts suggests the 
independence of the abstract level of concept types. It suggests that the public, 
abstract concept types are something ‘over and above’ the collections of their 
token instances, and they cannot be reduced to such collections. Consequently, 
the abstract level is not merely epiphenomenal, but must necessarily come first: 
either ontologically or at least logically, i.e. in the order of explanation. This in 
turn would threaten to discredit the autonomy of the I-semantic perspective 
relative to the E-semantic perspective; it might also prove difficult to square with 
the naturalistic approach. 
 I propose to resolve this final difficulty in the following way. What is 
relatively uncontroversial is the truly ‘public’ status of the words of a natural 
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language. Words are symbols and as such, despite being semantic in the sense of 
having meanings, can at the same time be individuated on the basis of their 
nonsemantic, physical properties (phonemes or graphemes). ‘Public’ (sensu 
‘shareable’) concepts are dependent on public (sensu ‘truly public’) words – 
dependent not as a kind of artificial, abstractly specified relation, but rather in an 
actual, causal manner. As has already been established, on the present account 
concepts emerge developmentally, in the process of infants becoming ‘linguistic 
creatures’, that is, becoming proficient users of their native languages. The 
internalisation of lexical labels exerts real, causal influence on children’s mental 
representations: children’s concepts are shaped – among other things – through 
repeated witnessed instances of meaningful use of corresponding phonological 
words (in ways partly described in 4.5.2.3.). 
  Consequently, on the present account, concepts as individual mental 
representations are ontologically primary, and they do not have an inherent 
public character. The ‘publicity’ (qua shareability) of concept types is only 
derived, being dependent on the public status of the lexical labels, the correlation 
with which is constitutive of concepthood. On this account, which can be thought 
of as moderately neo-nominalist, the abstract concept types are purely 
epiphenomenal and have no additional properties over and above those directly 
resulting from concept tokens. A resulting additional virtue is the preservation of 
a naturalistic framework of explanation.  
 
4.3. Cocnlusion 
In this chapter, I considered concepts as seen from the standpoint of Cognitive 
Science. I made a decision to define ‘concepts’ as ‘mental representations having 
lexical correlates’; such a definition makes it possible to treat ‘concept’ as a 
technical term across the Cognitive Sciences, while also preserving most 
intuitions from a looser use of this word in the literature. I narrowed down the 
subject of the present study to content concepts (prototypically, concepts for 
common words), having found the corresponding distinction into content and 
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function words well motivated, both theoretically and in terms of its 
psychological and neuronal reality. I also addressed several relatively less central 
terminological points. 
 Later in the chapter, I adduced arguments for the qualitative difference 
that is made by mental representations’ being correlated with lexical items of a 
natural language (both as a direct result of such a correlation, and indirectly 
through its functioning within a linguistic cognitive system). In this context, the 
process of language acquisition in the child is seen as directly, causally 
responsible for the formation of fully-fledged concepts on the basis of more 
primitive proto-conceptual mental representations. 
 In the final sections of this chapter, I addressed the problem of the 
shareability of concepts, a characteristic being particularly difficult to reconcile 
with a mentalistic ontology. I proposed that this could be achieved by ascribing 
shareability to concept types, but only derivatively: resulting entirely from the 
correlation with truly shareable and public lexical labels that – via language 
acquisition – exert causal influence on the nature of concepts. Thus, concept 
types should be seen purely as idealisations exploiting an assumed high degree of 
isomorphism between individual conceptual repertoires of the members of a 
linguistic community. 
 I conclude that, on the present analysis, construing concepts as mental 
representations with lexical correlates may be considered the optimal solution 
from a cognitivist perspective. It has the two crucial advantages of, firstly, 
preserving most of the pre-theoretical intuitions connected to the word ‘concept’, 
and secondly, solving several theoretical problems, most importantly the problem 
of shareability. 
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In Chapter 5, I provide the background for discussion of similarity-based 
(prototype and exemplar) models of categorisation by reviewing and evaluating 
the most influential traditional approach to the topic of categorisation/concepts, 
that is the ‘classical approach’. Both the review and, especially, the evaluation 
are carried out from the cognitivist perspective that characterises the entirety of 
this work. 
 I start from the problematic issues of terminology and highlight the pitfalls 
related to this broad subject matter. After (re)establishing the crucial 
terminological distinctions, I provide the required historical review. Rather than 
being a detailed historical study, it brings to the surface and then discusses the 
most important characteristics of the particular approaches. 
 
5.1.1. Theories of categorisation or theories of concepts? Review of 
terminological problems. 
As has already been described in section 4.2.4., any philosophically informed 
discussion of the topic of concepts and categorisation runs into terminological 
problems which, although seemingly trivial, turn out to be insurmountable in 
practice. What some academic works (e.g. Barsalou 1992, Medin et al. 2001) 
review as the ‘theories of categorisation’ is essentially identical in scope and 
structure to what others (e.g. Medin and Smith 1984, Nęcka et al. 2006) discuss 
under the heading of ‘theories of concepts’. Even if some principled distinctions 
can be specified (such as, for instance, ‘categorisation’ being only one of many 
functions of concepts, however prominent), they are rather unsystematic and 
none seems to be well established in the literature. 
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 The use of the term ‘category’ (hence, too, ‘categorisation’) is particularly 
problematic. Category can be construed extensionally as a class of beings, i.e. as 
the sum of all actually or potentially existing exemplars of a given set. 
Alternatively, it can be construed as an intensional specification of such a set. 
Nevertheless, on closer inspection this would presuppose extreme ontological 
realism, assuming the existence of an already categorised reality independent of 
its cognisers. What is more, ‘intensional specification’ already strongly suggests 
a specific method of reference determination, i.e. the ‘classical’ one. Also, such a 
construal encounters severe problems with dealing with non-concrete categories 
that do not have objects as their exemplars (note, too, that while the term 
‘exemplar’ is popularly used to designate a particular individual, it can also 
designate a concept one step down the hierarchy, such as SPARROW being a 
hyponym and therefore an exemplar of BIRD170). All the reasons enumerated 
above serve to show that the traditional nonmentalistic understanding of 
‘category’ as ‘class of beings’, although dominant, has its difficulties and cannot 
be treated as the only valid option (a broader discussion of this point has been 
provided in 4.2.4.). Finally, ‘category’ has a still different traditional 
philosophical meaning: one of the most basic and broad general classes of 
entities. 
 In this work, I propose to use to use the term ‘category’ in the broad but 
mentalistic sense (unless the context makes it very clear that the nonmentalistic 
and more traditional reading is intended): a category is any mental representation 
regardless of its level of abstraction. Thus, categories can be conceptual but also 
perceptual or even sensory or sensorimotor, and can be exemplified even in quite 
basic cognitive agents. A concept is a mental representation expressible by a 
lexical item and correlated with it, in the sense that the lexical item in question is 
present in the mental lexicon of a given agent (see 4.2.5.2.). ‘Categorisation’ has 
a dual – most likely irredeemably dual – meaning. Firstly, it is classification: the 
                                                 
170 This is common in exemplar approaches to categorisation, e.g. Storms et al. 2000. 
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act/process of assigning some inputs to a category; secondly, it is a general 
theoretical topic related to the issues of categories, including category 
boundaries, category formation, conceptual structure, etc. It is this latter, more 
inclusive, sense that is intended in this work in the expression ‘theories of 
categorisation’. 
 
5.1.2. Mentalism, psychological reality, and theoretical goals. 
In this chapter, as was so often the case in the preceding parts of this work, the 
overall research perspective will play a decisive role. This was already visible in 
the previous point, which highlighted the matters of terminology. The problem 
extends even further since the topic of categorisation/concepts transitions 
seamlessly into such topics as the form and structure of knowledge 
representation171, and the encoding, storage and retrieval of items in semantic 
memory. 
 Looking from the cognitivist perspective, at the forefront of interests are 
the topics related to the way in which natural or artificial cognitive agents 
process information. Hence, cognitive scientists will be relatively less interested 
in aspects such as reference determination or even ideal cognitive economy172, 
but at the same time much more interested in such subject areas as drawing 
inferences or concept acquisition. As nearly always when the perspective of 
Cognitive Science is involved, psychological reality remains a fundamental 
(probably the single most significant) criterion in evaluating particular models or 
larger theoretical approaches. 
 
5.2. Classical approach 
5.2.1. Exposition 
                                                 
171 Such is the observation of Frank C. Keil et al. (1998), who concede that no principled, non-
arbitrary distinction can be drawn between the study of categorisation and knowledge 
representation. 
172 The notion of cognitive economy is discussed by Eleanor Rosch (1988a). 
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The so-called classical approach to the issue of concepts and categorisation is 
both the intuitively natural and historically dominant one. Notwithstanding its 
prevalent criticism and apparent retreat, this model of understanding 
categorisation (speaking broadly) still pervades everyday thinking and continues 
to exert a very strong influence on Cognitive Science – as well as science in 
general. I agree with the opinion of George Murphy, who suggests that the 
classical view may be thought of as a default, pre-theoretic position on 
categorisation173. 
 The key premises of the classical approach can be briefly summarised in 
the following way. Categories have internal structures that can be adequately 
captured in the form of conjunctions of features, and most importantly, at least 
some of those features are essential. Essential features are ‘necessary and 
sufficient’, i.e. they are jointly sufficient and individually necessary for 
something to be a category exemplar. The conjunctions of essential features form 
category cores that decide about category identity; these cores may – but do not 
have to – be accompanied by other, non-necessary (accidental) features carrying 
additional but non-criterial information about the category. 
 The classical approach is also sometimes referred to as the traditional 
theory (Laurence and Margolis 1999) or the definitional approach (Murphy 
2002). The former term reflects the historical predominance of this view (see 
section 5.2.2.: History). The latter term is based on the fact that this perspective 
on categorisation shares its precepts with the method of intensional definition 
widely employed in describing the meanings of lexical items. Still other 
denominations for this general intellectual perspective include the Aristotelian 
                                                 
173 „…[A] reading of the most cited work on concepts written prior to 1970 reveals its 
assumption of definitions. I should emphasize that these writers did not always explicitly say, <I 
have a definitional theory of concepts.> Rather, they took such an approach for granted and then 
went about making proposals for how people learned concepts (i.e., learned these definitions) 
from experience.” (Murphy 2002: 12) 
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approach (Taylor 1995), the scholastic approach (Aarts 2006) and the 
categorical view (Labov 2004 [1973]). 
 Taylor (1995: 79–80) has summarised the main assumptions of the 
classical view of categorisation174: 
 
a) all members of a category have equal status 
b) all non-members of a category have equal status 
c) there is a fixed set of necessary and sufficient conditions defining 
membership to each category 
d) all necessary and sufficient features defining a category have equal status 
e) category boundaries are fixed 
 
 A further point, f), could be added to the list: 
 
f) categories form a hierarchy with transitive category membership 
 
Points a) and b) indicate that no gradability is allowed: category membership 
status is binary, with exemplars simply classified as ‘members’ versus ‘non-
members’ rather than being rated on a more complex membership scale. 
Categorisation decisions are all-or-none, with no possibilities for finer-grain 
distinctions or evaluations. 
 Point c) states the method of categorisation – through the set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions – but further implies that the set is ‘neat’: it is finite and 
probably very small, and the features themselves are simple in the sense of being 
(relatively) easy both to verbalise and to determine in the tested exemplars. 
                                                 
174 A different summary is provided by William Labov (2004 [1973]: 68), who in his critical 
address of the classical view lists its “implicit assertions”: “all linguistic units are categories that 
are: 1) discrete, 2) invariant, 3) qualitatively distinct, 4) conjunctively defined, 5) composed of 
atomic primes”. 
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 Point d) indicates the lack of weighting, that is of endowing certain 
features with greater relative significance than others. This indirectly results from 
points a) and b). If no gradability is allowed in the first place, it follows that no 
particular feature can carry more importance than any other, since the failure to 
meet any of the individual criteria has exactly the same influence on the outcome 
of the categorisation decision. Any given exemplar can only either meet all of the 
criteria and thus be classified as a member, or not meet all of the criteria and thus 
be classified as a non-member, with no other outcomes possible. 
 Point e) reasserts the binary character of the system of categories (member 
or non-member), which should admit no haziness or uncertainty about category 
membership. Also, it stresses the system’s universality. The division of the world 
into categories is stable both across subjects and across time, so that for any two 
people, or for two moments in time for the same person, there should in principle 
be only one correct way to categorise. In such cases, different categorisation 
decisions would automatically imply the incorrectness of at least some of them. 
 Point f) expresses the organisational aspect of the system of categories: 
they form a hierarchy, with the more specific categories being well-defined 
subsets of the more general ones, progressing recursively down the hierarchy to 
the most specific ones. Since the subordinate category is characterised by all of 
the features of its superordinate category, this enables the straightforward 
inheritance of inferences. This in turn enables the convenient intensional 
definition by genus proximum and differentia specifica. 
 The list quoted above, rather than being an arbitrary stipulation, appears to 
be a manifestation of an underlying deeper ontological commitment. It seems 
that the points a) through f) should be complemented with an additional 
assumption of a more general kind, one that serves as a philosophical foundation 
for the classical approach: 
 
A) categorisation (qua category formation) captures the pre-existing, 
objective structure of the world 
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In other words, the objective reality has a ready-made structure and comes pre-
categorised even before it is experienced by the cognitive subject. The system of 
categories is inherent in the reality, it is single, universal, and “carves the nature 
at its joints”. The division of the world into categories is discovered by the 
cognisers rather than being the product of their interaction with the world. As 
will become evident, it is this realist ontological position lying at the foundations 
of the classical approach that has become ultimately untenable and resulted in the 
criticism of this theoretical outlook. 
 Recapitulating, the classical approach is founded on the intuitively 
appealing idea of categories having clear-cut conditions of membership, 
expressible as (relatively short) lists of (relatively explicit) necessary and 
sufficient features.  
 Furthermore, a closer examination of the above points reveals additional 
more basic philosophical commitments. I propose that the following underlying 
assumptions are presupposed by the classical view: 
 
– essentialism – in the world there are essences – usually hidden, i.e. not 
manifest in the surface properties – common to all members of the class 
(e.g. genomes are sometimes taken to constitute the hidden essences of 
biological species); 
– analyticity – the internal structure of a concept (and its corresponding word) 
mandates a number of infallible inferences, which are true a priori and in 
all contexts, and their truth results trivially and necessarily from the 
concept’s internal structure (e.g. “a bachelor is a man”); 
– determinacy – a given entity’s  membership status for any given category is 
always determinate, and any uncertainty in determining whether it is a 
member or a nonmember is always owing to the cognitive agent’s 
epistemic limitations; 
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– composition – concepts are built from (relatively few) primitive elements 
that can be added to form gradually more complex compounds; 
– decomposition (reversibility) – the process of acquisition is theoretically 
fully reversible, so that the structure of a concept can be analytically 
traced back to the list of all of its individual, basic component parts (with 
no interfering emergent qualities); 
– discreteness – the individual component parts are distinctive, discrete 
wholes, separable from one another; when combined, they retain their 
identities rather than e.g. blending; they are also usually taken to be 
expressible in a verbal format (see 5.2.5); 
– reductionism – the lists of necessary and sufficient features are 
nonredundant and relatively short (ruling out all noncriterial information); 
this translates into maximum reduction of complexity in category 
information, which in turn maximises the economy of coding that 
information. 
 
The above theses will be progressively discussed in some more detail in 5.2.2. 
below as they recur in particular historical conceptions. The historical review, for 
obvious reasons, will have a selective nature, while still preserving the 




The spirit of the classical theory of categorisation is easily spotted already in the 
works dating back to antiquity. One classic example are Plato’s Socratic 
dialogues. Many of them were characterised by Socrates’ elenctic method of 
argumentation: Socrates aimed at laying bare the shortcomings of his opponent’s 
provisional description of a phenomenon, leading to a closer examination of the 
phenomenon in question so that the provisional characterisation could be 
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superseded with an infallible universal definition175. Such definitions were 
intended to be objective – i.e. to describe real phenomena rather than, for 
instance, people’s conceptions or the meanings of words – which highlights 
Plato’s position as an extreme ontological realist. Socratic definitions were 
expected to admit no counterexamples and to capture the very essence of a given 
phenomenon, that is its ‘true nature’. The defined objects were usually highly 
abstract moral or philosophical qualities, such as piety (Euthyphro), virtue 
(Meno), or knowledge (Theaetetus). 
 Nevertheless, this philosopher is most famously associated with another 
definition, that of man (the human being) as ‘featherless biped’, the anecdotal 
case of which serves to demonstrate that problems with definitions have already 
started to be evident in Plato’s time. Allegedly, after Plato defining man as 
‘featherless biped’, Diogenes of Sinope (Diogenes the Cynic) countered this 
definition with the example of a plucked chicken. The source of the report is the 
much later work of the biographer Diogenes Laertius (VI, 40; 1696: 414)176, and 
it should perhaps be noted that Plato’s actual commitment to the abovementioned 
definition is unclear. In Plato’s extant works it is found in Statesman 266e (transl. 
by Benjamin Jowett; Jowett 1902: 550), where it is expressed by Stranger – the 
polemist of Young Socrates177. 
                                                 
175 This method is very close in spirit to conceptual analysis that forms the cornerstone of the 
contemporary field of analytic philosophy, the main distinction being perhaps that the latter is 
interested in the analysis of word meanings.  
176 “Plato having defined a Man to be an Animal with two Legs, without feathers, and having 
gain’d great applause thereby, he [Diogenes of Sinope] stript a Cock, and brought him into his 
School, and said, here is Plato’s Man for you: which occasioned him to add to his Definition, 
With broad Nails” [italics in the original]. 
177 “I say that we should have begun at first by dividing land animals into biped and quadruped; 
and since the winged herd, and that alone, comes out in the same class with man, should divide 
bipeds into those which have feathers and those which have not, and when they have been 
divided, and the art of the management of mankind is brought to light, the time will have come 
This is a submitted manuscript version. The publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint the 
material in any form. Final published version, copyright Peter Lang: https://doi.org/10.3726/978-3-653-05287-9 
 171 
 However, it was not Plato but rather his successor Aristotle who was the 
more central figure to the advance of this line of thought. Aristotle developed 
three rather crucial theoretical principles: the law of noncontradiction (LNC), the 
law of excluded middle (LEM)178, as well as the distinction of attributes into 
necessary and accidental (see also Taylor 1995: 22–24, who comments on the 
influence of those logical principles). The seeds of the two laws are already 
incipient in Socrates’ elenctic method of argumentation, and the seeds of the 
essence-accident distinction – in Socratic definitions; still full credit is due to 
Aristotle for their explicit formulation. Quite obviously, their importance to the 
Western intellectual tradition extends much farther, but here only their 
significance with respect to categorisation will be reviewed. 
 The law of noncontradiction, held by Aristotle to be a self-evident and 
absolutely fundamental axiom of all logical thought, decrees that the same thing 
cannot be simultaneously asserted and negated. This principle has been stated in 
several slightly different variants in Metaphysics, for example: 
 
Evidently then such a principle is the most certain of all; which principle this 
is, let us proceed to say. It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time 
belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect; we must 
presuppose, to guard against dialectical objections, any further qualifications 
which might be added. (Metaphysics 4.3). 
 
But we have now posited that it is impossible for anything at the same time to 
be and not to be, and by this means have shown that this is the most 
indisputable of all principles. (Metaphysics 4.4). 
 
                                                                                                                                               
to produce our Statesman and ruler, and set him like a charioteer in his place, and hand over to 
him the reins of state, for that too is a vocation which belongs to him”. 
178 These two „laws” are sometimes called „principles”, and abbreviated accordingly to PNC 
and PEM. The law of non-contradiction is often referred to, somewhat misleadingly, as „the law 
of contradiction”. 
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The law of excluded middle, although very often confused or conflated with the 
former law, is something distinctly different from it. Aristotle writes: 
 
But on the other hand there cannot be an intermediate between contradictories, 
but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate. 
(Metaphysics 4.7) 
 
While the doctrine of Heraclitus, that all things are and are not, seems to make 
everything true, that of Anaxagoras, that there is an intermediate between the 
terms of a contradiction, seems to make everything false; for when things are 
mixed, the mixture is neither good nor not-good, so that one cannot say 
anything that is true. (Metaphysics 4.7) [italics added – SW] 
 
This law requires that the truth value of every proposition (with the possible 
exception of those dealing with future contingencies) be determinate: not merely 
that it cannot be both true and false, but that it must be either one or the other, 
with no third option allowed.  
 With respect to categories, the law of noncontradiction and the law of 
excluded middle, taken together, ensure the binary, all-or-nothing nature of 
categorical divisions. The total universe of entities is always neatly divided into 
two sets, members and nonmembers of the category, that are nonintersecting and 
complementary. No instances are inherently undetermined regarding their 
membership status: even when a person is unsure or erroneous in their 
classification, this is the result of his epistemic limitations, not of any haziness or 
indeterminacy in the objective structure of the reality. 
 It is the distinction into the essence of a being and its accidental 
characteristics that most directly reflects the spirit of the classical approach to 
categorisation. To Aristotle, entities are characterised by innumerable traits that 
might be truly asserted of them, but the truth of such assertions is contingent and 
not vital to the identity of the thing179. Such traits are called accidents, and their 
                                                 
179 Metaphysics 4.4. 
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elimination would not change the identity of the thing in question. On the other 
hand, entities also have their essences that can be stated in the form of a 
conjunction of necessary and sufficient (defining) features (see 5.2.1.c)). 
 
The parts which are present in such things, limiting them and marking them as 
individuals, and by whose destruction the whole is destroyed, as the body is by 
the destruction of the plane, as some say, and the plane by the destruction of 
the line; and in general number is thought by some to be of this nature; for if it 
is destroyed, they say, nothing exists, and it limits all things… The essence, the 
formula of which is a definition, is also called the substance of each thing. 
(Metaphysics 5.8.) [italics added – SW] 
 
It is important to understand properly the role of Plato, Aristotle, and their 
contemporaries in the development of the classical approach to 
categorisation/concepts. Their work conveyed a general worldview that was 
highly convergent with this approach and, especially in the case of Aristotle, 
introduced a number of devices useful in its development. Still, it would perhaps 
be an overstatement to credit any individual philosopher with the name of the 
‘founding father’ of this theoretical outlook. Again, it is probably more 
productive to conceptualise the classical approach as the default, natural position, 
certain crucial aspects of which were brought to the surface already in the 
writings of the Greek masters. 
 
5.2.2.2. Modernity 
The default, natural character of the classical approach ensured the continuation 
of its historical dominance for the following several centuries. Notably, it formed 
the implicit foundation for the empiricist doctrine of knowledge, which is aptly 
observed by Laurence and Margolis (1999). Accounting for the origins of 
knowledge was the main theoretical objective of empiricism, so the most central 
aspect of the classical approach in this context was the elegance with which it 
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explained concept formation (concept acquisition). This was achieved by the idea 
of combination of simple elements into progressively more complex structures, 
and ultimately into concepts (“Ideas” in the original terminology). 
 On the generalised empiricist account, the acquisition of concepts consists 
in assembling their internal structures from more basic elements which in turn 
are assembled from even more basic elements, and ultimately from sense data. At 
least on the level of ideas, this process is characterised by discreetness: no 
blending between components occurs, so that particular components remain 
distinct. Thus, the process has the property of being theoretically reversible – 
through the analytical reversion of concept acquisition one is able to deconstruct 
concepts into their primitive component parts or at least extract their essences. 
 As is usually the case, paradigmatic examples come from the concepts of 
physical objects. John Locke envisages the process of the formation of concepts 
of physical objects in the following way: 
 
…[I]deas of Substances are such combinations of simple ideas as are taken to 
represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves; the supposed or 
confused idea of substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief Thus if to 
substance be joined the simple idea of a certain dull whitish colour, with 
certain degrees of weight, hardness, ductility, and fusibility, we have the idea 
of lead; and a combination of the ideas of a certain sort of figure, with the 
powers of motion, thought and reasoning, joined to substance, the ordinary idea 
of a man. (Locke 1999 [1690]: 149). 
 
…[T]he greatest part of the ideas that make our complex idea of gold are 
yellowness, great weight, ductility, fusibility, and solubility in aqua regia, etc., 
all united together in an unknown substratum. (Locke 1999: 300) 
 
This last quote, although clearly illustrative of the classical-like assumptions 
behind Locke’s system, is in fact part of a larger section explaining the 
ontological status of such properties. In an interesting way, this is a deviation 
from the principle A listed above – categories as mirroring the objective reality – 
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towards a considerable degree of mind-dependence, a theme later developed 
especially by George Berkeley. Once again it needs to be stressed, however, that 
the chief motivation behind the classical mindset of the empiricists was the idea 
of explaining the acquisition of all knowledge by reference to the relatively 
simple processes of combination of units (of ultimately sensory origin), which 
made it possible to postulate minimal inborn cognitive machinery. 
 
5.2.2.3. The twentieth century 
In one form or another, the implicit assumption of the classical view prevailed in 
our intellectual tradition in most, if not all, of the past century. Many of the most 
pervasive intellectual currents of the first part of the twentieth century can easily 
be shown to implicitly embrace the classical precepts. Similarly, early mentalistic 
research into concept acquisition in developmental psychology was founded on a 
classical-like general outlook. 
 For the logical positivists such as Rudolf Carnap180, one of the guiding 
ideas was that of reducing all statements to atomic statements about basic 
observational facts; the very possibility of such a reduction was a criterion of 
classifying a statement as truly meaningful. This can be diagnosed as reflecting 
classical-like intuitions, albeit on a propositional level rather than on the level of 
individual words/concepts. These, however, too were postulated to be reducible, 
first to other words, and then progressively to “primary” or “protocol senses” 
reporting basic experienced qualities (Carnap 1959 [1932]) – at least in case of 
‘meaningful’ as opposed to ‘metaphysical’ words. Another caveat is that the 
interests of the logical positivists were largely limited to scientific discourse. 
 Behaviourists, researching category learning with abstract stimuli saw it 
essentially as discovering the common property possessed by all members and no 
non-members (cf. the works by Clark L. Hull and Kenneth L. Smoke, as 
                                                 
180 Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970), a philosopher and logician of German origin, later an American 
citizen,  a leading logical positivist and a member of the intellectual group known as Vienna 
Circle. 
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discussed e.g. by Murphy [2002: 12–16] and Storms [2004]). Although the 
objects of study were not so much ‘concepts’ or ‘word meanings’ but rather 
artificial categories, the general framework was classical in the sense of relying 
on the necessary and sufficient features. This line of thought essentially agreed in 
this respect with the later work on learning theory conducted within a 
representational paradigm, represented notably by Jerome Bruner (e.g. Bruner et 
al. 1999 [1956]). 
 
5.2.3. Criticism 
Serious opposition against the broadly understood classical view did not emerge 
until the later half of the twentieth century; since then, however, the classical 
perspective has faced very strong criticism on many grounds, leading to its 
systematic decline in Cognitive Science. At a minimum, it has gradually lost its 
appeal as a theoretical approach giving any promise of eventually describing 
accurately the mentalistic range of phenomena related to categories, such as 
categorisation decisions or concept acquisition. The growing criticism has been 
backed up by a broad and increasing range of objections having both conceptual 
and empirical nature. 
 Murphy (2002: 16–49), who takes an extremely critical position against 
the classical approach, groups the objections into “in-principle arguments” and 
“empirical problems”. Medin and Smith (as quoted in Medin 1998: 95–96) 
enumerate three main reasons: the failure to specify defining features, the 
existence of goodness of example effects, and the existence of unclear cases. 
Medin and Rips (2005: 37–72) focus on the problems with hierarchical 
arrangement of categories, such as the failure of the hyponyms to inherit all of 
the defining properties of the hypernym. Laurence and Margolis (1998: 14–27) 
further specify the list of reservations, adding the problems with psychological 
reality, analyticity, ignorance and error, conceptual fuzziness, and typicality 
effects. Partly drawing on these lists, below I discuss, comment, and summarise 
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the main lines of objections, suggesting a general philosophical reason for the 
inadequacy of the theoretical perspective in question. 
 
5.2.3.1. Ludwig Wittgenstein 
It is widely accepted, at least by linguists and philosophers (somewhat less by 
cognitive psychologists, who tend to put more stress on the issue of typicality 
effects, as described below), that an important, possibly decisive blow against the 
classical approach was dealt by Ludwig Wittgenstein181 in a work published 
posthumously as Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein 1987 [1953]). Such 
legendary status of Wittgenstein’s work in this particular respect is rather 
astounding. It must be made clear that – contrary to a popular belief – the book 
never explicitly touches on the problems of categorisation, and its focus is 
entirely different. Instead, the relevant sections of the text have the character of 
comments made in passing by way of addressing the question of the definition of 
the book’s central term, “language-game” (Sprachspiel). Wittgenstein’s 
observation runs as follows (1987: 31–32): 
 
 For someone might object against me: "You take the easy way out! 
You talk about all sorts of language-games, but have nowhere said what the 
essence of a language-game, and hence of language, is: what is common to all 
these activities, and what makes them into language or parts of language..." 
 And this is true.—Instead of producing something common to all that 
we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in 
common which makes us use the same word for all,— but that they are related 
to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or 
these relationships, that we call them all "language"… 
 …Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean 
board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is 
                                                 
181 Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (1889–1951), an Austrian philosopher whose work 
exerted enormous influence on the philosophy of language in the twentieth century, precursor of 
the intellectual movement known as the linguistic turn which emphasised the study of natural 
language in its relation to philosophical problems. 
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common to them all?—Don't say: "There must be something common, or they 
would not be called 'games' "—but look and see whether there is anything 
common to all.—For if you look at them you will not see something that is 
common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at 
that. To repeat: don't think, but look!—Look for example at board-games, with 
their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find many 
correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and 
others appear. When we pass next to ballgames, much that is common is 
retained, but much is lost.—Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess with 
noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition 
between players? Think of patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; 
but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has 
disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the difference 
between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring-
a-roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteristic 
features have disappeared! And we can go through the many, many other 
groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and 
disappear182. [italics in the original] 
 
It should be noted that in the context of theories of categorisation, where this 
argument is usually applied, it is remarkably weak183. What it does establish is an 
original case for explicit definitions’ sensitivity to counterexamples, a trait that 
has since been underscored by many researchers. One popular example is the 
often quoted case of the inadequacy of the definition of ‘bachelor’ as ‘unmarried 
                                                 
182 Wittgenstein then extends his analysis to the concepts of ‘number’, ‘proposition’, ‘derive’, 
‘guide’ and ‘reading’, with a similar conclusion, i.e. that it is impossible to specify the 
definitions of the relevant terms. His best known quotes that deliver this conclusion are „[a]nd 
the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole 
length, but in the overlapping of many fibres” (1987: 32), and „[i]n order to find the real 
artichoke, we divested it of its leaves.” (1987: 66). 
183 The very idea of over two millennia of intellectual tradition being destroyed by an implicit 
argument contained in almost a single passage of text must be felt as deeply disturbing. The 
status of Wittgenstein’s observations in this respect might in a large part result from his general 
status as a major figure in twentieth century philosophy. 
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man’, another – Fodor’s “painting one’s paintbrush” analysis (Fodor 1981a), in 
which each of a number of successive attempts at decomposing the verb ‘to 
paint’ is countered by a counterexample. 
 The sensitivity to counterexamples, while indeed posing considerable 
difficulty to the classical approach, is still very far from being conclusive 
evidence against it. The incontrovertible fact that explicit definitions are sensitive 
to counterexamples translates into a claim that it is very difficult to provide lists 
of necessary and sufficient conditions for any given concept (analogically, word 
meaning) by means of introspective linguistic analysis, where the conditions 
would be expressed by other words – but not into a strong refutation of this 
general view. 
 The challenge of sensitivity to counterexamples invites at least three 
possible replies. Firstly, the difficulty in producing successful definitions does 
not itself constitute a proof that this is impossible in principle (see e.g. Medin 
1998). Secondly, there may be other methods of arriving at the lists of conditions 
than introspective analysis drawing on the linguistic intuitions of a researcher or 
researchers (see especially Harnad 1990, 2002, 2005). Thirdly, and most 
importantly, the problem might lie in the implicit assumption of the verbal format 
of the features, that is that the features can be adequately captured in terms of 
words (cf. section 5.2.5.). 
 A final point concerns the positive side of the Wittgensteinian argument, 
that is the idea of family resemblance. This is the idea that category members, on 
analogy with members of a family, do not universally share any single property, 
but rather are distinguished by each exemplifying some of the set of features 
characteristic of the family as a whole: “I can think of no better expression to 
characterize these similarities than <family resemblances>; for the various 
resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, 
temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way” (Wittgenstein 
1987: 32). Again, this has not been developed by Wittgenstein in any greater 
detail, but has proven to be almost equally seminal as the negative part of his 
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argument. Notably, family resemblances were a leading inspiration behind the 
work of Eleanor Rosch (see below). 
 
5.2.3.2. Willard van Orman Quine 
Another line of philosophical reflection widely taken to constitute evidence 
against the classical view was inspired by the logician and philosopher Willard 
van Orman Quine. In particular, his influential text “Two dogmas of empiricism” 
(Quine 1961 [1951]) shed light on the problems with the notion of analyticity. 
The essence of Quine’s argument in this text was that there could be no 
principled and nonarbitrary dividing line between ‘the empirical’ (fact, 
observation, ‘pure’ experience) and ‘the linguistic’ (the description, the coding, 
the ‘semantic component’); between the sentences confirmable synthetically and 
analytically. Thus, analyticity was downgraded from something qualitatively and 
categorically different to being simply an idealised extreme on an uninterrupted 
continuum with syntheticity. Once again, Quine’s paper was not meant as a 
critique of a theory of categorisation – it was an important text in the philosophy 
of science questioning the possibility of dividing the propositions of a science 
into two distinct sets: ones whose truth needs to be demonstrated by reference to 
experience (synthetic) and ones whose truth can be demonstrated on purely 
conceptual grounds (analytic). The relevant problematic consequence of Quine’s 
text – analysed in Laurence and Margolis (1999) – resulted from the questioning 
of the overall validity of the notion of analyticity understood generally. The 
classical view requires that there be a precise, qualitative distinction between a 
small class of inferences mandated by the core structure of a concept, which 
should be true analytically (necessarily in virtue of the concepts meaning), and 
all other inferences, contingently true or false. In the opinion of Laurence and 
Margolis, with such a qualitative difference removed or even made a matter of 
degree the classical approach loses its fundamental rationale. 
 While undeniably philosophically influential, for the cognitive scientist 
this line of criticism carries only limited impact. It must be kept in mind that 
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Quine’s original motivation and context was related to the philosophy of science, 
not theories of concepts or categorisation. Thus, the argument applies to a 
cognitivist study of categorisation only on the strength of analogy of science to 
cognitive processes184. From the perspective of Cognitive Science it qualifies 
simply as a valuable insight, and more conclusive arguments should come from 
empirically oriented studies. 
 
5.2.3.3. Psycholinguistic experiments (typicality effects) 
Outside of philosophy and traditional linguistics, it was empirical work by 
cognitive psychologists that has given most momentum for discrediting the 
classical approach. Of particular import was the research of Eleanor Rosch and 
her establishing the phenomenon of typicality effects (although it is worth noting 
that the philosophical insight of family resemblances was a guiding inspiration 
behind her proposals, e.g. Rosch and Mervis 1996 [1975]: 442–443). More 
specifically, this concerns the pervasive and wide-ranging effects that the 
phenomenon of typicality has on the performance of subjects in tasks based on 
processing category-related information. 
 Rosch’s point of departure was the realisation that categorisation is a 
ubiquitous phenomenon and a fundamental process in nature, vastly exceeding 
the area of ‘high-level’, conceptual categorisation (cf. section 3.2.3.). She 
understood categorisation as a real process carried out by living organisms 
constrained by their environments and resources such as time and energy. There 
followed a shift from an ‘abstract’185 to a functional understanding of categories, 
as organised around the structure of goals of the cognitive agent. Perhaps the 
most prominent consequence was the prediction of a differential status of 
                                                 
184 For other arguments related to the controversial status of the general analogy between 
cognitive processes and science see Botterill and Carruthers (1999: 69–73). 
185 “My own work on categories did not originate in learning theory, in concept identification, in 
formal linguistic semantics, or in semantic memory; it might have taken a very different course 
had it done so.” (Rosch 1988b: 374; italics in the original). 
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exemplars as members of a category relative to what is important from the 
perspective of a given agent or – especially in the context of linguistic categories 
– community of agents.  
 In a series of experiments, Rosch (prior to 1973 publishing under the name 
Heider) and her co-workers conclusively established a range of effects that were 
related to the item’s typicality as a member of a given category. How typical an 
item was for its category was found to reliably influence (reviewed e.g. in Rosch 
1988a, 1988b): 
 
– reaction times; in responses to questions of the structure ‘is an X a Y’, 
where X is an exemplar and Y is a category, response times are 
inversely correlated with the item’s typicality, i.e. subjects respond 
faster for X’s that are typical for the category Y; so that e.g. they react 
faster to ‘is robin a bird’ than to ‘is turkey a bird’; 
– speed of learning; children are faster in forming categories based on 
exposure to ‘good’ (typical) than to ‘bad’ (atypical) exemplars of a 
category; 
– spontaneous generation probability/order; subjects asked to generate a 
list of members of a given category tend to produce typical members 
with higher probability than atypical members and usually before 
them; 
– use of hedges and sentence substitutability; sentences of the structure 
‘an X is a Y’ are readily qualified with hedges such as ‘technically’ 
(e.g. as ‘a turkey is technically a bird’) when X is an atypical category 
member but not when it is a typical member; in contrast, only typical 
members can figure in constructions as ‘an X is an Y par excellence’. 
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Typicality effects are a basic cognitive phenomenon that is extremely well-
established and extremely pervasive186. Worth appreciating is the fact that they 
are by no means restricted to lexical-semantic categories, but appear in all areas 
of cognitive processing, for all types of subjects. They are found for artificial as 
well as natural categories (Posner and Keele, referred to by Murphy [2002: 28–
31]), in perceptual as well as conceptual categorisation and in animals as well as 
in humans (Dépy et al. 1997). 
 A point that requires clarification is the distinction between typicality 
effects and the related but separate topic of prototype theories or models of 
concepts/categorisation (in this work, the former topic is discussed in this 
section, the latter – in the next chapter). This is best illustrated by the position of 
Rosch herself, who warned against equating those two subject matters (1988a 
[1978]). Although her earlier texts (e.g. Rosch and Mervis 1996 [1975]) might 
have encouraged different conclusions, in a later paper, Rosch (1988a: 319–320) 
made it clear that her general discussion of the prototypes should not be taken as 
a proposal of a specific prototype theory of concepts/categorisation. Her own 
point, as clarified in the quoted text, was more modest, i.e. merely that typicality 
effects are a robust and important phenomenon that must be accommodated by 
any successful theory with serious aspirations to psychological reality: “In short, 
prototypes only constrain but do not specify representation and process 
models”187. 
                                                 
186 Such is, for example, the opinion of Zdzisław Chlewiński (1999: 176) and Laurence 
Barsalou (1992: 175–176), among many others. 
187 Rosch (1988a: 319–320): “2. Prototypes do not constitute any particular processing model 
for categories... What the facts about prototypicality do contribute to processing notions is a 
constraint - process models should not be inconsistent with the known facts about prototypes... 
3. Prototypes do not constitute a theory of representation of categories. Although we have 
suggested elsewhere that it would be reasonable in light of the basic principles of categorization, 
if categories were represented by prototypes... such a statement remains an unspecified formula 
until it is made concrete by inclusion in some specific theory of representation… 
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 It is precisely this constraint that is violated by the classical approach. 
Models based on the classical premises lack the explanatory power to account for 
typicality effects. The classical approach has no resources to capture the 
gradability of structure and thus cannot differentiate between the typicality 
statuses of the items under classification. These either match the set of criterial 
features, thus counting as category members, or fail to match the set, thus 
counting as nonmembers, with no further distinctions possible (cf. 5.2.1. a) “all 
members of a category have equal status”, and b) “all non-members of a category 
have equal status”. 
 Much like in the two previous cases, it is easy to misinterpret the exact 
power and scope of critical argument against the classical view resulting from the 
phenomenon of typicality effects. It is therefore necessary to underscore that – 
strictly speaking – this phenomenon does not overtly contradict the classical 
view; it is simply not accounted for in this tradition, and so does not constitute a 
conclusive argument in and of itself. While typicality must be acknowledged as a 
cognitively real phenomenon, categorisation (at least in principle) can still be 
maintained to be a psychological process independent of typicality effects. 
Indeed, in case of at least some types of categories, such dissociation between 
categorisation and typicality was shown experimentally (e.g. Armstrong et al. 
1999 [1983]188). This leads to the proposals that the classical view can be 
salvaged by upgrading it to a ‘hybrid view’189, on which concepts would 
                                                                                                                                               
4. Although prototypes must be learned, they do not constitute any particular theory of category 
learning... In short, prototypes only constrain but do not specify representation and process 
models.” 
188 In this experiment, certain concepts such as ODD NUMBER proved both to be well-defined 
(accordingly, to have clear boundaries) and to have graded typicality structure. Typicality 
structure, however, did not influence categorisation, i.e. how typical an item was rated for the 
concept had no effect on whether it was appropriately classified. 
189 Also termed the Binary Model (Hampton 1995), the Dual Theory (Laurence and Margolis 
1999) or the Revised Classical View (Murphy 2002). Nęcka et al.’s (2006) use of the term The 
Probabilistic View in this context seems to be incorrect. 
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incorporate ‘classical’ cores as well as more superficial ‘identification 
procedures’ characterised by graded typicality. 
 To a degree, the question of the validity of ‘hybrid models’ reflects the 
distinction between the philosophical and the cognitivist stance. Although there 
is some experimental evidence specifically favouring the prototype to the 
“Binary” view (provided by e.g. Hampton 1995) on empirical grounds, that latter 
stance also has the major drawback of being in principle unappealing to a 
cognitively minded researcher. Even assuming the possibility that the classical 
part of the model could handle the task of categorisation, the notion of 
categorisation would be construed very narrowly. To a cognitive scientist, 
categorisation is the most interesting as a reliable shorthand for a whole set of 
associated phenomena, in particular differential behaviour and inferencing (cf. 
Barsalou 1992: 25: “…[t]he primary purpose of making categorizations is to 
support inferences relevant to the perceiver’s goals: Categorization is usually not 
an end in itself.”). From such a standpoint, one categorises an entity as a dog not 
just for the sake of categorising itself, but rather in order to gain access to a rich 
body of inferentially available information associated with this category; and he 
can even be reliably expected to behave in certain ways appropriate for 
encounters with dogs. Since the ‘classical cores’ have been shown to be deeply 
deficient in explaining this extended cognitive dimension of categorisation, their 
theoretical value is minimal190. 
 
5.2.3.4. Context sensitivity and vagueness 
A specific phenomenon of particular interest, also related to typicality, was first 
identified in a study by Michael McCloskey and Sam Glucksberg (1978). They 
found that – especially for atypical members of a category, that is items neither 
                                                 
190 Cf. also the highly critical opinion of Murphy (2002: 39–40), who complains that the 
‘revised classical theory’ starts from the position of attempting to mitigate the criticism based 
on typicality effects in order to preserve certain preexisting theoretical goals rather than starting 
from the psychological data itself. 
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clearly belonging nor clearly not belonging to a category, e.g. egg for ANIMAL 
– categorisation decisions could differ not only intersubjectively (between 
different people) but also intra-subjectively (for the same person across time). As 
shown by McCloskey and Glucksberg, in some cases the subjects were 
inconsistent in some of their classification decisions, so that one and the same 
person could classify the same item differently on different occasions. This is 
unexpected and hard to explain if one assumes the classical view, since if 
categorisation decisions are reached via a property-matching process, it is 
difficult to see how it could yield results unstable through time for the same 
subjects. 
 A classic example of vagueness/fuzziness from the field of linguistics is 
discussed in the widely quoted text by William Labov (2004). In Labov’s 
experiment, the subjects were requested to name the objects presented to them on 
drawings (one at a time, in randomised order) – see Fig. 7. The most interesting 
finding was related to the “Contexts” trial, in which the subjects were asked to 
imagine the objects in one of four context, e.g. with someone drinking coffee 
from the object, or the object standing on a table filled with mashed potatoes. 
The imagined context turned out to have a substantial impact on the 
categorisation of the objects on drawings as evidenced by their naming.  
 Such a result stands in direct conflict with the classical view (specifically, 
its essentialist premises), which does not allow contextual – and therefore 
noncriterial – features to influence categorisation decision outcomes. In theory, 
this objection could be addressed by re-qualifying the contextual variables of 
such sort as criterial features and thus including them into the extended set of 
necessary and sufficient features. This, however, would lead to further problems. 
Firstly, it would be extremely difficult to constraint the set of relevant contextual 
variables, and secondly, their differential importance would still contradict the 
classical tenets (cf. point d) in 5.2.1.); thirdly, they could turn out to be very 
difficult to formalise and operationalise. 
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 Fig. 7. Visual stimulus used in the study by Labov (2004 [1973]). 
 
A natural way of dealing with the cases such as those in McCloskey and 
Glucksberg 1978 and Labov 2004 is parallel to a popular philosophical response 
to the so called ‘the Sorites paradox’, or ‘the paradox of the heap’. This paradox 
illustrates the difficulty in establishing the exact number of grains of cereal 
needed to constitute a heap. Although a heap consists of a finite number of grains 
greater than one, when adding grains one by one it seems to be impossible to 
identify any particular turning point at which the next grain would complete the 
qualitative transition after which the entity in question could finally be described 
as ‘a heap’ (reviewed e.g. in Dominic Hyde 2005).  
 A frequently offered solution rests on resorting to the division of the 
indeterminacy pinpointed by the paradox into semantic and epistemic191. If the 
indeterminacy is qualified as merely epistemic, it is a viable option to claim that 
                                                 
191 Cf. Hyde 2005. 
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there indeed exists a specific borderline number of grains necessary and 
sufficient for making a heap. The apparent indeterminacy would result purely 
from the epistemic limitations of the subjects who would be normally unable to 
determine this number with the requisite accuracy192. 
 By the same token, it could be proposed that in reality the meaning of 
words/concepts from the studies in the vein of (McCloskey and Glucksberg 
1978) and (Labov 2004) quoted above is fixed and not vague. It would follow 
that for every (conceptualised) object such as an individual cup or an instance of 
a disease it either does or does not belong to a classically construed category, 
understood here as a class of entities in the world. Whereas the subjects might 
not always be able to adequately determine the categorial status of the olive or a 
receptacle, in reality, the olive either is or is not a fruit, and a given receptacle 
either is or is not a cup. It is already obvious, however, that from a cognitivist 
perspective such a reply is deeply uninteresting for the same reasons as were 
mentioned in some of the previous objections. It is precisely this epistemic, 
cognitive dimension that a psychologically real theory of categorisation should 
be able to explain; when it is missing from the account, the theory can no longer 
count as a theory of categorisation (the broad subject area of categorisation) but 
rather as an ontological theory. 
 
5.2.4. Evaluation 
As can be seen from the previous section, the criticism of the classical approach 
is overwhelming. In particular, in Cognitive Science, it is considered a non-
contender (although in fairness it should be noted that this has never been the 
primary area of application of the work in the spirit of the classical view). Very 
clearly, the classical way is not how humans go about categorisation tasks, and if 
                                                 
192 It could be observed that some ‘soritic’ predicates are more amenable to such an explanation 
than others. While seemingly valid for ‘is red’ or ‘is bald’, such a strategy feels drastically less 
palpable for predicates like ‘is fast’, ‘is shy’, or ‘is fairly big’. 
This is a submitted manuscript version. The publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint the 
material in any form. Final published version, copyright Peter Lang: https://doi.org/10.3726/978-3-653-05287-9 
 189 
the criterion of psychological reality is violated, the theoretical approach in 
question must automatically be discarded. 
 While such a strong conclusion is well founded, one should also 
remember that the scope of the refutation of the classical view is not absolute, 
and that several theoretical areas can be identified in which it appears to be the 
most adequate description of phenomena. One such area is specialised scientific 
vocabulary, which is often thought to be classical par excellence: specialised 
scientific terms are not so much described by their definitions as called into being 
by them, so theoretically they should be fully reducible to their definitions. 
Another area is categorisation as a conscious, rule governed process. Humans are 
fully capable of acting in ways compatible with the classical view in that they 
can follow a set of explicit rules in sorting tasks, e.g. in assigning objects to 
specific categories on a basis of predefined feature checklist. For example, if a 
person has mastered the rules of chess, he or she can categorise the moves into 
legal and illegal one by the process of conscious application of explicit, 
linguaform rules.  
 Still, even such cases are not without their caveats. Firstly, technical 
vocabulary is often found to be sensitive to counterexamples, which 
demonstrates that at least some technical terms have other stabilising elements 
over and above their definitions193. As to conscious, rule governed categorisation, 
experimental data show that it is always to some degree influenced by 
nonclassical effects. Even when one is given a very clear set of explicit rules, 
noncriterial factors still tend to have an impact on categorisation outcomes, and 
certainly have a significant impact on the categorisation process. This is shown 
unequivocally by Edward Smith et al. (1998), who discuss and then replicate a 
study in visual categorisation of artificial stimuli by Scott W. Allen and Lee R. 
Brooks (quoted and analysed in Smith et al. 1998: 172–180). They have 
established that the subjects, although presented with an unambiguous rule, also 
                                                 
193 Cf. the example of a ‘straight line’ in non-Euclidean geometry. 
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invoke implicit ‘similarity’ procedures at the same time, as evidenced by the 
error rate and reaction times194. Somewhat similar effects were shown for natural 
conceptual categories in (Hampton 1995), where the categorisation decision of 
subjects still depended on the presence of the “characteristic features” even 
though the subjects had been explicitly instructed to rely exclusively on the 
“defining features” of a category (cf. also the further comments by Smith et al. 
1998: 180–181). 
 A much better candidate for the area where the classical view can be at 
least partly vindicated is that of people’s beliefs regarding the categorial structure 
of the world. While their concepts, and as a result, their actual categorisation 
decisions are patently nonclassical (as discussed above), people appear to be 
convinced that the external world, especially in the biological dimension, is 
partitioned into classes of beings, each of which has clear boundaries and has an 
identity defined by its hidden essence. This is known as psychological 
essentialism. The term in question comes from Douglas Medin and Andrew 
Ortony (1989), who dub it “the psychologically plausible analog of the logically 
implausible doctrine of metaphysical essentialism”. The authors explain: “[t]his 
would be not the view that things have essences, but that people’s 
representations of things might reflect such a belief… We think there is evidence 
that ordinary people do believe that things have essences” (Medin and Ortony 
                                                 
194 In this experiment, the subject were asked to categorise pictures of imaginary animals as 
Diggers versus Builders. The criterion for categorisation was the presence of at least 2 of the 
three attributes in the test object. There were two groups of subjects – the Rule group (who were 
told the rule for categorisation) and the Memory group (who did not know the rule and were 
supposed to make guesses on the basis of previous exemplars). The most interesting results 
concern the so-called Negative Matches - examples that were technically Builders (they 
matched the rule), but were more perceptually similar to Diggers. The Rule group was better at 
categorising normal Builders than Negative Matches, which suggested that apart from rule-
based strategy they also resorted to some similarity judgements. If they had relied solely on 
rules, they should have categorised all builders, including Negative Matches, with the same 
accuracy. 
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1989: 183, italics in the original). Psychological essentialism has subsequently 
received sound empirical confirmation, although mostly with respect to 
biological kinds (e.g. the study by Woo-kyoung Ahn et al. 2001). Despite this 
last limitation, psychological essentialism might turn out the only major aspect of 
categorisation relevant to Cognitive Science that is highly compatible with the 
classical approach. 
 
5.2.5. Specific problem: feature format 
The problem of the format of the features of concepts has reappeared throughout 
the present chapter. Here, it is singled out as a separate point, a decision that is 
substantiated by the need to highlight its utmost importance. 
 Much of the study on categorisation, especially in linguistics and 
philosophy, appears to have rested on the unspoken underlying assumption that 
adequate and relevant categorisation features are overt and can be given in a 
verbal representational format (single words, ‘primes’ roughly equivalent to 
single words, “subject-generated verbal predicates”, etc.). The identification of 
such features requires analytical scrutiny of the studied concept, involving 
selective attention and drawing on working memory resources, and the 
subsequent encoding of the features in a symbolic format (in the process of 
describing a feature verbally). The cognitive resources used in such a task are 
thus characteristic only of controlled, rule-based processing. 
 It is crucial to bear in mind that there is no guarantee that the features 
which one uses in this analytical, post-factum, symbolic description of a 
particular category are exactly the features upon which one actually bases her 
categorisation decisions. It might be useful to revert to Wittgenstein’s (1987) 
well-known example of family resemblance – but in a literal way. On 
encountering a (known) human face, one is instantly able to categorise it as a 
particular familiar face; one completes this categorisation task using low-level 
cognitive processes that does not enter his consciousness. The face can relatively 
easily be described verbally, employing such predicates as ‘has bushy eyebrows’, 
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‘has a long nose’ or ‘has a pointy chin’, but there is little doubt that even a very 
detailed description of this kind will be highly unsatisfactory; the features 
actually involved in the categorisation process must be of a rather different 
nature. The true features are below the level of our verbal access195. 
 Particularly relevant here is Jackendoff’s (1996: 545) comment on the 
character of semantic primitives of word meanings (which on most views are 
equivalent to ‘essential features’ of concepts): 
 
[I]t is not necessarily the case that all (or any) semantic/conceptual primitives 
are independently expressible as words. Just as the smallest isolable speech 
sounds (phonemes) are composites of distinctive features that cannot appear 
independently, so it appears to be the case that all word meanings are 
composite, made up of semantic/conceptual constituents that cannot appear in 
isolation. That is, word meanings are “molecular” entities in the “chemistry of 
concepts”, while semantic/conceptual primitives are subatomic or even 
quarklike. This being the case, the ultimate decomposition of a lexical item 
cannot be expressed in terms of a linguistic paraphrase. [Italics in the original.] 
 
When properly considered, this turns out to have interesting consequences for the 
evaluation of the generalised classical view. Consider the influential 
Wittgensteinian objection reviewed in 5.2.3.1. Rather than the proper 
interpretation to the effect of ‘necessary and sufficient features are very difficult 
if not impossible to state verbally’, it is often given an overly strong 
interpretation to the effect of ‘there is no feature whatsoever, of whatever 
character, that would be exemplified by all category members and no 
nonmembers’. Harnad (2002) takes issue with such a view, pointing to the 
                                                 
195 Jackendoff [1990: 42–43] introduces the example of face recognition to reach a similar 
conclusion, although in a slightly different context. 
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logical necessity of the existence of some invariances, as implied by the very 
phenomenon of successful categorisation196: 
 
(1) Successful Sorting Capacity Must Be Based on Detectable Invariance. 
 
The theorist who wishes to explain organisms' empirical success in sorting 
sensorimotor projections by means other than a detectable invariance shared by 
those projections (an invariance that of course need not be positive, monadic 
and conjunctive, but could also be negative, disjunctive, polyadic, conditional, 
probabilistic, constructive -- i.e., the result of any operation performed on the 
projection, including invariance under a projective transformation or under a 
change in relative luminance -- indeed, any complex boolean operation) has his 
work cut out for him if he wishes to avoid recourse to miracles, something a 
roboticist certainly cannot afford to do. (Harnad 2002) 
 
Harnad’s point is that for each category there simply must – as a matter of 
logical necessity – exist an invariance that is responsible for supporting the 
category’s identity, and that the difficulties for pinpointing such invariances 
stem from their elusive nature rather than their nonexistence. Firstly, the 
invariances in question may consist, and probably do consist, in something much 
more complex than the simple process of binary feature checking, as assumed in 
the basic classical models. One example of a plausible invariance is the distance 
from the category prototype (that is: the invariant element shared by all category 
members is the distance from the prototype on the scale of similarity, computed 
over the matrix of weighted shared features), which is precisely the mechanism 
underlying the similarity-based (that is, prototype and exemplar) approaches. 
However, the other point to bear in mind is that the features involved in 
                                                 
196 This, in a way, is already acknowledged by Wittgenstein: „But if someone wished to say: 
<There is something common to all these constructions—namely the disjunction of all their 
common properties>—I should reply: Now you are only playing with words. One might as well 
say: <Something runs through the whole thread—namely the continuous overlapping of those 
fibres>.” (1987: 32) 
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establishing the invariances might be present on a deeper, sublinguistic (using 
Jackendoff’s metaphor quoted above, “quark” rather than “atomic”) level. 
 
5.2.6. Natural Semantic Metalanguage 
An illustration of the above problem might be the original approach to 
lexical/conceptual semantics known as NSM (Natural Semantic Metalanguage), 
developed over several decades by a Polish linguist Anna Wierzbicka. Natural 
Semantic Metalanguage is an approach to semantic analysis of word meanings in 
natural languages, the central element of which are the so-called ‘primitive 
concepts’ (Wierzbicka 1996: 35–110), also variously referred to as 
‘indefinabilia’, ‘atomic expressions’, ‘semantic primes’, or the ‘alphabet of 
human thought’ (cf. Kalisz 1998). While Wierzbicka’s approach cannot be 
strictly classified as ‘classical in spirit’ – at least not without caveats and 
reservations – it shares with it at least one crucial general assumption, i.e. that of 
decomposition of wholes (word meanings) into features that themselves have a 
semantic character and can be expressed lexically197. 
 Semantic primitives (primes) as construed in NSM are the ultimate units 
of semantic analysis. The meanings of other words in a natural language can be 
expressed in short paraphrases involving only semantic primes and/or 
intermediate expressions that could themselves be stated in terms of semantic 
primitives. In contrast, the primes are atomic, and even though in principle they 
could be broken down into sets of arbitrary features, they are not amenable to 
being further decomposed in the way described above (Wierzbicka 1996: 28). 
Each of the postulated semantic primes needs to have a lexical exponent; ‘lexical 
exponent’, however, “is used in a broad sense to include not only words, but also 
bound morphemes and phrasemes (fixed phrases)” (Goddard 2002: 406–407). 
Semantic primes are arrived at through “in depth analysis of any natural 
                                                 
197 Wierzbicka herself seems to subscribe to the widely understood definitional view in her 
rebuttal of Fodor’s arguments against the posibility of defining lexical concepts (Wierzbicka 
1996: 237–257), and also, to a degree, in her criticism of the prototype theory (1996: 148–169). 
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language” (Wierzbicka 1996: 13, italics [SW]): for each postulated primitive, 
there is (hypothesised to be) a lexical exponent of that primitive in any natural 
language. This implies universality, but not only on the level of linguistic sings, 
but also conceptual repertoires of the speakers of all human languages. This 
universality across human languages is suggested to be founded on a strong 
innate component (Wierzbicka 1996: 16–19). 
 An example of an NSM paraphrase could be the definition of the concepts 
‘game’ supplied by Wierzbicka (1996: 158–159) as a reply to the influential 
Wittgensteinian argument quoted above: 
 
 games 
(a) many kinds of things that people do 
(b) for some time 
(c) “for pleasure” (i.e. because they want to feel something good) 
(d) when people do these things, one can say these things about these 
people: 
(e) they want some things to happen 
(f) if they were not doing these things, they wouldn’t want these things 
to happen 
(g) they don’t know what will happen 
(h) they know what they can do 
(i) they know what they cannot do 
 
The NSM approach, however, is not without its problems. Symptomatically, the 
analysis of ‘game’ (or, strictly speaking, the concept GAME) just cited is 
accompanied by a footnote explaining that “metaphorical extensions, ironic or 
humorous use, and the like” are excluded from being covered by this definition; 
Wierzbicka (1996: 159) resorts here to the distinction into “playful extensions” 
and “basic meaning”, which she does not further substantiate. The difficulties 
with semantic primes are concisely reviewed by Roman Kalisz (1998), who 
groups them into the following categories: 
- incompleteness and incomprehensibility 
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- generality 




In short, Kalisz (1998) points out that firstly, Wierzbicka’s paraphrases in fact to 
a large extent rely on intermediate expressions, and when these are substituted 
with their analyses into primitives, the paraphrases become incomprehensible. 
Secondly, the paraphrastic explications are usually too general (unrestrictive), 
extending to cover examples not falling under the relevant concept. Thirdly, the 
paraphrases only approximate the original meaning, being unable to capture 
some of the emergent subtleties that are specific to the unreduced forms. 
Fourthly, closed class words, although frequently appearing in the paraphrases, 
are underrepresented in the proposed repertoire of primitives; as a result, the 
ideal of building explanations fully reducible to the set of primitives is difficult to 
achieve in practice. Finally, in practice the explanations often turn out to be 
clumsy, calling for increased processing effort in comprehension. 
 Despite Wierzbicka’s ingenuity – acknowledged by commentators 
including Kalisz himself – it is clear that complete representations of word 
meaning can only very rarely (if at all) be reconstructed from semantic 
primitives. I suggest that this follows directly from the main commitment of the 
NSM approach (to the primitives having lexical exponents), thus constituting 
another example of the feature format problem. 
 
5.3. Summary and conclusion 
In Chapter 5, I reviewed the so-called ‘classical approach’ to the problem of 
(broadly understood) categorisation and conceptual structure. After clarifying the 
potential terminological difficulties, I summarised the main theoretical tenets, 
which was followed by a brief historical review. In later sections, I discussed the 
main objections against the classical view, most importantly the problems with 
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typicality effects and with irremovable context sensitivity. Recapitulating on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the classical approach, I determined that no attempt 
to salvage this general stance was convincing and, at least in Cognitive Science, 
this approach offers no promise for a successful application. 
 In the final section, I considered the crucial problem of establishing the 
features relevant for categorisation. Specifically, I focussed on the format of the 
features. I concluded that the assumption about the possibility of capturing the 
features verbally, i.e. the assumption that the features can be adequately 
described by words, might be a major stumbling block to developing more 
accurate models of categorisation. What is more, even those decompositional 
accounts of conceptual content or word meaning that explicitly avoid identifying 
conceptual components with words must ultimately refer to the descriptive 
categories offered by a natural language. This is a pervasive and possibly even 
irremovable problem resulting directly from the qualitative rather than 
quantitative nature of linguistic and philosophical study. 
 The above treatment of the classical approach leads to several additional 
considerations that might turn out to be worth exploring in more detail in further 
philosophically-oriented research. Firstly, the failures of the classical view with 
respect to the cognitive dimension seem to reflect a consistent pattern. In view of 
the division of labour between the mentalistic and externalistic perspectives 
presented in Chapter 2, it is possible that the classical approach meshes much 
more naturally with the latter alternative. For example, the normativity of 
concepts appears to be an essentially E-semantic subject area, with very limited 
potential for exploration within a mentalistic framework. Still, in the applications 
related to normativity – especially where the requirement for an explicit 
statement of a set of criteria results from the very nature of the task, e.g. in 
normative definition – models based on classical assumptions may turn out to be 
indispensable. 
 Another, and a possibly surprising reflection stems from a juxtaposition of 
the abovementioned pattern of failures of the classical approach with the pattern 
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of failures of the general project of classical Artificial Intelligence. It has been 
repeatedly observed (perhaps most pungently by Jerry Fodor [1983], [2000]) that 
AI has so far failed to live up to its early promise. Considering that since the 
influential paper by Alan Turing (1950) the standard measure of success of AI 
has been the capability for intelligent conversation with a human, it is the 
mastery of the concepts of natural language that seems to be the foremost 
obstacle to the successful progress of AI. One may note that if the idea of 
meanings-as-lists-of-necessary-and-sufficient-conditions was in fact a feasible 
one, and if concepts for standard lexical items were in fact implementable in the 
classical spirit, then the problem of concept acquisition in machines could be 
reduced to the implementation of a set of primitives plus simple computational 
rules. Accordingly, the as yet insurmountable difficulties of classical AI may 
partly reflect the troubles with the classical theory of conceptual content. 
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In the previous chapter, I provided a review of historically the most influential 
theory of conceptual structure in linguistic, philosophical and cognitive-
psychological literature on the topic of categorisation, broadly construed (as 
defined in 3.2.3.). The review has been accomplished from a recent historical 
perspective, and has been supplemented with a critical evaluation from a 
cognitivist standpoint represented in this work. 
 All of the theories – or more appropriately, theoretical approaches –
considered in Chapters 5 and 7 can be grouped together as ‘decompositional’ 
views on concepts/categorisation. Such a name is pertinent, because the common 
ground between such views consists in the intuitively compelling guiding 
assumption about the structural complexity of simple concepts resulting from 
composition of more basic parts. More precisely, by this assumption simple 
concepts are posited to have internal structures that can – at least potentially – be 
analysed into sub-components, and that are the main factor deciding about their 
individuation. 
 Conceptual atomism is an alternative view, distinct from all of those 
characterised above in claiming that concepts display no internal structure. On 
this view, it is concepts themselves that are the most primitive building blocks of 
cognitive meaning, with no possibilities for further decomposition. Although this 
stance – arguably a minority view in Cognitive Science – has several 
contemporary adherents (e.g. Ruth Millikan, 2000), the most vocal of them is 
arguably Jerry A. Fodor (especially 1998), whose formulation of conceptual 
atomism has come to serve as its paradigmatic construal. 
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 Reasons for a special treatment of the Fodorian position start from its 
originality, the difficulties it has posed for the attempts at its accurate 
reconstruction (cf. Laurence and Margolis 2002), and the extremely influential 
status of its author. However, one motivation to address and convincingly refute 
it stands out prominently. As suggested by the subtitle of his 1998 classic 
(Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong), Fodor’s conceptual atomism, 
rather than being yet another view of concepts, constitutes a challenge for entire 
mainstream Cognitive Science in this respect. If one is prepared to follow Fodor 
to the full extent of his argument, and consequently, if one accepts that concepts 
are indivisible atoms of (propositional) thought, then no legitimate form of 
conceptual analysis can be exercised, and analytic philosophy and lexical 
semantics face the need of a radical reformulation of their fundamental goals (cf. 
Fodor 1998: 162–163; Fodor 2000: 350; and also Wierzbicka 1996: 257)198. 
 That Fodor is not in fact correct seems to be uncontested (consider the 
converging overall verdicts of, among many others, Murat Aydede [1998], Kent 
Bach [2000], Eric Dietrich [2001], Alex Levine and Mark H. Bickhard [1999], as 
well as the authors of reviews in the March 2000 issue of Mind and 
Language199). Still, much less unanimity is achieved regarding the exact 
motivation of this dismissal, other than the extreme counterintuitiveness of some 
of his proposals. Focussing their comment on another aspect of Fodor’s doctrine, 
namely extreme nativism (innatism)200, Laurence and Margolis (2002: 26) write:  
 
                                                 
198 This consideration may be largely irrelevant to non-mentalistic approaches to language and 
concepts (broadly characterised as E-linguistics in chapters 3 and 4), where the main 
commitment is to descriptive power. However, in the present work as well as all other 
cognitively oriented projects, in which psychological reality is a major desideratum, Fodor’s 
argument must be taken seriously. 
199 Dietrich’s (2001: 94) quip: “[Fodor] wouldn’t be happy if anyone agreed with him” perfectly 
captures the general spirit of the debate, both with respect to its content and its form: the 
characteristically waggish style of Fodor’s later writings is often adopted by his opponents. 
200 A position somewhat relaxed in Fodor 1998. See below. 
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Not surprisingly, Fodor has had few supporters. Philosophers seem to have 
taken the conclusion to be so patently absurd that they think the argument 
behind it barely needs to be addressed…  
As will become clear, we think that these reactions are deeply problematic. 
Apart from anything else, responses like these have encouraged a superficial 
understanding of Fodor’s argument. This is unfortunate since, in spite of the 
near universal rejection of its conclusion, the dialectic that Fodor’s argument 
generates remains extremely influential. 
 
Laurence and Margolis’s observation, despite the abovementioned qualification 
that it pertains to the nativistic rather than atomistic aspect of Fodor’s theory, 
readily transfers to the present context as well. This is due to the fact those 
aspects represent different facets of the same comprehensive and carefully 
constructed theory of cognitive meaning. Thus, the argument for radical concept 
nativism can be treated as the argument for conceptual atomism run one step 
further. Conceptual atomism, in turn, links very closely to informational 
semantics. These have been described as “natural allies” (Fodor 1998: 156), but 
in fact this relation generalises to most other building blocks of Fodor’s 
theoretical edifice. Especially when commenting on elements that individually 
strike one as strongly counterintuitive, it is important to have before one’s eyes 
the complete picture of mutually supporting and illuminating theses. 
 
6.2. Jerry Fodor’s theory of concepts 
The roots of Jerry Fodor’s general theoretical outlook regarding meaning in 
thought and language can be traced to two rudimentary but far-reaching 
commitments: to naturalism and to (propositional) folk psychology201. These can 
be supplemented by the observation about the systematic nature of human 
                                                 
201 Cf. M. J. Cain’s diagnosis in the introduction to his monograph on Jerry Fodor: “Fodor has 
two basic commitments: one is to folk psychology and the other is to physicalism” (Cain 2002: 
1). Contrary to Cain, I opt for naturalism instead of the latter term. Rather than any changes in 
essence, it involves slightly different (less reductionistic) connotations. 
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thought processes. The Fodorian project can be seen almost in its entirety as 
advances in spelling out the consequences of those two guiding desiderata. 
Naturally, over the span of several decades some aspects of Fodor’s philosophy 
have undergone certain modifications, and in what follows I focus on the more 
recently defended positions. 
 
6.2.1. Naturalism 
A tenet that is central to Jerry Fodor’s theoretical programme, as it is to 
contemporary mainstream Western philosophy and science in general (see 
1.3.3.), is that there exist no supernatural properties and reality is at bottom 
uniformly physical; hence, mind and meaning are purely natural phenomena 
whose properties are, at bottom, strictly physical properties. Such an approach 
requires that all relations and phenomena that are postulated in science must at 
least be made compatible with a physical explanation, actual or at least 
possible202. In particular, intentional/semantic relations must be suitable for an 
ultimate reformulation in a naturalistic vocabulary involving non-intentional and 
non-semantic phenomena and relations, such as causal or nomic relations203. 
Naturalism requires no separate substantiation, since it receives practically 
unanimous endorsement within Cognitive Science, counting among its most 
basic precepts. 
 Note that this is not equivalent to a strong reductionistic position that 
would prophet or even advocate the dissolution of all other sciences in physics. 
Fodor defends the legitimate status of special sciences in general and psychology 
                                                 
202 “It's a methodological consequence of our conviction - contingent, no doubt, but inductively 
extremely well confirmed - that everything that the sciences talk about is physical. If that is so, 
then the properties that appear in scientific laws must be ones that it is possible for physical 
things to have, and there must be an intelligible story to tell about how physical things can have 
them.” (Fodor 1994: 5) 
203 “I want a naturalized theory of meaning; a theory that articulates, in nonsemantic and 
nonintentional terms, sufficient conditions for one bit of the world to be about (to express, 
represent, or be true of) another bit.” (Fodor 1993 [1987]: 98; italics in the original) 
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in particular (e.g. Fodor 1980 [1974]); according to him, the ultimate viability of 
strong reductionism, while possible, is not likely, much less necessary. 
 
6.2.2. Folk psychology 
Folk psychology has been concisely introduced in section 4.2.3.2., where it was 
quoted as a possible supporting argument for the reality of concepts. What is 
most relevant for the present purposes is that firstly, folk psychology is extremely 
successful, and secondly, its operations are routinely couched in propositional 
terms. 
 Although the spontaneity and efficiency of folk psychological 
explanations are universally familiar, Fodor’s celebrated “lecture” example (1993 
[1987]: 3–8) serves as a convenient illustration. From the telephone conversation 
in which Fodor is asked to lecture in a distant city and accepts the invitation, one 
can effortlessly and accurately predict Fodor’s consequent arrival in that city on a 
given date. Such predictions concerning people’s behaviour can be achieved 
exclusively by means of folk psychology and, despite the ‘ceteris paribus’ clause, 
they tend to be very reliable – especially when compared to predicting the course 
of arguably less complex natural phenomena, such as the weather. Fodor takes 
these considerations to provide evidence for the reality of folk psychology as a 
genuine mental process, whereas the majority of philosophers, notably Daniel 
Dennett (e.g. 1998: 81–94) and Patricia Churchland, remain much more sceptical 
about such an interpretation. 
 The other important point regarding folk psychology is that it exploits 
generalisations not unlike those functioning in regular sciences. In order for its 
sentences to generalise across contexts and people, its basic component parts – 
propositions and, in turn, their component parts, concepts – must remain ‘public’, 
i.e. invariant for different subjects. This bears the vital consequence that the 
identity of concepts (qua concept types) must be preserved across individuals, 
which motivates Publicity Constraint as a “non-negotiable” criterion for a theory 
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of concepts (Fodor 1998: 28–34; see section 4.2.6.): to Fodor, such a theory must 
account for different people sharing the same concepts. 
 
6.2.3. Systematic nature of human thought (compositionality) 
One additional corollary of the central status of folk psychology and, especially, 
of propositions serving as its vehicles, is that thought is implied to have at least 
certain logical properties. But the arguments for compositionality are not 
dependent on the above; rather they are founded on independent observation. In 
short, a system is compositional if it is productive in predictable ways. The 
pithiest definitions are probably those supplied in Fodor 2001 (p. 6)204: 
 
Both human thought and human language are, invariably, productive and 
systematic; and the only way they could be is by being compositional. 
(Productivity is the property that a system of representations has if it includes 
infinitely many syntactically and semantically distinct symbols. Systematicity 
is the property that a system of representations has (whether or not it is 
productive) if each of the symbols it contains occurs with the same semantic 
value as a constituent of many different hosts). 
 
Productivity and systematicity constitute very strong intuitive criteria for concept 
possession, as it indeed seems legitimate to credit a cognitive agent with a 
possession of a given concept only if she can satisfy the Generality Constraint 
(i.e. be able to recombine a given concept with all other semantically and 
syntactically appropriate concepts in her repertoire205), and also apply the 
concept systematically (i.e. her being able to grasp the meaning of xRy, e.g. 
‘John loves Mary’, is itself sufficient to guarantee that she is able to grasp the 
                                                 
204 Towards the end of this text, Fodor apparently contradicts himself, claiming that “language is 
not compositional” (2001: 14). This should properly be read as an assertion that the 
compositionality characteristic of language is secondary and imperfect, and it is only thought 
that is primarily and perfectly compositional. 
205 As postulated by as Gareth Evans 1982; see also more extensive comments in section 4.2.2.) 
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meaning yRx, e.g. ‘Mary loves John’). To Fodor, systematicity and productivity 
are fundamental properties of the human conceptual system (and, derivatively, of 
natural languages), and their successful explanation is a sine qua non criterion for 
a viable account thereof – hence the vehement attacks on connectionist 
architectures as models of the human mind (e.g. Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988), 
which are at best capable of approximating systematic/productive behaviour, but 
have so far been unable to implement fully general systematicity/productivity. 
 
6.2.4. Consequences 
Throughout his career, Jerry Fodor has remained dedicated to the core tenets 
outlined in 6.2.1., 6.2.2. and 6.2.3. The positions reviewed below are most 
fruitfully seen as the consequences stemming from the above foundations and, 
when Fodor’s anti-relativistic leanings are also taken into consideration, are at 
least partly predictable from them. Below I present a very brief account of the 
key consequences that together form a framework into which conceptual 
atomism then fits in naturally. Conceptual atomism itself, the position central to 
the interests of the present work, receives a more detailed exposition in the next 
major section (6.2.5.). 
 
6.2.4.1. Language of thought 
Despite being introduced as early as in 1975, the idea – or the hypothesis of – the 
language of thought (LOT or mentalese; Fodor 1975) has continued to exert a 
powerful influence on Cognitive Science, with such prominent researchers as 
Steven Pinker (e.g. 1995: 55–82) considering it one of its mainsprings. In crudest 
terms, LOTH (language of thought hypothesis) stipulates that (propositional) 
“thought and thinking are done in a mental language, i.e., in a symbolic system 
physically realized in the brain of the relevant organisms” (Aydede 2004). By 
this hypothesis, LOT is a linguaform computational system with combinatorial 
syntax and compositional semantics that generates complex, sentential 
representations from simple wordlike representations (i.e. concepts), the 
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‘sentences’ being identical to complex physical brain states in particular 
organisms, the ‘words’ – to distinct component parts of those states. Whenever 
an organism tokens a propositional attitude with the content P, it does that by 
virtue of tokening an isomorphic sentence S in LOT, which happens by virtue of 
tokening the corresponding brain state (cf. Cain 2002: 55–56)206. 
 All sources of motivation for LOT derive in one form or another from the 
logical-cum-linguistic properties exhibited by human thought. Firstly, other 
representational formats, such as images, are fundamentally inadequate for 
implementing linguistic meanings with their potential for compositionality, 
inference, etc. Note that Fodor does not question the reality of picturelike and 
other sensory representations, but he follows the later Wittgenstein (e.g. 1987 
[1953]: 131–132)207, and ultimately Frege, in demonstrating imagistic 
representations to lack context independence, stability, generality, and other 
features necessary for supporting propositional, publicly shareable meanings. 
Secondly, a discrete symbolic medium is required to implement full systematicity 
and productivity that, as has been shown in 6.2.3., Fodor takes to embody the 
most important attributes of human thought. 
                                                 
206 Strictly speaking, either ‘identical’ or ‘brain states’, as well as ‘organism’ need to be 
qualified, since LOT is multiply realisable. In addition to the possibility of LOT being 
differently physically encoded for different people, this also means that LOT is at least in 
principle possible for non-human and/or artificial beings. Note, too Fodor’s very strong realistic 
stance on the ontology of LOT: it is an actually existing, cerebrally realised system, not a mere 
descriptive heuristic. 
207 E.g. remark 449: “We do not realize that we calculate, operate, with words, and in the course 
of time turn them sometimes into one picture, sometimes into another.—It is as if one were to 
believe that a written order for a cow which someone is to hand over to me always had to be 
accompanied by an image of a cow, if the order was not to lose its meaning.” (Italics in the 
original.) 
Incidentally, and ironically, it is Wittgenstein’s (1987 [1953]) argument for the primacy of 
society to rules (and to rule-governed systems such as languages), and hence against the 
possibility of private language, that most forcefully militates against LOTH. 
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 The multiple realisability of LOT notwithstanding, in humans it is 
supposed to be a universal, innate piece of cognitive equipment. Its innateness 
allows Fodor to explain concept acquisition without resort to learning (see 
6.2.4.3.). 
 
6.2.4.2. Criticism of inferential role semantics (holism) 
Much of Fodor’s support for his favoured conception of semantics – understood 
in the sense of a method for individuating meanings – relies on a negative 
argument against the rival views, especially inferential role semantics. Inferential 
role semantics, or conceptual role semantics, [IRS/CRS] is a type of functional 
role semantics mentioned in 3.3. subsection c), where the adequate roles are 
restricted to inferential roles  (see e.g. Block 1998).  
 From Fodor’s perspective, the most powerful objection against 
inferential/conceptual role semantics is that they are seen by to be irreparably 
holistic. If, as stipulated by IRS, a concept is individuated by its inferential 
relations, then – since there can be indefinitely many inferences involving 
numerous other concepts – its individuation is necessarily dependent on other 
concepts. This would be acceptable if that dependence could be shown to be 
‘manageable’, i.e. if one could reliably differentiate the important inferences 
(meaning-constitutive, analytic; for example from is a dog to is an animal) from 
the unimportant ones (contingent, synthetic; for example from is a dog to wags 
its tail). Unfortunately, since Willard van Orman Quine’s (1961) extremely 
influential attack on the analytic–synthetic distinction, it has been almost 
universally agreed that no principled way of such a differentiation is attainable – 
a point that is reinforced by the general failure of the classical views on 
categorisation (see 5.2.3.2.). Thus, the individuation of a concept depends to 
some degree on all inferences (and hence all concepts)208, if not immediately, 
                                                 
208 “To put it in slightly other terms, it seemed to us [Fodor and Ernest Lepore – SW] likely that 
either translation is an atomistic relation, so that what translates an expression of L [a language 
– SW] is independent of what, if any, other expressions L contains; or translation is a holistic 
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then at least indirectly, by depending on some concepts that in turn depend on 
other concepts, etc. IRS’s producing holistic consequences is inescapable (cf. 
Cain 2002: 125–127). 
 The reason why Fodor finds holism objectionable follows directly from 
his commitment to folk psychology (6.2.2.), and more precisely, to folk 
psychology’s dependence of publicly shareable, stable conceptual contents. If 
concept individuation is holistic, then given even the slightest interpersonal 
differences, concepts are non-identical (non-type-identical, token non-identity 
being a truism) from person to person, and folk-psychological generalisations 
cannot be salvaged. “…[I]f the individuation of concepts is literally relativized to 
whole belief systems, then no two people, and no two time slices of a given 
person, are ever subsumed by the same intentional generalizations, and the 
prospects for robust theories in intentional psychology are negligible.” (Fodor 
1998: 114) 
 
6.2.4.3. Nativism and modularity 
Fodor’s nativism regarding concepts (radical concepts nativism) is mostly 
dependent on the argument for informational semantics and consequently, 
conceptual atomism. It should be noted that in his 1998 book, Fodor has to some 
extent backtracked on his rather extreme position. Still, contrary to Cain’s (2002: 
73–80) opinion, it seems that his stance continues to qualify as rather nativistic, if 
to a somewhat lesser degree209. A more extensive treatment of this issue is 
offered in the next section. 
                                                                                                                                               
relation, so that what translates an expression of L depends on all the other expressions L 
contains. We saw no stable middle ground short of wholesale appeals to the analytic/synthetic 
distinction, which, following Quine, we took to be a Very Frail Reed.” (Fodor 1994: 74; italics 
in the original) 
209 “Likewise, it used to seem to me that atomism about concepts means that DOORKNOB is 
innate. But now I think that you can trade a certain amount of innateness for a certain amount of 
mind-dependence. Being a doorknob is just: striking our kinds of minds the way that doorknobs 
do. So, what you need to acquire the concept DOORKNOB <from experience> is just: the kind 
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 There is also a nativistic ring to Fodor’s prominent theory of the 
modularity of mind (Fodor 1983, 2000; see also 1.4.6.1.), in that the 
developmental paths of the modules are supposed to be relatively inflexible. This 
topic is relatively less relevant for the present considerations, but two remarks 
can be of interest. Firstly, contrary to the popular reception of this theory, only 
peripheral systems, i.e. the processing systems for the sensory modalities and 
language, have modular properties, while the central system for conducting 
propositional operations, such as the fixation of beliefs, does not; on the contrary, 
it is informationally unencapsulated and domain-general. This means that 
‘central’ cognition is non-modular. Secondly, this non-modular character of 
central cognition is what renders it hopeless for any productive cognitive-
scientific study, and this is the case precisely because of the problem of holism 
(Fodor 1983: 101–129)210.  
 
6.2.5. Fodor’s conceptual atomism and informational semantic 
The two elements of Jerry Fodor’s rather impressive theoretical construction that 
are of the most immediate interest from the perspective of the present work are 
informational semantics and conceptual atomism, also jointly referred to as 
informational atomism (IA) due to their interdependence. The most 
comprehensive treatment of those positions was given in Fodor’s 1998 
monograph on concepts, Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. 
Accordingly, in my review and the subsequent critical discussion of this 
                                                                                                                                               
of mind that experience causes to be struck that way by doorknobs.” (Fodor 1998: 162; italics in 
the original) Note that such a rephrasing does not envisage the process of concept acquisition as 
substantially more environmentally driven, but still presents it as rigidly dependent on the 
presumably innate cognitive equipment. See 6.2.5. 
210 More accurately, on Fodor’s account central cognition is doubly holistic, being both isotropic 
and Quinean. This means that the level of acceptance of any belief may be sensitive, 
respectively, “to the level of acceptance of any other belief in the system”, and “to the global 
properties of the system’s beliefs taken collectively” (Fodor 1983: 107–108). 
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philosopher’s defence of informational semantics and conceptual atomism, I will 
rely mostly on the arguments provided in this book. 
 The first theoretical element, conceptual atomism, can be defined as 
follows: 
 
Conceptual atomism: concepts211 are atoms, i.e. indivisible units 
with no internal structure. 
 
Thus, each of the concepts in one’s conceptual repertoire constitutes a self-
contained primitive that cannot be further analysed into component parts. 
Furthermore, relations between concepts do not play any role in content 
individuation: what relations a given concept may have to any other concepts is 
entirely immaterial to establishing its content. Similarly, the acquisition of each 
individual concept proceeds in isolation from the rest of the conceptual system, 
and the possession of any given concept is likewise independent of the 
possession of any other(s). On the above account it is (theoretically) possible to 
possess only one concept, or, for example, to possess the concept FOREST 
without simultaneously possessing the concept TREE (Fodor’s own vivid 
examples include BACHELOR and UNMARRIED [1998: 14], and TUESDAY 
and WEDNESDAY [1998: 74]). 
 The unorthodox view that concepts cannot be individuated by means of 
interconceptual relations compels its proponents to identify an alternative method 
of successful content individuation. According to Fodor, such a method, i.e. a 
semantics, is informational: 
                                                 
211 For the sake of accuracy it should be reemphasised that here, as elsewhere in the text, 
“concepts” are meant in their default understanding – in line with 3.2.3. c) and 4.1. – i.e. as 
simple concepts. The considerations below, quite obviously, do not apply to complex concepts. 
To a first approximation, conceptual atomism claims that what is morphemically unstructured at 
the level of language must also be unstructured at the level of thought (although the reverse 
need not hold, cf. Fodor’s standard example of DOORKNOB). 
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Informational semantics: contents are individuated by the nomic 
relations that link concepts to appropriate elements of the mind-
external world. 
 
This is to say that the instances of a certain class of entities in the world (e.g. 
dogs) reliably cause the tokenings of a given concept (e.g. DOG), and the stable 
and lawlike (nomic) character of this relation of tokening is meaning-constitutive 
for this concept212. Dogs (“instances of doghood”, to use Fodor’s wording, who 
himself borrows it from James J. Gibson) causally co-vary with the tokenings of 
the concept DOG, and the variety of possible causal chains from dogs to DOG 
reflects the variety of the means of semantic access (Fodor 1998: 75–80). The 
basic mode of semantic access is perceptual – when a person simply 
sees/hears/touches a dog – but may take much more complex forms for more 
abstract concepts or in non-standard cases. Fodor (1998: 29, 76, 79) repeatedly 
cites the example of the deaf-blind American author Helen Keller, whose 
disabilities did not prevent her from the acquisition of English, testifying to her 
grasp of the underlying concepts. 
 Conceptual atomism and informational semantics, mutually supportive but 
considerably less intuitively appealing and consequently less readily acceptable 
than the available rival views, require an elaboration. Fodor’s argumentation 
builds upon what Alexander Levine and Mark Bickhard (1999) call a “what 
else?” argument: the systematic and comprehensive criticism of the alternative 
views, in the light of which his preferred position emerges as the only viable one. 
                                                 
212 “[T]he fact that DOG means dog (and hence the fact that <dog> does) is constituted by a 
nomic connection between two properties of dogs; viz. being dogs and being causes of actual 
and possible DOG tokenings in us.” (Fodor 1998: 73, italics in the original) 
“<[D]og> and DOG mean dog because <dog> expresses DOG, and DOG tokens fall under a 
law according to which they reliably are (or would be) among the effects of instantiated 
doghood.” (Fodor 1998: 75, italics in the original) 
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Fodor divides inferential role semantic (IRS) accounts of concepts into two main 
groups – definitional and similarity-based (“statistical”, as he labels them) – and 
addresses them with counterarguments of both empirical and conceptual nature. 
 
6.2.5.1. Criticism of definitional accounts 
Definitional accounts of conceptual structure are such that assume most concepts 
to be composed of lists of features (which are usually taken to be other concepts) 
in a way that the content of the given concept is fully inherited from the contents 
of its components; such a view is equivalent to the Classical View characterised 
in section 5.2.1. From this standpoint, concepts are definitions (strictly speaking, 
they are definienda or structural descriptions; Fodor 1998: 41, footnote 1), or 
feature bundles. Note that their being feature bundles is a stronger claim than the 
possibility of predicating features of concepts (Fodor 1998: 63), since it requires 
that concepts be composed of those features in a way deciding about their 
identity. Another vital hedge is that such a description pertains to most, but not 
all concepts, because there must be at least some primitive concepts that avoid 
the problem of circularity. 
 Definitional accounts are a species of IRS, since the structural description 
that is supposed to constitute a given concept can be readily recast in terms of 
inferences: for example, the fact that the concept BACHELOR comprises the 
concept MALE trivially licences the inference that if someone is a bachelor, he is 
a male. Nevertheless, bona fide definitional accounts are immune from Fodor’s 
two foremost criticisms against IRS, that is the problem of holism/publicity and 
the failure to support compositionality (Fodor 1998: 44). As to the first, the 
identity of a given concept is decided exclusively by the contents of its 
definition, which is finite and exactly stated, and no holistic sensitivity to the rest 
of the conceptual system arises; furthermore, different people can have identical 
concepts (concept types) in virtue of the sameness of the definitions of these 
concepts. As to compositionality, definitions readily compose by contributing all 
of their contents to the content of the complex expression. In short, with respect 
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to holism and compositionality, definitions behave exactly like complex 
concepts. BACHELOR remains the same from person to person, because it is 
constituted only by UNMARRIED and MALE, independently of any 
idiosyncratic and contingent beliefs about bachelors that particular people might 
entertain; also, it contributes all of its contents to complex mental representations 
such as HUNGRY BACHELOR which then has the same content as HUNGRY 
UNMARRIED MAN. 
 Accordingly, the objection that Fodor raises against the definitional 
accounts of concepts is ultimately of empirical nature. Firstly, Fodor points out 
that it is only ‘true’ definitions, i.e. ones that fully reduce the given concept to its 
component parts, that qualify as safe from his reservations against IRS. In order 
to avoid the discussed problems with publicity and compositionality (as well as 
with concept acquisition), the structural descriptions proposed as definitions must 
indeed achieve full synonymy with the corresponding concepts (Fodor 1998: 48–
49). Fodor’s summary denies the existence of such bona fide definitions on the 
ground that empirical research within Cognitive Science has repeatedly failed to 
identify any incontrovertible cases. 
 The core of Fodor’s argumentation developed over two chapters need not 
be reviewed here, considering that his central conclusion about the status of 
definitional accounts is uncontroversial and was independently reached and 
substantiated in the previous chapter of my work. However, Fodor proceeds to 
lay a much stronger claim, one regarding the impossibility of even partial (non-
complete) decomposition of concepts213. Being indivisible atoms, concepts lack 
                                                 
213 Such a claim is tangential to the conclusion just reached: from the point of view of publicity 
and compositionality, it suffices that there exist no genuine definitions of the sort described 
above. Still, admitting the possibility that (at least some) concepts might (at least in part) be 
constituted of some identifiable components would undermine both conceptual atomism and 
informational semantics: the former because concepts could no longer be considered indivisible, 
and the latter because the mind-world nomic relation would cease to be the only factor relevant 
to establishing contents. 
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not only well defined internal structures, but any structure whatsoever. This, 
however, clashes with commonsensical data, such as the intuition of the 
polysemy of ‘keep’ in “Susan kept the money” and “Sam kept the crowd happy” 
(Fodor 1998: 49–50; examples originally from Jackendoff 1992)214. The meaning 
of the word ‘keep’, and hence of the concept KEEP, seems to be partly identical 
and partly different across the sentences, an explanation that questions the 
indivisibility of ‘keep’/KEEP and assumes structural complexity. Fodor insists 
that, since no more primitive level of semantic analysis exists than that of 
concepts themselves, ‘keep’/KEEP must be univocal, and the only relation that 
the word ‘kept’ has in common in both quoted sentences is simply the relation of 
keeping (Fodor 1998: 55). 
 
6.2.5.2. Criticism of similarity-based accounts 
Fodor’s argument against the similarity-based accounts of concepts is a mirror 
image of his critique of definitional accounts. In his analysis, Fodor focuses 
heavily on prototype accounts, which he takes to be representative of the whole 
class in all relevant respects, and which are discussed in the seventh chapter of 
my work. In this case, empirical evidence for the reality of prototypes – sensu 
typicality effects – cannot be questioned, a fact that Fodor acknowledges (1998: 
93) and, as will be explained, whose consequences he is prepared to take very 
seriously. Nonetheless, in Fodor’s opinion, probabilistic theories are critically 
vulnerable to his chief conceptual objection, that is the problem of 
compositionality. According to this researcher (Fodor 1998: 100), “the status of 
the statistical theory of concepts turns, practically entirely, on this issue”. 
 The attack against the possibility of prototypes being concept-constitutive 
is launched in Fodor 1998 along the lines familiar from his earlier work (e.g. 
Fodor 1995: 14–19, Fodor and Lepore 1996). The key reservation, termed here 
                                                 
214 Following Gilbert Ryle’s analysis quoted in section 3.2.2., one could compose a zeugmatic 
„Susan kept both the crown happy and her money”, diagnosing a category mistake that would 
indicate that each example of ‘keep’ belongs to a different category. 
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‘the Standard Objection’, is succinctly captured in the two initial sentences of 
Fodor and Lepore’s text (1996: 253–254): “[t]here is a standard objection to the 
idea that concepts might be prototypes (or exemplars, or stereotypes): because 
they are productive, concepts must be compositional. Prototypes aren’t 
compositional, so concepts can’t be prototypes”. 
 As was illustrated in 6.2.3., compositionality is a basic fact about human 
language and thought. The truistic observation that people’s understanding and 
production of meaningful sentences is not limited to the set of previously 
encountered examples, but is readily extended to an infinite number of novel 
ones cannot be explained without the recourse to compositionality, i.e. “the 
derivation of the content of a complex concept just from its structure and the 
content of its constituents” (Fodor 1998: 104). Even though the precise way in 
which the content of a complex concept is derived may at times be rather 
intricate (cf. e.g. Jackendoff’s [2002: 378–394] distinction into “simple” and 
“enriched” composition), the status of compositionality remains beyond doubt. 
 The problem of prototypes with compositionality is twofold. Firstly, 
indefinitely many complex, i.e. composed, concepts (e.g. “GRANDMOTHERS 
MOST OF WHOSE GRANDCHILDREN ARE MARRIED TO DENTISTS” 
[Jerry Fodor’s example cited in Laurence and Margolis 1999: 36], CARS THAT 
HAVE BEEN SCRATCHED BY CHINESE WOMEN, etc.) lack prototypes. 
Secondly, and more importantly, for those complex concepts that do have 
prototypes, their prototypes do not seem to be constructed from the prototypes of 
their constituents. PET FISH serves as Fodor’s main example: the prototype of a 
pet fish (i.e. the goldfish) is totally unpredictable from the prototypes of pets and 
of fish, which presumably are respectively dogs and cats, and e.g. carp or 
mackerel, depending on the specific socio-cultural context. Fodor (1998: 107) 
emphasises that PET FISH/‘pet fish’ is not idiomatic, but is formed 
compositionally, as attested by the inferences from is a pet fish to is a pet and is 
a fish; this can be compared with the idiomaticity of ‘hot dog’ and resulting 
fallible inferences from is a hot dog to is hot and is a dog. To support 
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compositionality, prototype theories would have to propose a reliable mechanism 
specifying, for any given complex concept, exactly which features and exactly to 
what degree are contributed by each of the simple concepts. Fodor is satisfied 
that no principled account of this sort is attainable. 
 The above simple but still powerful argument does not, however, exhaust 
the relation Fodor’s theory bears to the topic of prototypes. The existence of 
typicality effects such as prototype enhancement, decreased reaction times, 
increased rates of spontaneous generation, etc.215 constitutes a conclusive proof 
that the formation of prototypes is a pervasive trait of the organisation of human 
knowledge. As has already been remarked, Fodor does not attempt to question 
this finding, and endorses the existence of prototypes. The resolution of this 
prima facie contradiction is instrumental in shedding light on Fodor’s theory in a 
more general context, helping one to avoid a simplistic treatment of this 
philosopher’s position. 
 Central to the understanding of Fodor’s theory of concepts is the fact that 
– in virtue of its being an informational theory, as opposed to inferential role 
theories – it allows one to make distinctions, on one hand, between concept 
identity and content identity, and on the other, between concepts and the 
epistemic factors related to them; distinctions that are not fully available to the 
proponents of IRS. This rather crucial insight tends to be easily overlooked when 
one intuitively accepts the standard perspective of the more ‘natural’ inferential 
role theories. On the different versions of IRS216: 
 
– concepts are individuated by their contents, 
– contents are individuated by the inferences they license (is a bachelor 
licenses is unmarried in virtue of the internal structure of the concept 
BACHELOR which has UNMARRIED as one of its constituents); 
                                                 
215 Phenomena discussed in the section 5.2.3.3. 
216 E.g. Block 1998. 
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– inferences, in turn, are epistemic, which, put simplistically, means that 
content individuation depends on one’s knowledge; in short, one can 
possess the concept BACHELOR only on condition that one knows that 
bachelors are unmarried males. 
 
On the view sanctioned by Fodor, however, 
 
– concepts are individuated syntactically (as symbols of the language of 
thought/LOT), 
– contents are individuated by their nomic mind-world relations (lawlike 
causal co-variation of BACHELOR tokenings and bachelors)217, and 
– any inferences one may be able to draw or any knowledge one may 
happen to possess with regard to their concepts – are entirely irrelevant to 
the individuation of either. 
 
In other words, on Fodor’s atomistic-informational account, no epistemic factors 
are content-constitutive. This, however, should not be taken to mean that 
epistemic factors have been totally eradicated. As observed by Laurence and 
Margolis (1999: 65): “[l]ike any other theorist, the atomist holds that people 
associate a considerable amount of information with any concept they possess. 
The only difference is that whereas other theorists say that much of the 
information is collateral (and that only a small part is constitutive of the concept 
itself), atomists say that all of it is collateral.” 
                                                 
217 “Given my view that content is information, I can’t, as we’ve just seen, afford to agree that 
the content of the concept H2O is different from the content of the concept WATER. But I am 
entirely prepared to agree that they are different concepts. In effect, I’m assuming that 
coreferential representations are ipso facto synonyms and conceding that, since they are, content 
individuation can’t be all that there is to concept individuation.” (Fodor 1998: 15; italics in the 
original, underline mine [SW]) 
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 Accordingly, since the nature of prototype structures and prototype effects 
is epistemic – e.g. what prototype one has for BIRD depends on what one 
explicitly or implicitly knows about birds – it does not affect content 
individuation. Prototypes, neither being concepts nor entering their structures, are 
merely associated with concepts in a way tangential to the individuation of the 
latter’s contents. In much the same way, inference is still possible on an atomistic 
account: it suffices that the inferences that are drawn in virtue of any information 
associated with a given concept are collateral and not content-constitutive. From 
Fodor’s standpoint, that red is a colour does not contribute to the meaning of 
RED (nor ‘red’); nevertheless, a reliable inference from is red to is a colour is 
still operational (in Fodor’s [1998: 110] words, “RED entails COLOUR”). Still, 
such an elimination of epistemic factors from the account of concepts has 
important ramifications that make it an open target for criticism, a consequence 
that will be developed further in the discussion. 
 
6.3. Criticism of Fodor’s conceptual atomism 
Numerous lines of criticism have been advanced against Fodor’s view of 
concepts, with scant agreement on the precise reasons of either the failure or at 
least inadequacy of his proposals. In my opinion, most of this criticism is 
misplaced: the arguments, while essentially correct, fall short of addressing the 
actual view of that author in its full sophistication, and so fall short of 
questioning it. In the present section, I shall argue that the most critical objection 
actually turns out to be the most trivial one, namely, that when given the 
appropriate exegesis, Fodor’s theory does not qualify as a legitimate theory of 
concepts. The underlying reasons, however, appear much less trivial, and can be 
traced down to a fault regarding one of his “non-negotiable criteria of a theory of 
concepts” (1998: 23–34), namely, the requirement of “publicity”.  
 
6.3.1. Radical concept nativism 
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Among the most far-reaching consequences of Fodor’s contention that concepts 
are atomic are those for the theory of concept acquisition. The natural account of 
concept acquisition available to the various versions of IRS involves the process 
of learning in the form of compiling the target concept from its more basic 
constituents. On pain of infinite regress, there must also exist primitive concepts, 
which, lacking any more basic elements to be compiled from, cannot be learned 
and must therefore be innate. Still, their number can be assumed to be relatively 
small. In contrast, conceptual atomism, by its commitment to the thesis that all 
(simple) concepts are structureless, must reject learning altogether, with the 
corollary that all (simple) concepts are primitive and thus innate. 
 What is controversial, therefore, is not the very postulate of the existence 
of innate concepts itself; rather, it is the scale of this nativism that has provoked 
severe criticism. To remain consistent, a conceptual atomist seems to be 
committed to the innateness of e.g. DEMOCRACY, CARBURETTOR, as well 
as indefinitely many other concepts, including those for future cultural and 
technological inventions. As noted by Laurence and Margolis (2002: 26; cf. the 
quote in 6.1.) such radical concept nativism appears to be preposterous and its 
extreme intuitive implausibility alone seems to merit its rejection. 
 It should be observed, however, that the above objection exploits our IRS-
informed presupposition that concepts are constituted by at least some of the 
knowledge related to them, and the implausibility actually regards the amount of 
assumed innate knowledge. The distinctions available to Fodor make the situation 
more complex, allowing him to claim that while concepts are indeed (in a way) 
‘innate’, their contents are not, and neither is their proprietary ‘epistemology’. 
This equals a departure from radical concept nativism for a more moderate 
position, one on which our strongly antinativist intuitions have no bearing, since 
– although remaining distinctly nativistic – Fodor’s present stance does not hold 
concepts to be innate in the radical sense. This is so because, on the present 
proposal, concepts are neither innate nor learned, but are activated by our minds 
‘locking to’ particular properties – a relation that cuts across the traditional 
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dichotomy, dividing the labour between ‘the innate’ and ‘the learned’ in a 
nonstandard way218. What is innate ultimately turns out not to be concepts per 
se219. Rather, it turns out to be a sort of species-specific system of category 
formation. 
 Central to the understanding of the issue of concept nativism is the 
doorknob/DOORKNOB problem (d/D problem; DOORKNOB being Fodor’s 
standard example of a concept), phrased by Fodor in the following way: “why is 
it so often experiences of doorknobs, and so rarely experience of whipped cream 
and giraffes, that lead one to lock to doorknobhood?” (Fodor 1998: 127) Despite 
its trivial appearance (and whimsical statement), the d/D problem is real, but its 
treatment by Fodor is obscure and calls for a careful explication. The d/D 
problem should best be understood by transforming it into the related question of 
‘why do humans categorise in the way in which they do, and not in any of the 
countless other logically possible ways?’ 
 Firstly, note that the d/D problem does not have an explicit linguistic 
component, i.e. it is not the d/‘d’ or D/‘d’ problem. Thus, it is not the banal 
problem of why it is the word ‘doorknob’ that, in English, happens to be the 
name for doorknobs or for the corresponding concept; as is well known, in any 
natural language this is decided by arbitrary convention. Rather, it is a problem 
of why, given that there are infinitely many ways of sorting things into 
categories, humans use precisely this and not other small subset of those possible 
ways. 
                                                 
218 „The natural, appalled, reaction to radical concept nativism is: <But how could you have a 
concept like DOORKNOB innately?> To which the proper answer is: <That depends a lot on 
what it is to have a concept.> According to the present proposal, to have a concept is to be 
locked to the corresponding property.” (Fodor 1998: 141; italics in the original, underline mine 
– SW) 
219 „What has to be innately given to get us locked to doorknobhood is whatever mechanisms 
are required for doorknobs to come to strike us as such… [T]he kind of nativism about 
DOORKNOB that an informational atomist has to put up with is perhaps not one of concepts 
but of mechanisms.” (Fodor 1998: 142; italics in the original) 
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 At this point, it may help to consider a quote from Jorge Luis Borges as 
commented on by Eleanor Rosch (1988a: 312): 
 
The following is a taxonomy of the animal kingdom. It has been attributed to 
an ancient Chinese encyclopedia entitled the Celestial Emporium of 
Benevolent Knowledge:  
“On those remote pages it is written that animals are divided into (a) 
those that belong to the Emperor, (b) embalmed ones, (c) those that 
are trained, (d) suckling pigs, (e) mermaids, (f) fabulous ones, (g) 
stray dogs, (h) those that are included in this classification, (i) those 
that tremble as if they were mad, j) innumerable ones, (k) those 
drawn with a very fine camel's hair brush, (l) others, (m) those that 
have just broken a flower vase, (n) those that resemble flies from a 
distance (Borges, 1966: 108).” 
Conceptually, the most interesting aspect of this classification system is that it 
does not exist. Certain types of categorizations may appear in the imagination 
of poets, but they are never found in the practical or linguistic classes of 
organisms or of man-made objects used by any of the cultures of the world. 
 
In other words, human categories, understood as the extensions of concepts, 
strike us as homogenous. Although humans could in principle classify things-
presently-categorised-as-doorknobs and things-presently-categorised-as-giraffes 
together under a single concept corresponding to a single lexeme (e.g. FLURG, 
‘flurg’) – in practice we do not. Such a pattern of categorisation, absolutely 
arbitrary to human beings, could in principle be entirely natural to a hypothetical 
but logically possible non-human mind. Conversely, it is only for human minds 
that doorknobs can come to form a coherent category. The fact that it is possible 
for humans to naturally find all these things and not others to be members of a 
single, uniform category is a fact about the innate, species specific makeup of our 
minds. Human minds, in virtue of being human minds, license certain patterns of 
categorisation while proscribing indefinitely many others.  
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 It needs to be underscored that humans have an innate spectrum of viable 
categorisation patterns rather than just one, rigid, universal pattern. As is well 
known, ‘the same’ experiential world can be partitioned into linguistic classes in 
distinct ways in different cultures. Compare the English ‘doorknob’ (similarly, 
DOORKNOB) and the Polish ‘klamka’ (KLAMKA), which covers both 
‘doorknob’ and ‘(door)handle’. As is evidenced by their functioning as lexemes, 
both those categorisation patterns are valid possibilities, latent in the innate 
equipment of all human beings. Again, this is opposed by ‘arbitrary’ categories. 
To give an extravagant example, a category could be formed composed of metal 
objects, trapezoids, inequities, and some (but not all) trips; it is a logically 
possible category that is nevertheless unnatural to human minds and 
consequently never used and never lexicalised. 
 To sum up, on Fodor’s account, the innate concepts should be construed 
not as concepts in the usual meaning, but rather as ‘the humanly accessible ways 
to divide the reality into coherent classes’. 
 
6.3.1.1. Role of ontology 
The crux of Fodor’s argument lies in transferring a large part of the theoretical 
burden from the problem of concept acquisition to problems of ontology. Fodor’s 
ontological claims exactly complement the innatist claims, being their mirror 
image. Such a strategy also allows Fodor to remain consistent with his realistic 
leanings. 
 Despite sounding intricate, Fodor’s claims originate at bottom in a 
relatively basic Kantian constructivist insight about the inherently two-factor 
nature of cognition220, in which the contributions of the subject are inseparable 
from the contributions of the object – if the two can be distinguished, it is only 
possible by means of abstract conceptual analysis, but not in practice. Similarly, 
on Fodor’s account reality exists not as pre-structured into ready-made entities 
                                                 
220 Briefly mentioned in the discussion of categories in section 3.2.2. 
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and classes of entities, but the structure in reality is only found relative to human, 
or humanlike, minds. Note that the metaphor is neither that of the mind 
discovering preexisting structure (naïve realism), nor that of the mind imposing 
structure on originally unstructured reality (antirealism). Doorknobs really do 
exist (ontological realism), but can be perceived and categorised as doorknobs 
only by human, or humanlike, minds – in virtue of their innate cognitive 
equipment, which enables human minds, but not other hypothetical minds, to 
cognise properties such as doorknobhood and form concepts such as 
DOORKNOB221. 
 The situation is further complicated by the fact that in addition to mind-
dependent properties, Fodor distinguishes natural kind concepts (based on natural 
kind properties). This distinction, however, is made on unclear grounds and is 
deeply problematic. For example, water sensu H2O is classified as a natural kind, 
but DOG is not (cf. Fodor 1998: 150–151; 137 [footnote 11]) – a decision that 
might strike as somewhat arbitrary. In any case, natural kind concepts form a 
clear minority of concepts in the human repertoire and are not in any sense 
crucial to the present analysis. Furthermore, the general idea of natural kinds (as 
having a special status secured by the authority of the modern natural sciences) is 
itself highly questionable, as was shown in 2.2.3. 
 
6.3.2. Problem of elimination of epistemic factors 
The elaborate and philosophically refined construction of Fodor’s argument 
commands respect and merits a careful analysis. This scholar’s account might 
                                                 
221 “The basic idea is that what makes something a doorknob is just: the kind of thing from 
experience with which our kind of mind readily acquires the concept DOORKNOB. And, 
conversely, what makes something the concept DOORKNOB is just: expressing the property 
that our kinds of minds lock to from good examples of instantiated doorknobhood.” (Fodor 
1998: 137; italics in the original) 
“Being a doorknob is just: striking our kinds of minds the way that doorknobs do. So, what you 
need to acquire the concept DOORKNOB <from experience> is just: the kind of mind that 
experience causes to be struck that way by doorknobs.” (Fodor 1998: 162; italics in the original) 
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turn out to be defensible and valuable on philosophical grounds. However, more 
doubts arise as to whether it remains similarly valuable from the cognitivist 
perspective. The gravest problem seems to be the simple fact that Fodor proposes 
basically no explanation for the phenomena of central interest to Cognitive 
Science – a criticism very close to those already raised against the classical view 
in sections 5.2.3.3. and 5.2.3.4. While Fodor has never claimed to have such 
ambitions, such a slant of his arguments results directly from other underlying 
assumptions whose importance can be shown to be overrated. 
 As it has already been discussed, for Fodor the epistemic factors (one’s 
‘knowledge’) should be excluded from a theory of concepts. This is possible 
because he proposes that firstly, concepts are not individuated based solely on 
their contents, but chiefly based on their nonsemantic properties, i.e. physical 
properties as symbols of LOT. Secondly, unlike in mainstream Cognitive 
Science, concepts are not ‘capsules of knowledge’. The contents of concepts are 
not constituted by knowledge associated to concepts, but rather from nomic 
mind-world relations (lawlike causal co-variation of things in the world and the 
tokenings of the concepts they fall under). 
 In Fodor’s view, the adoption of such a semantics is made necessary by 
the threat of holism (6.2.4.2.). That author perceives meaning holism not simply 
as a phenomenon to be explained, but as a severe problem to any functional role 
semantics – and especially inferential/conceptual role semantics (IRS/CRS), 
where contents are determined by the available inferences, which in turn depend 
on the knowledge associated with concepts. Since it is in principle impossible to 
show which inferences count as meaning-constitutive and which are merely 
subsidiary, meaning (content) depends to some degree on all possible inferences. 
To Fodor this is unacceptable, for the reason that the identity of any single 
content is distributed over the whole conceptual network and thus impossible to 
establish conclusively. 
 A naturally convincing reply is that there exist numerous examples of 
other systems whose elements are highly interdependent in the relevant respects 
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but nevertheless preserve their identities and are easily singled out from the rich 
web of interrelations because most of those interrelations can safely be ignored. 
Consider for example the distribution of gravitational forces in the universe, 
which is in principle influenced by all existing bodies with mass; however, one 
can neglect almost all of the influences and effortlessly identify the proprietary 
gravitational fields of individual celestial bodies (essentially the same point is 
made by Keil and Wilson [2000: 314]222). To Fodor, however, such a solution 
cannot be made to work, since it is too ‘loose’: with the phenomenon of holism 
taken into account, the identification of contents in IRS – and thus, assuming 
IRS, of concepts themselves – is always only approximate. Consequently, any 
two contents can only be determined to be almost identical (very similar), 
whereas Fodor insist that a successful theory of concepts must spell out strict 
criteria for two contents to be exactly the same; to him, the notion of content-
similarity is secondary to and dependent on the notion of content-identity (e.g. 
Fodor 1998: 30)223. 
                                                 
222 “All of the moons of our solar system are influenced in their orbits by all other masses in our 
solar system; but each planet and its moons form a coherent system distinct from any other one, 
constituting a system that can be almost completely understood at that level of analysis. 
Explanatory beliefs are not distributed evenly in the web of understanding. They form tight, 
richly structured clusters that then have sparse links to other clusters. Beliefs about the 
mechanics of solid objects, for example, are richly structured and tightly interconnected, but 
their connections to the cluster of beliefs about minds are comparatively very few. (It is, 
admittedly, awfully hard to know how to count, but by any metric that is devised, the difference 
would be huge.)” (Keil and Wilson 2000: 314) 
223 “In fact, however, the idea that content similarity is the basic notion in intentional 
explanation is affirmed a lot more widely than it’s explained… On one hand, such a notion must 
be robust in the sense that it preserves intentional explanations pretty generally; on the other 
hand, it must do so without itself presupposing a robust notion of content identity. To the best of 
my knowledge, it’s true without exception that all the construals of concept similarity that have 
thus far been put on offer egregiously fail the second condition”. (Fodor 1998: 30; italics in the 
original) 
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 Still, the rationale for such a strict demand can be easily questioned. As 
has been remarked several times: Fodor’s original motivation in this respect can 
be traced to a specific and overly restrictive condition of the 
publicity/shareability of concepts, motivated in turn by the efficiency of human 
communication and folk-psychological reasoning. In section 4.2.6.1. I proposed a 
different understanding of the public character of concepts, as logically 
secondary to and ontogenetically derived from truly public words of a natural 
language: it is the lexical labels of a natural language that are the only type of 
entity that is truly public, being type-identical for all subjects. With this solution 
accepted, the stabilising invariant dimension to human concepts is seen to reside 
in language (qua E-language) and no longer has to depend on the eccentric 
requirement of the (type-)identity of everyone’s mental representations. This 
allows for the reintroduction of some natural degree of variety between ‘the 
same’ concepts in different people, and so neutralises Fodor’s main objection 
against functionally based accounts of meaning. 
 To recapitulate, Fodor’s position is undeniably original and sophisticated. 
By rethinking and modifying his former theses, Fodor actually manages to rescue 
his theory from the most frequent accusation, namely that of radical concept 
nativism that would lead to absurd and unacceptable consequences. At the same 
time, Fodor’s position becomes effectively a philosophical account, of only 
limited relevance to the concerns of Cognitive Science. The cognitivist criteria of 
adequacy of a theory of categorisation are essentially epistemic, i.e. how 
knowledge associated with concepts is acquired and put to use, e.g. in abductive 
inference (this point has already been heavily emphasised, especially in section 
5.2.3.3.). As is rightly observed by Eric Dietrich (2001), even if one accepts 
Fodor’s policy of divorcing epistemic factors from the theory of concepts, one 
still has to complement the theory of concepts with a successful theory of those 
‘epistemic factors’, which then inherits nearly all of the problems interesting to a 
cognitive scientist.  
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6.4. Recapitulation 
The sixth, and penultimate, chapter of this book, treated the atomistic stance on 
concepts/categorisation, as expounded by its leading proponent, Jerry Fodor. The 
motivation for addressing Fodor’s claims in considerable detail was, beside this 
philosopher influential status, the challenge that it created for the basic tenets of 
mainstream Cognitive Science. I discussed Fodor’s position holistically, in the 
sense of tracing and reconstructing the interdependence of his views regarding 
particular problems such as naturalism, nativism, or language of thought. After a 
reconstruction of this philosopher’s intricate theoretical stance and the correction 
of possible misinterpretations, there followed a critical examination. 
 Although I defended Fodor from the most common line of criticism – that 
of radical concept nativism – showing his position to be philosophically well-
founded, I pointed out a different problem with his view on concepts. The 
rejection of functional accounts of meaning such as IRS, which are so central to 
Cognitive Science, turns out to result from a peculiar choice of his theoretical 
priorities – specifically, an overly restrictive commitment to the ‘public’ nature 
of concepts.  
 I hope to have demonstrated that firstly, such a commitment is ill-founded, 
and secondly, that it gives rise to the main weakness of Fodor’s account, namely, 
that the attempt to solve this mostly philosophical problem is made at the cost of 
the neglect of the cognitively interesting issues related to concepts. 
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7.1. Preliminary remarks 
In the seventh, and final, chapter, I conclude my work by considering the 
possibilities of application of the exemplar view to the issue of lexical-semantic 
categorisation. Having established the inadequacy of the major competing 
approaches – the classical view in Chapter 5 and Fodor’s atomism in Chapter 6 – 
I turn to their similarity-based alternatives, that is the prototype and exemplar 
views. As a necessary starting point, I briefly examine the relevant theoretical 
foundation, that is the very notion of similarity in which these approaches are 
grounded. My specific aim in this chapter is to demonstrate why the exemplar 
approach can be legitimately thought of as qualitatively different from other 
approaches under consideration, and secondly, to provide a strong footing for the 
claim – hopefully to be borne out by future interdisciplinary empirical research – 
that the exemplar approach shows promise for overcoming the diagnosed 
shortcomings of the rival views. Accordingly, the convention of this closing part 
of my work is largely that of research postulates and sketching out further 
prospects. 
 As should already be clear, this concluding chapter is not intended as a 
comprehensive analysis or even detailed presentation of the similarity-based 
accounts of categorisation. It should be kept in mind that especially the general 
topic of prototypes constitutes a diversified subject area, extending beyond the 
topic of concepts and important to many fields of Cognitive Science224. In 
particular, the prototype theory of categorisation, broadly construed, can be taken 
                                                 
224 E.g. low-level perception (see Dépy et. al. 1997). 
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to constitute the paradigm approach adopted in cognitive linguistics (though 
arguably not in Cognitive Science at large). 
 Because of the abundance and popularity of existing theoretical proposals 
built around the notion of prototypes (e.g. Taylor 1995, Lakoff 1990) 225, I do not 
discuss this topic in detail – only to the extent to which it is necessary for making 
the distinction from the closely related exemplar view. Note, too, that some 
versions of prototype theory developed in cognitive linguistics differ in important 
points from the basic description stated below – e.g. on George Lakoff’s 
extended version of prototype theory the prototype is no longer the organising 
element of the category and, crucially, similarity to prototype does not govern 
category membership226. Therefore, the focus of the following sections is on the 
general assumptions of the exemplar approach, the reasons for its limited 
popularity, the similarities to as well as the differences from the prototype view, 
the possible advantages, and the implications it carries for lexical categorisation 
and for Cognitive Science in general. 
   
7.2. Similarity as theoretical notion 
The prototype and exemplar approaches are frequently grouped together under 
the rubric of similarity-based approaches (e.g. Hampton 1998, Smith et al. 
1998)227. In concord with this denomination, both rest on the general assumption 
that categorisation is a function of similarity, i.e. that categorisation decisions 
                                                 
225 Important critical discussions of this topic are offered in: Osherson, Daniel, Edward E. Smith 
1999. [1981]. “On the Adequacy of Prototype Theory as a Theory of Concepts”. In: Margolis 
and Laurence (eds.), 261–278. [Cognition 9, 35–58], and Wierzbicka, Anna 1999. Język - umysł 
- kultura [Language – mind – culture]. Edited by Jerzy Bartmiński. Warszawa : Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe PWN. 
226 Summarised and discussed in Bombor (2005: 20–22). 
227 I employ the term ‘similarity-based approaches’ rather than ‘probabilistic approaches’ 
because it seems to be used more uniformly in the literature. The term ‘probabilistic views’ is 
used mostly in the same sense, to include both prototype and exemplar theories (e.g. Medin et 
al. 2001: 387); however, some (e.g. Murphy 2003, Nęcka et al. 2006) use it differently. 
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causally depend on the judgement of how similar the categorised item is to a 
stored representation (whatever the exact form of this representation – see 
below). The concept of similarity, or resemblance, thus becomes of central 
significance and requires a closer examination. 
 
7.2.1. Problems with similarity 
Similarity is a notion that has had an immense impact on the discussions of 
issues related to categorisation (Medin and Aguilar 1999). While constituting a 
potentially useful or sometimes even indispensable theoretical tool, it also evokes 
concern about the possibilities of its successful application in particular models. 
This is owing chiefly to the dilemma regarding the broad versus narrow construal 
of similarity, with the apparent lack of a productive middle ground. A natural 
way of understanding similarity narrowly is to treat it as perceptually driven, a 
construal patently too limited for most of interesting applications to 
categorisation (see below)228. The only viable alternative is to understand 
similarity broadly, with the inclusion of abstract, relational, functional and 
contextual aspects. Similarity so construed becomes more useful for theoretical 
applications, but immediately becomes sensitive to the difficulties with 
operationalising it with the rigour requisite for scientific discourse, or 
“constraining” it229. 
 A famous reservation very often referred to in the discussions of the 
validity of the concept of ‘similarity’ is the one voiced and developed by Nelson 
                                                 
228 The default construal of similarity as perceptual similarity is very common in everyday 
explanations of categorisation, consider e.g. the popular „a whale is a mammal despite its being 
more similar to fish”. 
229 “…[S]imilarity can be a notoriously unconstrained variable.” (Hampton 1998: 139)  
“The main criticism has been that the notion of similarity is too unconstrained to be useful as an 
explanatory principle.” (Medin and Aguilar 1999: 104) 
“[s]imilarity is too flexible and unconstrained to serve as a grounding explanation for 
categorization… [if] similarity is overly flexible and context-dependent, then similarity would 
be in as much need of explanation as categorization.” (Goldstone 1994: 126–127) 
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Goodman230 (1992 [1970]). This apparently multifarious problem proves to be 
fundamentally that of underspecification: any two entities can be construed as 
similar in some respects, e.g. in virtue of sharing an infinite number of features 
(be they irrelevant ones, such as ‘is smaller than a galaxy’), and judging what 
respects and what features are the relevant ones must circularly refer back to the 
notion of similarity. By the same token, Medin et al. (2001) observe that for 
every pair of entities A and B, they can be estimated as similar (or dissimilar) in 
one respect or another, and “a zebra and a barber pole could be seen as more 
similar than a zebra and a horse, if the feature striped is given sufficient weight” 
(Medin et al. 2001: 387). 
 Similarity, even in a general sense based on the natural language 
understanding, is a notion considerably more complex than it could at first 
appear. As is well known – but contrary to pre-theoretical intuitions – similarity 
is not symmetrical, but directional. Pairs of entities will be judged as more or less 
similar depending solely on the direction of comparison, i.e. A can be judged as 
more similar to B than B to A, sometimes considerably. Such a directional 
character of similarity was originally shown by the economist and cognitive 
scientist Amos Tversky (2004 [1977]) and later confirmed by a number of other 
studies (e.g. Medin and Goldstone 1995). Likewise, actual similarity judgements 
show considerably less transitivity (if A similar to B and B similar to C, then A 
similar to C) than could be naturally expected. 
 While similarity is most often conceptualised in terms of a two-argument 
relation (similar [A, B]), such a formulation leaves this notion grossly 
underspecified. This problem is discussed by Medin and Goldstone (1995: 83–
87), who – also building on Goodman’s (1992) insight – conclude that 
“[s]pecifically, the statement that A is similar to B in respect C is an incomplete, 
misleading analysis of similarity. At a minimum, similarity statements need to be 
expanded to include <according to comparison process D, relative to some 
                                                 
230 Henry Nelson Goodman (1906–1998), an American philosopher. 
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standard E, mapped onto judgments by some function F, from perspective G>” 
(note that this comment concerns similarity statements). Such a strategy of 
constraining similarity, however, has the price of introducing dangerously ‘loose’ 
variables: variables such as ‘perspective’ might in practice turn out to be very 
difficult to operationalise. 
  Furthermore, although the correlation between similarity and 
categorisation is both intuitively obvious and has been firmly established 
experimentally, still – as is well known since at least David Hume – correlation 
alone is no proof of causation, and the direction of the causal link remains 
difficult to show conclusively. In other words, similarity can give rise to 
categorisation, but the relation could run in reverse; and researchers such as 
Philippe Schyns (1997) or Douglas Medin (Medin et. al. 2001: 389) have 
repeatedly pointed out that not only can an item be categorised on a basis of 
similarity, but two items can be viewed as (more) similar precisely because they 
share a category label. 
 The above points illustrate the main challenges for the attempts of spelling 
out an approach to categorisation/conceptual structure based on similarity. 
Firstly, similarity has to be stated in some more tractable format. Precisely 
because the tools of classical logic are not naturally fit for the task of capturing 
the nuances of the notion of similarity, models based on statistical procedures 
must instead be employed. Secondly, if a feasible way of judging the direction of 
dependence between similarity and categorisation could be devised, that would 
strengthen the approach philosophically. 
 
7.2.1.1. Note: similarity versus ‘shallow’ perceptual similarity 
There is a natural propensity to construe similarity in terms of merely perceptual 
similarity, especially outward visual appearance, carrying the implication of it 
being a ‘shallow’ heuristic. This is especially visible in frequent juxtapositions of 
‘surface similarity’ with ‘deeper’ organising principles of a category (often 
suggesting a division of labour between the similarity-based ‘identification 
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procedures’ and the rule-based ‘conceptual core’, as discussed in 5.2.3.3.). A 
prime example is the principle of “original sim”231, whereby young children 
categorise – and frequently ‘miscategorise’ – items based exclusively on their 
outward appearance. Later in development children gradually abandon this 
strategy, being driven instead by other kinds of information, such as causal 
relations. For example, circus lions dressed up in tigers’ costumes are judged to 
be tigers by younger children (‘original sim’), but to be lions by older children. 
 Nevertheless, the tendency to constrain similarity in this particular way is 
unfounded and overly limiting. Similarity between two items can hold in virtue 
of all types of respects: there are no reasons why more abstract features or 
dimensions should be excluded from being taken into account (cf. Hampton 
1998: 138, 142–143). Particularly illustrative is the issue of categorisation of 
items other than concrete, material objects – consider for example detecting the 
‘instances of beauty’ or issuing verdicts in legal cases. These categorisation 
decisions cannot rest on ‘outward appearance’ and patently require other forms 
of similarity. Therefore, in this respect similarity needs to be understood in a 
general sense, as a candidate for a more universal categorisation mechanism. 
 
7.2.2. Ways of constraining similarity 
The theoretical value of similarity hinges on the way in which it can be 
formalised with the introduction of appropriately strong constraints. When this 
has been achieved, similarity can be successfully applied as a direct tool for 
modelling categorisation. Minimally, similarity could be a vital component in the 
models, if still having to be complemented with other principles; ideally, 
similarity alone could predict categorisation decisions. Presented below are the 
most influential approaches – of varied specificity – to harnessing similarity so 
that it becomes adequate for grounding categorisation. Note that except for 
overall similarity, the other methods listed below assume the breakdown of the 
                                                 
231 “Original sim” is a term invented by Frank C. Keil (cited in Hampton 2001: 16); see also 
Keil et al. 1998. 
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stimulus to be categorised into feature bundles, which makes them sensitive to 
the feature format problem (5.2.5.). 
 
7.2.2.1. Overall similarity 
It has been argued that judging category membership by overall similarity is an 
often used categorisation procedure, at least for perceptual categorisation. It is 
accomplished by a rapid response to a stimulus by essentially holistic processing, 
without – or prior to – breaking the stimulus down into separate features or 
aspects. Robert Goldstone and Laurence Barsalou (1998: 240–241) make a case 
for a wide application of undifferentiated overall similarity especially in rapid 
visual categorisation. A related strategy is categorisation by blurring, whereby 
one classifies novel instances without forming the precise schema of a category, 
but purely by comparing the novel instance to a known member of the category 
and blurring over the irrelevant differences. In Goldstone’s and Barsalou’s words 
(1998: 250): “[o]ne does not need to know what makes something a dog in order 
to categorize the neighbor’s poodle as a dog, as long as one knows that a beagle 
is a dog, and is able to ignore (blur over) the differences between poodles and 
beagles”. 
 Overall similarity has the major advantage of avoiding the feature format 
problem sketched out in the section 5.2.5. Categorisation by overall similarity is 
rapid and automatic, and takes place without recourse to explicitly coded 
features, so the problem of the linguistic format of the features does not arise. 
Still, the trade-off appears to be that such a strategy has little use in 
nonperceptual categorisation; consequently, the prospects of applying it to the 
study of lexical categorisation seem to be very limited. 
 
7.2.2.2. Typicality 
In apparent contrast to the predictions of the classical view – cf. 5.2.1. point a) – 
different members of a given category are consistently judged as differentially 
representative of the category to which they belong. This level of perceived 
This is a submitted manuscript version. The publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint the 
material in any form. Final published version, copyright Peter Lang: https://doi.org/10.3726/978-3-653-05287-9 
 235 
representativeness is extremely robustly correlated with several variables of 
subjects’ performance in category-related tasks (see 5.2.3.3.) and is measured as 
typicality, or goodness of example. In other words, category members are 
gradable in terms of ‘how well’ they exemplify their category. In the prototype 
view, the phenomenon of typicality gradient is taken as a clue to the actual 
category structure: typicality is assumed to be the similarity of an item to the 
category prototype(s) and, at the same time, to be the sole variable underlying 
categorisation decisions (the exemplar view sees the phenomenon of typicality as 
emergent rather than reflecting the actual structure of mental representations). 
Note that typicality so conceived remains an intentional rather than formal 
measure, itself in need of further specification or explicit coding. 
 James Hampton (1998: 139) proposes to treat typicality as “similarity in 
respect of those attributes which form the intensional representation of the 
prototype concept”; typicality thus becomes “…a constrained form of similarity, 
in which the respects (and their relative importance) are determined by the 
conceptual representation itself.” (1998: 139) Vital is the fact that while 
typicality assumes similarity as dependent on the comparison of feature bundles, 
the nature of those features is not prejudged: they may encode not only 
perceptual but also abstract characteristics. The exact mechanism of quantifying 
over feature overlaps may vary, as particular models will adjust the specific 
computations to best reflect the performance of human subjects. 
 
7.2.2.3. Family resemblance 
The concept of family resemblances was originally suggested by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1987 [1953]) as an alternative to the understanding of meanings of 
words in the traditional, essentialist spirit (see 5.2.3.1.). Rather than there being 
any properties common to all designata of a word, there can be found only 
overlaps of properties: “the various resemblances between members of a family: 
build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross 
in the same way”, hence the name (Wittgenstein 1987: 32). In the 1970s, 
This is a submitted manuscript version. The publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint the 
material in any form. Final published version, copyright Peter Lang: https://doi.org/10.3726/978-3-653-05287-9 
 236 
developing this inspiration, Eleanor Rosch hypothesised that the patterns of 
feature overlaps might be what explains both typicality ratings and categorisation 
decisions: the ‘best’ category members tend to have the most attributes in 
common with other category members while at the same time having the least 
attributes in common with category nonmembers (in modelling, attributes may 
also be given differential weighting according to their relative importance). 
Rosch and Mervis (1996 [1975]) found empirical support for this hypothesis, 
with later empirical work generally confirming the overall soundness of this 
conclusion232. 
 One rather important difference should be reemphasised between Rosch et 
al.’s treatment of family resemblances and the intuitive understanding of this 
notion. This difference consists in enhancing the basic intra-category dimension 
with the addition of the inter-category dimension: the exclusion of the non-
overlapping attributes, i.e. ones that are uncommon for other category members. 
Thus, high family resemblance scores, predicting both typicality and 
categorisation, reflect both minimised within-category differences and 
maximised between-category differences. 
  
7.3. Prototype and exemplar models of categorisation 
The prototype approach to categorisation/concepts arose as a reaction to the 
classical approach early in the 1970s. The main philosophical inspiration had 
been that of the Wittgensteinian ‘family resemblances’, while the decisive 
empirical contributions came from the work of Eleanor Rosch and her associates, 
already mentioned in 5.2.3.3233. Since the general topic of prototypes (prototype 
representations) is very extensively covered in extant cognitive-linguistic 
literature, I will not treat it at length here. Rather, I will examine its main 
                                                 
232 See especially the discussion in Murphy 2002 
233 Other key influences, especially the contributions from the logician Lofti Zadeh and the 
anthropologists Brent Berlin and Paul Kay, are discussed in Lakoff (1990 [1987]: 12–57). 
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theoretical underpinnings, and turn to highlighting the crucial difference from the 
exemplar view, focussing in particular on the advantages of the latter. 
The exemplar approach to concepts/categorisation appears to have been 
somewhat neglected in Cognitive Science, at least until recently. Although 
exemplar-based models also have a considerable history, dating back to as early 
as the 1970s (e.g. Medin and Schaffer 1978; cf. Medin et al. 2001: 379), the 
influence of the exemplar view on Cognitive Science has been relatively limited. 
This is especially striking when compared to the tremendous impact that the 
closely related prototype view has exerted in the areas of linguistics and 
philosophy; many important discussions (e.g. Chlewiński 1999, Fodor 1998) 
either ignore the exemplar view or fail to acknowledge it as a contender distinct 
from the prototype view. Reasons for such a situation include, but are not limited 
to, the smaller tractability of exemplar models as well as their natural inclination 
towards stricte perceptual categorisation, and will constitute a topic of discussion 
in the later sections of this chapter. 
 
7.3.1. What is ‘a prototype’? 
When reflecting on the notion of ‘a prototype’, one is faced with ontological 
problems along the lines already known from the discussion of the terms 
‘concept’, ‘category’, etc. That is, do prototypes exist as real entities in the 
subject-external world, as abstracta, or as subject-internal mental 
representations? If the notion of a prototype as a mental representation is 
accepted, there arise additional difficulties with the particular format of such a 
representation. 
 The idea of category prototypes as specific exemplars in the world (e.g. a 
particular individual sparrow for BIRD) must be discarded due to immediate 
absurd consequences: for example, it is unclear how one would establish a 
particular individual to be the best exemplar for each category, or how people 
could gain epistemic access to that particular individual. The externalistic 
understanding of prototypes as abstract beings is also ruled out in a work where 
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the fundamentally mentalistic perspective to meanings has been assumed and 
defended – for reasons discussed in 4.2.4. 
 The mentalistic reading of the notion of prototype again admits two 
interpretations: as a singular representation versus a summary one. Early work by 
Rosch favoured the first construal, i.e. of prototypes as individual best examples 
(as represented in the cognitive system): “[p]rototypes appear to be just those 
members of a category which most reflect the redundancy structure of the 
category as a whole.” (Rosch et al. 1976: 433) However, an interpretation both 
more popular and more useful for modelling takes a prototype not to represent 
any particular individual, but to be an abstract summary representation – formed 
by a statistical generalisation over the features of the category members and 
usually encoded as a list of features234. 
 
7.3.2. Categorisation by prototype 
The foundation of the prototype approach to concepts is the discovery of 
typicality effects taken one step forward – to the assumption that concepts are 
mentally represented as prototypes235 (or, more consistently with the terminology 
advocated in this work: concepts are encoded as prototypes, or concepts are 
mental representations taking the form of prototypes). Accordingly, the process 
of categorisation consists in measuring the similarity of the categorised item to 
the category prototype, typically achieved through detecting feature overlaps: 
sufficient similarity triggers the ‘member’ categorisation decision, while 
insufficient similarity triggers the ‘nonmember’ decision. 
                                                 
234 Accordingly, a trout can be said to be the prototype of the category FISH only in so much as 
it is likely to be judged a prototypical member of this class of objects, i.e. of fish. Still, the 
prototype representation of the category FISH is an abstract representation consisting of such 
(weighted) features as ‘lives in water’, ‘has fins’, ‘is slimy’, and so on. 
235 This is a ‘strong’ assumption. Rosch (Rosch 1988a, Rosch and Mervis 1996) stressed 
repeatedly that the existence and pervasiveness of typicality effects merely suggests, and by no 
means proves, that categories are represented as prototypes. 
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 James A. Hampton, one of the main proponents of prototype models of 
categorisation, describes the basic meta-model of categorisation by prototype as 
having three essential components: an intensional representation, a metric of 
similarity, and a threshold criterion (Hampton 1998). The intensional 
representation is a set of features – either an unstructured list, or a structured 
form such as a frame, tree, or schema – often with weights dependent on their 
relative importance. The metric of similarity is a specific mathematical 
mechanism for calculating the similarity of the categorised item to the above 
standard, i.e. the intensional representation, based on the number and weights of 
matching and non-matching features; the computations may also take into 
account the inter-category aspect (see 7.2.2.3. above). The threshold criterion can 
be conceptualised as the category border in the similarity space: it is a binary 
mark that, when reached or exceeded by the computed similarity rating, produces 
the ‘member’ categorisation decision, and otherwise produces the ‘nonmember’ 
decision. 
 
7.3.3. What is ‘an exemplar’? 
The notion of ‘an exemplar’ in the exemplar view is a non-obvious one and 
requires specification – much like the notion of ‘a prototype’, but in slightly 
different ways. Intuitively, exemplars are real-world countable objects or 
samples; however, not surprisingly, cognitivist approaches to categorisation 
assume exemplars to be mental kinds of beings: exemplars as representations that 
are stored in memory. Although there suggests itself the simple interpretation of 
an exemplar as a representation of an individual, this issue is more complex, as 
illustrated by the quote from Murphy (2002: 58): 
 
Suppose that I know a bulldog that drools a great deal named Wilbur… How 
do I decide, now, whether a friend of mine, who is complaining about her new 
dog’s drooling, has a bulldog? According to the exemplar view, I would have 
to retrieve all the dog exemplars that I know that drool (no small number), and 
then essentially count up how many of them are bulldogs. But in retrieving 
This is a submitted manuscript version. The publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint the 
material in any form. Final published version, copyright Peter Lang: https://doi.org/10.3726/978-3-653-05287-9 
 240 
these exemplars, how do I count Wilbur? Does he count once, because he is 
only one dog, or does each encounter with Wilbur count separately? Put in 
more formal terms, do I count types (Wilbur) or tokens (Wilbur-encounters)? 
 
It seems that ‘exemplars’ are best made sense of in terms of distinct memory 
traces. It can be assumed that every occurrence of an item leaves a separate 
memory trace; alternatively, people store only individuals, so that each 
occurrence of the same individual would not leave a separate trace, but update 
and strengthen the present one for this individual. In any case, instance-level 
information should be preserved in the system in addition to individual-level 
information rather than excluded, since it has been shown to exert influence on 
categorisation (Barsalou et al. 1998). Another key point is that each exemplar 
must appear with its associated category label. 
 A common spontaneous objection against the exemplar fashion of 
processing category-related information is the concern that it could place too 
much strain on long term memory resources; simply put, there may be no ‘room’ 
in memory to remember all encountered exemplars of all known categories. The 
idea of people being able to ‘remember’ every single exemplar of every single 
object and other conceptualised entity that they come across might indeed seem 
counterintuitive. However, such a scenario does not contradict what is known 
about the workings of the human central nervous system. Crucial here is the 
understanding of ‘remembering’: the exemplar view does not require that the 
experienced exemplars or instances be remembered individually in full detail, in 
the form accessible to later conscious retrieval; it stipulates merely that ‘storing’ 
an exemplar means each of them having some impact on the structure of the 
category. The increase in stored information takes place at an arithmetic rate, 
therefore sidestepping the risk of combinatorial explosion: the number of stored 
exemplars is large, but – given what is known about the human brain – not 
unmanageably large. The synaptic plasticity, both in terms of the creation of new 
synapses and adjusting existing connections’ strengths, is sufficient to 
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accommodate the consequences of an exemplar model of categorisation (see also 
Barsalou 1992: 27). 
 
7.3.4. Categorisation by exemplars 
The foundational commitment of exemplar models (such as Exemplar-Based 
Random Walk – Palmeri 1997; Generalised Context Model – Medin and Schaffer 
1978; or various exemplar predictors in Storms et al. 2000)236 is that of resisting 
the default ideas: 
 
- of abstraction of criterial features, 
- of reduction of complexity in category information, and  
- of creating categories as nonredundant representations.  
 
On this view, people store in memory all encountered instances of a given 
category to form an emergent representation that is distributed, collective, and 
heavily redundant. According to exemplar-based models such as the ones 
mentioned above, categorisation decision process consists in retrieving from 
memory a certain (potentially huge) number of candidate exemplars that are 
similar to the test stimulus, and classifying the test stimulus on the basis of its 
relative similarity to the exemplars from the various categories. This means that 
on coming across e.g. some animal, subjects invoke a number of similar 
exemplars, choose the best match (or a few closest matches237), extract the 
category label attached to the exemplar(s), and assign that label (e.g. ‘cat’) to the 
encountered animal. Needless to say, just as in other models of categorisation, 
this is assumed to be a split-second process performed in the cognitive 
unconscious. 
                                                 
236 Also based on the discussions by Storms (2004), Murphy (2003: 50–53, 73–114), and Medin 
et al. (2001: 378–392). 
237 As in EBRW (Palmeri 1997, Nosofsky and Palmeri 1997). 
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 Consider for example the Exemplar-Based Random Walk model (EBRW; 
developed over Robert M. Nosofsky’s Generalised Context Model, GCM) of 
speeded perceptual categorisation (Nosofsky and Palmeri 1997). In the model, 
exemplars are conceptualised as points in multidimensional psychological space, 
with their similarity (inversely) reflected by their distance in that space, i.e. the 
distance in the psychological space decreasing with growing similarity. Note that 
rather than feature checks, multidimensional scaling is used as a similarity 
metric, so that exemplars’ similarity on any dimension may vary continuously 
(exemplars being continuously more or less similar in any given respect, e.g. 
more or less ‘red’) rather than being a matter of a binary match/mismatch (+/- 
‘red’). On presenting the test stimulus (the item to be categorised), all exemplars 
stored in memory ‘race’ to be retrieved one by one, and their category label is 
read. More similar exemplars, being less ‘distant’, are thus more likely to ‘win 
the race’. The retrieval process continues until enough evidence is build – a 
sufficient number of sufficiently similar exemplars are retrieved – for the item to 
be assigned to a given category. Among the strengths of EBRW is its 
computational flexibility, which allows it to successfully incorporate the 
influence on categorisation of such cognitive factors as context, selective 
attention, and the recency of presentation, resulting in a wider scope of 
predictions related to performance in category-based tasks and thus yielding 
greater psychological reality. 
 
7.4. From prototype to exemplar models in lexical categorisation 
In the literature on categorisation and concepts (e.g. Taylor 1995, Chlewiński 
1999), the qualitative difference between classical and prototype models is 
typically heavily emphasised. With respect to this salient opposition, the 
exemplar view is normally grouped together with the prototype one: they both 
are similarity-based, and in lexical categorisation they are continuous with each 
other (as shall be seen, the distinction between prototype and exemplar models is 
not always easy to make). Both the prototype and the exemplar views are 
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strongly ‘nonclassical’; in contrast to the tenets of the classical approach (5.2.1.), 
they converge on the same set of alternative theoretical assumptions: 
 
a) category members have differential, graded status (either as members of 
that category or at least in terms of how representative they are), 
b) category nonmembers have differential, graded status: even the entities 
that technically fall outside the category borders can be rated as more, or 
less, similar to the category prototype or to stored exemplars, 
c) no single feature can be necessary for category membership, 
d) features by which people categorise are weighted, that is, they differ in 
their relative significance, 
e) category boundaries are fuzzy; categorisation decisions are a matter of 
judgement; they may vary across individuals and depend not only on the 
categorised item, but on seemingly external factors such as context, 
 
A) categorisation (qua category formation) does not capture the objective 
structure of reality, but creates such a structure that is optimised for the 
cognitive agent’s maximally effective functioning in the world 
 
7.4.1. Distinguishing exemplar from prototype models 
The above convergence, however, is motivated in slightly different ways for both 
approaches. In the prototype view, some of the assumptions may be taken as 
revealing the specific representational structure of categories, whereas in the 
exemplar view they arise as consequences of the categorisation mechanism. A 
good illustration of the difference is the crucial phenomenon of typicality effects 
reviewed in 5.2.3.3. In prototype models, typicality is intrinsically encoded in the 
structure of representation, as it constitutes the same psychological variable that 
is used for making categorisation decisions: typicality effects are a direct 
consequence of the categorial representation having a prototype format. In the 
exemplar models, typicality effects will also naturally hold, but for a different 
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reason. Exemplar models predict the efficiency of performance to increase as a 
function of the number of similar stored exemplars; more prototypical instances 
of a category are, as a rule, more similar to (a greater number of) stored 
exemplars of the category than nonprototypical instances, and, as such, would be 
categorised faster and more accurately, thereby giving rise to typicality effects. 
Thus, ‘prototypes’ will be emergent statistical artefacts of the underlying 
processing of category-related information. 
In the context of semantic-lexical categorisation, the distinction between 
prototype and exemplar models becomes even more elusive. The difference 
between an exemplar-based and a prototype model is very much reduced to the 
type of computational process – calculating feature overlap with many exemplars 
rather than a single prototype – as is comprehensively illustrated by the following 
passage from Storms et. al. (2000: 53): 
 
To summarize, in the context of natural language categories like fruits, 
vegetables, vehicles, etc., three different theoretical views may be 
distinguished depending on the levels at which abstraction does or does not 
take place. The first view assumes that no abstraction whatsoever takes place 
and that only memory traces of particular encountered instances are stored. 
Any category-related judgment is based on these memory traces, as no abstract 
information is stored with verbal concepts. The second view assumes that 
abstraction may take place, but only at a level lower than the concepts studied, 
that is, at the level of tomatoes in case vegetables are studied. The 
representation of the studied natural language concepts, like vegetables and 
vehicles, is comprised of lower level concepts like tomatoes and bikes, 
respectively. Finally, the third view states that abstraction (also) takes place at 
the level of the studied natural language concepts and that (characteristic) 
features of their exemplars are directly stored at this level. The latter view can 
be labeled the prototype view, and the first two views are exemplar views. 
(Storms et al. 2000: 53) 
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7.4.2. Distinctiveness and advantages of exemplar models 
As has been remarked before, owing to the major commonalities between the 
prototype and exemplar views, they are easily conflated, with the exemplar view 
typically losing its autonomy and being incorporated as a subtype of the 
prototype view. To a degree, this is understandable considering the well-
established status of the prototype approach (especially in cognitive 
linguistics238), and the relative obscurity of the exemplar approach. However, it is 
vitally important to appreciate the critical respect in which exemplar models are 
sharply distinguished from both prototype and classical models. This qualitative 
difference consists in the nature of postulated representation referred to above. 
Central to both classical and prototype view is the postulate of what George 
Murphy (2002: 42–58) names a summary representation, with considerable 
reduction in the amount of preserved category-related information. In contrast, 
the fundamental assumption behind exemplar models is the lack of an explicit, 
summary representation, which in a way ‘shifts’ the level on which the categorial 
representation resides one step ‘down’ – to the level of individual remembered 
instances. 
 The key characteristic is information redundancy, and the particular 
resultant strength of the exemplar view is the retention of a substantial body of 
category-related knowledge – especially in comparison to only skeletal category-
related information preserved by classical or prototype models. Thus, exemplar 
models best embody the cognitive mechanism postulated by Evan Heit and 
Laurence Barsalou (1996) under the name of instantiation principle – it consists 
in preserving rather than filtering out detailed information about individual 
instances. Instantiation principle has since been found to play a significant role in 
categorisation239. This is also partly equivalent to the incorporation of 
noncriterial, encyclopaedic information as inherently constitutive of 
concepts’/categories’ meaning, precisely as postulated in the cognitive 
                                                 
238 Cf. e.g. Kardela 2006a: 202, Kalisz 2001: 50. 
239 E.g. Storms et al. 2000; but see also Murphy 2003: 114. 
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conceptions of language. The exemplar stance also seems to be consistent with 
the way in which categories are put to use. This counts as an important 
advantage, in view of the repeated criticism of the rival approaches for treating 
categorisation as an end in itself and the consequent inability to account for 
category-related phenomena (5.2.3.3., 6.3.2.). For example, people possess 
knowledge not only of the attributes of a category, but also on its internal 
structure, including the correlations between the attributes; this supports within-
category predictions and inferences. The canonical examples here involve 
people’s ability to make the inferences that if a bird is large, it is unable to sing 
(Medin et al., 2001: 379), and if it has large wings, it is more likely to inhabit 
regions near the sea and live on fish (Medin and Smith, 1984: 125).  
 Exemplar models of natural language categories (e.g. Storms et al. 2000) 
assume the representations to be given as collections of features (“feature 
bundles”), making them partly vulnerable to the feature format problem (5.2.5.). 
However, their advantages also become clearly visible. Each categorial 
representation comprises x stored exemplars, and assuming that each of the 
exemplars can be broken down into a collection of y features, the distributed 
category representation effectively consists of the total of x * y features. For 
example, if the category A consists of 22 stored exemplars, and each of these 
exemplars consists – on average – of 6 features, then the total number of features 
in terms of which the category A is cumulatively represented is 22 * 6 = 132. 
Many of those features will of course overlap, being common to most of the 
exemplars. However, firstly, the ratio of recurrence itself conveys information 
about the feature’s importance for the category relative to other features, and 
secondly, the total number of nonrepeating features will still be substantially 
larger than for prototype models. Idiosyncratic features of seemingly marginal 
relevance that would be lost in classical and prototype models still reside in the 
representation and, though pushed back to deep background, can nevertheless be 
retrieved to influence categorisation as well as category-related processes. 
Moreover, information about feature correlations is preserved (such as is large - 
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is unable to sing for BIRD – see above). Those points are particularly significant 
if one remembers the dynamic character of categorisation and its sensitivity to 
relational and contextual properties: the inclusion of a broader knowledge base 
helps to account for this context-dependence. 
A final point concerns the relative unpopularity of the exemplar approach: 
as observed above, the application of exemplar-based models to semantic-lexical 
categorisation has so far been very limited, especially when compared with the 
very wide-ranging popularity of prototype models. Storms (2004: 5–7) identifies 
two major stumbling blocks in this respect. Firstly, instances of natural language 
concepts seem to have to be abstractions themselves (“what is an exemplar”), and 
secondly, the appropriate selection of features is problematic (“what are the 
relevant features”).  
While accepting Storms’s diagnosis, I suggest that this situation can be 
shown to have more fundamental basis, itself being another consequence of the 
refractory ‘feature format’ problem (5.2.5.). As was mentioned above, exemplar 
models have always had their roots in the area of perceptual categorisation, 
where they continue to thrive. The emphasis on the statistical and distributed 
nature of representation leads to heavy reliance on advanced computational 
procedures. While features and dimensions used in perceptual categorisation are 
much more amenable to purely quantitative treatment, for lexical-semantic 
categorisation this is much more problematic. In the case of lexical categories, 
some level of intentional description seems to be inevitable, which may be more 
difficult to reconcile with the inherently mathematical-computational nature of 
the exemplar approach. 
  
7.5. Summary 
The seventh, concluding chapter of my dissertation addressed the so-called 
‘similarity-based’ approaches to concepts and categorisation. I scrutinised the 
notion of similarity for its theoretical soundness and applicability for modelling 
categorisation. Sample ways of constraining similarity were concisely described. 
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Subsequently, I presented the basic assumptions as well as general operating 
mechanisms of both the prototype and exemplar views of categorisation, 
highlighting their commonalities, but also drawing attention to the key respect in 
which they differed, that is the summary versus distributed nature of 
representation. Briefly addressed was also the ontological/methodological 
question of the specific nature of both ‘a prototype’ and ‘an exemplar’.  
What I identified as the main asset of the exemplar view was the 
distributed, cumulative nature of categorial representation maximising 
‘instantiation principle’ (as opposed to classical and prototype summary 
representations maximising ‘cognitive economy’). Statistical generalisations over 
a large number of exemplars allow exemplar-based models to mimic the 
desirable characteristics of prototype models, in particular the phenomenon of 
typicality effects. At the same time, the principle of inclusion of large portions of 
noncriterial and seemingly ‘collateral’ knowledge brings the exemplar view 
closer to the way in which actual cognitive agents (humans) perform category-
related operations. 
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Categorisation may be the single most basic cognitive process in organisms, and 
as an area of theoretical inquiry, it is certainly fundamental to Cognitive Science 
as a whole. In the words of Lakoff and Johnson, “every living beings 
categorises”, treating distinguishable stimuli as equivalent in certain respects – 
respects important for the organism’s successfully functioning in its 
environment. Thus, categorisation truly underlies all cognition. At the other end 
of the spectrum, high-level cognition is organised and permeated by language, 
giving rise to mental representations that count, and can function as, fully blown 
concepts. 
 The study of language becomes particularly attractive when it is not 
practised as an isolated, purely descriptive enterprise; rather, its appeal is the 
greatest when it can be demonstrated to have wide-ranging implications for the 
study of the human mind. Half a century ago, precisely such was the motivation 
of Chomsky as a co-founder of the emerging science of cognition. Despite its 
evolution over the succeeding five decades (depicted in Chapter 1), Cognitive 
Science has preserved its standpoint on the phenomenon of language as well as 
the goals and methods of its study. 
 Precisely such is, too, the spirit of this book. Its main commitment is to the 
participation in Cognitive Science, a commitment whose theoretical 
consequences were spelled out and defended in Chapter 2. The cognitivist nature 
of this work consists in making connections to a larger body of interdisciplinary 
research: both in the sense of drawing from this research, and in the sense of 
yielding conclusions that, hopefully, might prove transferable and valuable to 
other fields within CS. 
 The theoretical achievements of this work present themselves as follows. 
Chapter 1 was devoted to introducing Cognitive Science in both historical and 
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contemporary context. Emphasis was placed on the current profile of this broad 
field of study, and the constitutive role of interdisciplinary collaboration. Chapter 
2 laid down the foundations for the mentalistic perspective that was assumed 
throughout this work; it also targeted polemically the influential argument 
against such a perspective, based on Hilary Putnam’s thought experiment. 
Chapter 3 systematised the definitions of the term ‘concept’ present in the 
literature, arriving at a list of fourteen features ascribed to concepts in a range of 
theoretical outlooks. It also examined the notions of category/categorisation and 
mental representation. 
 Chapter 4 contained a crucial argument regarding the character of the 
relation between concepts and lexical items. It was proposed that the term 
‘concept’ can be best made to work in the context of Cognitive Science when it is 
understood as a mental representation correlated with an entry in the mental 
lexicon. The above proposal was then substantiated by a survey of relevant 
evidence. 
 Chapter 5 consisted in a review of the historically dominant classical view 
of concepts/categorisation. Its subsequent evaluation generally reinforced the 
highly critical conclusions already present in the literature. However, in the 
discussion, one specific problem was suggested as lying at the heart of the 
problems of the classical approach, namely the frequent assumption of a 
wordlike format of component features. Chapter 6 brought a presentation of 
another influential view of conceptual structure, that is conceptual atomism. 
Arguments were supplied for the refutation of this view. 
 Chapter 7 offered a short examination of the underlying tenets of the 
similarity based approaches to categorisation. The discussion focussed on the less 
popular exemplar view; it was opined that this view emerged as best fulfilling the 
criteria of a cognitively oriented theory. Further research, it was proposed, should 
be concentrated on overcoming the technical problems with application of 
exemplar models to lexical-semantic categorisation. 
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 Two specific significant findings appeared to stand in certain conflict. The 
exemplar view, introduced towards the end of this work, was considered to show 
the most potential for modelling human cognition with respect to broadly 
understood categorisation. At the same time, it was also found to be vulnerable 
from the pervasive problem of the format of features (at least when used to 
model lexical-semantic categorisation), that is of dubious psychological reality of 
conceptual structural elements when rendered verbally. 
 A particularly interesting suggestion to follow may be to aim at a certain 
synthesis – one in which the statistical computational mechanism underlying 
exemplar models could be combined with a different, ‘non-featural’ 
representation format. Considering that the recently developed cognitive tradition 
in linguistics has made extensive use of nonpropositional (generally, 
‘nonlinguaform’) representations, such a direction of future research looks both 
viable and promising. 
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As a process/act: the act or process of treating some input as equivalent to some 
other inputs, i.e. assigning it to a category. Not to be confused with category 
formation/acquisition. 
As a theoretical topic: research area concerned with the problems of 
categorisation, category formation, conceptual structure, and related issues (3.2.). 
 
Category 
Traditionally: a class of entities.  
In this work: a discrete mental representation that makes it possible to categorise, 
as well as underlies a range of cognitive processes (3.2.; 4.2.4.). 
 
Cognitive Science 
Interdisciplinary science of the mind, thinking, perception, and related 
phenomena. Discussed at length in Chapter 1. 
 
Cognitive system 
Any information processing system of considerable complexity, either being the 
mind of a living creature or equivalent to a mind (in some relevant aspects) 
 
Conceptual structure 
1. A structure whose elements are concepts 
2. The internal structure of a concept 
In this work, usually in the sense 2. Whenever the sense 1 is intended, this should 
be clear from the context or, if not, is explicitly stated in the text. 
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Concept 
Traditionally: a non-sensory, non-imagistic representation.  
In this work: a mental representation that has a lexical correlate (discussed at 
length in Chapter 4). 
The following notation is used in this work:  
- (no marking) word – the extralinsuitic entity, or the ‘referent’; e.g. dogs bark 
- (single quotation marks) ‘word’  – the linguistic symbol; e.g. ‘dog’ is the 
anagram of ‘god’ 




The ‘content’ (of a symbol or mental representation) is a technical term for the 
equally vague common term ‘meaning’ (of a symbol or mental representation). 
 
Exemplar 
A singular mental representation of a category member: either of a subordinate 
category (e.g. APPLE to FRUIT), an individual (of a dog to DOG), or an 




A historical predecessor of the term ‘concept’, usually conveying more sensory 
and imagistic associations. 
In this work: used in the broad popular sense. 
 
Lexical category 
Traditionally: any of several grammatical classes of words; a part of speech. 
In this work: a concept, i.e. a category that has a lexical correlate.  
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Mental representation 
Traditionally: literally, mental representation, i.e. something that both is mental 
and stands for (represents) some other thing. 
In this work: any relatively stable mental structure that can be consistently 
redeployed in cognitive operations; as such, it does not need to have a 
repraesentatum in the reality external to the cognitive system (1.3.2; 3.3.). 
 
Notion 




In this work: a concept in the form of a summary mental representation, 
statistically generalising over the features of the category members 
 
